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1 Introduction 
 
Peter R. Rodrigues and Jaap van Donselaar  
 
Should politicians who make statements about ethnic or religious minority groups be 
answerable before a judge? Or is such accountability exclusively a matter for public debate? 
The relevance of this question also applies to political cartoonists, columnists and cabaret 
artists, and it has to do with an important social principle: where does freedom of expression 
end and the prohibition on discrimination begin? 
This border is not static; it changes depending on the time, place and circumstances. In the 
Netherlands this collision of basic rights is playing a central role in the legal suit being 
brought against PVV leader Geert Wilders. The suit was ordered by the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeals in early 2010. This case is of great importance in determining where to draw the line 
between basic rights in the Netherlands, but it is not all-decisive. Another factor to be 
considered is that the Netherlands has committed itself to certain international human rights 
treaties, and that it must comply with the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
 
Related to this discussion is the matter of searching for and then defining the border between 
victim and perpetrator in incidents involving racism and discrimination. In real-life situations 
the roles are easily reversed. Muslims can be victims of Islamophobic violence, but radical 
Muslims can also be the perpetrators of terrorist crimes. Sometimes right-wing extremist 
youths commit acts of violence because they themselves were once victims of violence at the 
hands of ethnic minorities. This double role is an especially salient feature in the 
aforementioned example of Geert Wilders. He is being accused of hate-mongering against 
Muslims, but he is also the victim of threats against his person that have required 24-hour 
security protection for years. 
 
It is partly because of the developments sketched above that this ninth Racism & Extremism 
Monitor focuses extra attention on victimhood and the possible role reversal that can occur in 
the case of perpetration. Another thread running through this Monitor is the collision between 
freedom of expression and the prohibition on discrimination. True to tradition, the aim of this 
Monitor is to follow and issue periodic reports on different forms of racism and the 
associated extremism and reactions to these phenomena. 
 
First we will look at the phenomena by themselves: how are racism and extremism 
manifested in Dutch society? This may involve looking at forms of expression, such as 
demonstrations, and at methods of exclusion, such as the use of violence. A fixed pattern in 
our Monitor research is the attempt to identify various kinds of victims and perpetrators as 
closely as possible. Perpetrators and victims can be found among the native Dutch as well as 
among ethnic minorities, and the latter can be divided into various minority groups. There is 
a range of responses to racism and extremism, including educational and juridical. Usually 
the nature of the response depends on the form of discrimination, the category of the victims 
and the background of the perpetrators. Some forms of response can function side by side, 
moreover, or can even reinforce each other. 
 
Conducting Monitor research and issuing periodic reports serves several purposes. First, it 
contributes to the insight being gained in the fight against racism, extremism and anti-
Semitism. In addition, the fixed structure and the periodicity of the reports results in an 
accumulation of knowledge. Finally, an idea emerges of how things will develop over the 
long term, and suggestions are made for future solutions based on experiences from the past.  
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The Racism & Extremism Monitor research project was started at Leiden University.1
 
In 1997 
the first report appeared, and so far − as of December 2010 − nine general, comprehensive 
reports have been published. Eight so-called ‘cahiers’ have also been issued: smaller research 
reports on specific topics. All the reports and cahiers can be found on our Racism & 
Extremism Monitor website.2
 
Since the fourth report (2001), the Monitor project has been 
conducted jointly by Leiden University and the Anne Frank House.  
 
In the current − ninth − Monitor, special attention is paid to: 
 – racial violence and the extreme right;  
 – right-wing extremist groups;  
 – the extreme right and the discriminatory identity of the PVV;  
 – Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands;  
 – Islamic radicalism in police practice;  
 – anti-Semitism;  
 – antiziganism;  
 – the consequences of stigma;  
 – anti-discrimination restrictions.  
 
The Monitor project employs a broad working definition of racism, comprising anti-
Semitism, extremism, xenophobia and Islamophobia. Discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality is also included, as is discrimination on the grounds of religion insofar as there is 
evidence of an ethnic component. This occurs, for example, in the case of personal spot 
checks carried out on the basis of a person’s ‘Islamic appearance’. Extremism is included in 
our research domain only if there is a connection with racism or interethnic relations.  
 
The Racism & Extremism Monitor is partly based on our own research. To a certain extent 
we are also dependent on data collected and analysed by others. 
Unfortunately, statistical data are not available across the entire expanse of the research field. 
Data collection in the area of Islamic extremism, for instance, is still in its infancy, at least 
compared with those older areas of Monitor research. 
 
Several different authors, both inside and outside the Anne Frank House, have contributed to 
this ninth Monitor.3 We are particularly grateful to the contributions made by Naomi 
Ellemers (professor of Social and Organisational Psychology, Leiden University), Colette van 
Laar (associate professor of Social and Organisational Psychology, Leiden University), Belle 
Derks (assistant professor, Social and Organisational Psychology, Leiden University), Mark 
Dechesne (senior researcher, Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Campus The 
Hague, Leiden University), Evelien Gans (professor of Contemporary Judaism, its history 
and its culture, University of Amsterdam). 
 
Monitor work owes its success to collaboration. This ninth report came about thanks to 
cooperation with a broad network of experts and organisations, both governmental and non-
governmental. They are listed here in random order: National Police Services Agency (Korps 
Landelijke Politie Diensten; KLPD); the National Expertise Centre for Discrimination of the 
Public Prosecution Service (Landelijk Expertise Centrum Discriminatie van het Openbaar 
Ministerie; LECD); the National Expertise Centre for Diversity of the police (Landelijk 
Expertise Centrum Diversiteit; LECDiv); Equal Treatment Commission (Commissie Gelijke 
Behandeling; CGB); Centre for Terrorism & Counterterrorism (Centrum Terrorisme & 
Counterterrorisme; CTC); the National Ombudsman; Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau 
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voor de Statistiek; CBS); the Kafka research group; the Discrimination on the Internet 
Reporting Centre (Meldpunt Discriminatie Internet; MDI); the Magenta Foundation; Art. 1 − 
the National Association against Discrimination; FORUM, the Institute for Multicultural 
Development; RADAR − the agency for equal treatment and against discrimination in the 
regions of Midden- and West-Brabant, Rotterdam-Rijnmond and Zuid-Holland-Zuid; the 
Amsterdam Discrimination Reporting Centre (Meldpunt Discriminatie Region Amsterdam); 
the Discrimination Agency for Hollands Midden and Haaglanden (Bureau Discriminatie 
Hollands Midden en Haaglanden); the Triana Foundation; and fellow researchers. 
 
Obtaining information goes hand-in-hand with the sharing of knowledge. The publication of 
the ninth report of the Racism & Extremism Monitor would not have been possible without 
the input of the partners mentioned here. 
 
Amsterdam, October 2010  
 
Notes 
 
1 See 'About the Racism & Extremism Monitor Project' elsewhere in this Monitor. 
2 <http://www.monitorrracisme.nl>. 
3 See 'About the authors' elsewhere in this Monitor.  
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2 Racial and right-wing extremist violence in 2009 
 
Willem Wagenaar and Jaap van Donselaar  
 
Recent research carried on as part of the Racism & Extremism Monitor project shows that 
acts of violence play an important role in the processes of radicalisation and deradicalisation 
of young right-wing extremists.1 Group violence was one of the reasons for becoming active 
or for remaining within a right-wing extremist group. At the same time, it was found that 
being a victim of violence often led to further radicalisation. Finally, in a few cases it was 
shown that the use of violence in one’s own group can have an impact on the process of 
deradicalisation. This role played by racial and right-wing extremist violence in processes of 
radicalisation is one of the many reasons why a systematic investigation of the problem is 
necessary. But above all, it is obvious that acts of racial and right-wing extremist violence are 
among the most serious forms of racism and extremism, and therefore deserve our attention. 
Since the mid-nineties we have been gathering data on racial and right-wing extremist 
violence in the Netherlands in order to gain better insight into this problem.2 In this ninth 
report we will focus on racial and right-wing extremist violence for the year 2009. We will 
also present an overview of figures and trends based on the gathered data. 
 
2.1 Definition and scope 
Preparing statistical data on racial and right-wing extremist violence is a matter of making 
choices. Many of these choices have to do with definition and scope, and they are often not 
easy to make.3 Opinions differ greatly when it comes to deciding what racial and right-wing 
extremist violence actually is. A considerable number of problems arise with regard to 
definition and scope, since violent incidents can have so many different aspects. A racist 
slogan written on the front door of a house inhabited by an ethnic minority family is an 
example. One person may see it as a threat, while another sees it as a form of vandalism. Yet 
another may be of the opinion that the incident isn’t worth reporting. Because the identity of 
the perpetrator is never discovered in many cases, and because information about such 
incidents is often scanty, it is difficult to assess the perpetrator’s motives and background. 
Perhaps there was another reason behind the graffiti action that was essentially non-racist. 
And because the perpetrator is unknown, opinions as to the seriousness of his act may differ. 
Another frequently asked question is whether the act was really a form of racial violence at 
all, or just a mischievous prank? 
Given this array of perspectives − known in sociological jargon as the different ‘definitions 
of the situation’ − we believe a broad working definition of racial violence is called for.4  
 
Thus violence is understood as:5 
 
behaviour in which one party wilfully harms another party, or threatens to do such harm, 
and in which this behaviour is mainly directed at physical damage to objects and/or 
persons. 
 
Following on this, racial violence can be understood as:
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that form of violence in which the victims or targets are chosen on the basis of their ethnic, 
racial, ethnic-religious, cultural or national origin. 
 
In addition to racial violence, this chapter will deal with violence with a right-wing extremist 
dimension. Right-wing extremist violence may be basically racist, but not necessarily. Right-
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wing extremist groups traditionally maintain a two-pronged enemy stereotype as a rule.7 This 
means they oppose elements that are either ‘alien’ or ‘hostile to the nation’, to use right-wing 
extremist jargon. In National Socialism from before and during the Second World War, Jews 
and Roma (gypsies) were regarded as ‘alien to the nation’. Since 1945, ‘alien to the nation’ 
has been extended in right-wing extremist ideology to include ethnic minorities in general. 
‘Hostile to the nation’ − from the right-wing extremist perspective − refers to the political 
opponents of the extreme right. These may be anti-fascistic activists and demonstrators, but 
they may also be politicians and government officials who are seen as part of the ‘system’ to 
be challenged. In short, right-wing extremist violence may be racist, but it may also be aimed 
at people regarded as opponents.8 
 
Our study comprises several different categories of violence. At first it might seem logical to 
choose categories of violence that correspond with criminal law, such as overt acts of 
violence, vandalism and assault. For our research purposes, however, such a choice would be 
insufficiently differentiated. Certain forms of violence are punishable under several different 
articles of the law. Our Monitor research includes a category of violence called 
‘confrontation’, for example. This refers to fights, or attempted fights, involving groups of 
people − clashes that can differ dramatically in size and ferocity. In addition, such 
confrontations are often characterised by great uncertainty as to the position of the 
perpetrators and the victims, the immediate cause and the chronology of events. A 
confrontation is a well-defined, recognisable and frequently occurring form of violence. In 
terms of criminal law, however, it could constitute an array of offences, depending on the 
exact events: threats, assault, overt use of force or, in certain cases, vandalism or even 
attempted homicide. 
In addition, articles of the criminal code are often phrased in general terms, making it 
difficult to clarify important differences. A swastika daubed on the wall of a synagogue and a 
swastika daubed inside a public washroom are both cases of vandalism in the context of 
criminal law. But because of the context, the perception of the two actions is entirely 
different. In our violence statistics, the first example is included (as targeted graffiti) and the 
second is not. 
 
Based on our findings over the years, we have devised a classification consisting of nine 
categories (see box). A few of these categories may require some explanation, which will be 
provided in the various sections: 
 – targeted graffiti;  
 – threats;  
 – bomb scares;  
 – confrontations;  
 – vandalism;  
 – arson;  
 – assault;  
 – bombings;  
 – homicide.  
 
Besides incidents in which violence was actually committed, our study also takes into 
account incidents in which an obvious attempt was made to commit violence. If a stone is 
thrown at the window of a mosque but the window doesn’t break, it is regarded as attempted 
vandalism. 
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2.2 Data collection 
To shed some light on our methodology, an explanation of data collection and analysis is in 
order. Collecting data on racial violence is not regarded as a primary responsibility of the 
government in the Netherlands, as it is in many other countries. For two years, the National 
Expertise Centre for Diversity (Landelijk Expertise Centrum Diversiteit; LECDiv), an organ 
of the police, and Radboud University have been constructing an overview and analysis of 
discriminatory crimes known to the police, including violence aggravated by discriminatory 
behaviour.9
 
This Poldis study includes figures for 2008 and 2009. 
 
The data forming the basis for this chapter are taken from various sources.10
 
The most 
important source is the National Police Services Agency (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten; 
KLPD). Data is also obtained from the news media, from annual reviews issued by the anti-
discrimination agencies and reporting centres throughout the country11 and from the Kafka 
Anti-Fascist Research Group (Antifascistische Onderzoeksgroep Kafka). This broad 
approach provides a more comprehensive picture than data from the police registries alone. 
We also now know from experience that data from several different sources have relatively 
few overlaps. This ‘proves’ the value and desirability of an integrated database that is based 
on several sources and not exclusively on data from the government. There have been some 
frowns of disapproval from the European Union regarding the absence of official statistics on 
racial violence in the Netherlands − statistical material generated by the government. We 
cannot agree on this point; we find that an integrated database based on several sources is 
better than a government database based only on government sources. It goes without saying 
that there is a role for the government in the creation of an integrated database. This year, 
data obtained from the police comprise 36% of our registered acts of violence. 
 
The KLPD gathers its own data from the various police systems. This involves data searches 
using a number of relevant keywords. The raw data are then handed over. After an initial 
inventory and selection of incidents for the Monitor study, additional information on a 
number of the incidents is obtained. In most cases this provides a clearer picture of the 
incidents. Almost exactly the same process takes place with data from other providers. After 
this selection, all available data are placed in a database for further processing and analysis.  
It should be noted that one event can fall under several categories. If a synagogue is smeared 
with graffiti and then set on fire, we register this as one case of targeted graffiti and one case 
of arson. Or if windows are smashed in the same mosque on two different days, we regard 
this as two cases of vandalism. Selection, classification and coding are done by us, not by the 
data providers. 
 
The classification of incidents is complicated somewhat by the available data, which tend to 
vary in volume and quality. In addition, opinions may differ as to the perpetrator’s motives, 
since in most cases the perpetrators are unknown. This makes it impossible in many cases to 
determine the motives underlying a particular action with certainty. Such a problem can occur 
even if the perpetrators have been properly identified. In such cases, suspects may deny racist 
or right-wing extremist motives, especially if they suppose that by doing so they can avoid 
more severe punishment. Confronted by these problems, we take a conservative approach. 
When there is doubt about the racist or right-wing extremist motives behind a particular 
incident, the incident is not included, even if it was delivered to us as such. The dataset thus 
assembled is checked for duplications and overlaps to prevent any distortion of the overall 
picture. The result is an integrated database for the year in question. The annual figures that 
follow are based on this database. Despite the advantages of combined data collection 
mentioned above, there are good reasons to assume that these figures are only a partial 
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reflection of the actual number of incidents of racial violence. 
 
The statistical data on racial and right-wing extremist violence often give rise to discussions 
because of the problem of ‘underreporting’: many incidents are not reported and are known 
only within a small circle, sometimes only to the perpetrator and the victim. In addition, even 
if the cases are reported, it is quite unusual for them to be registered as racial or right-wing 
extremist incidents. Only a small portion of the phenomenon is visible while a larger part 
remains hidden. Generally speaking, there are three causes of underreporting: victims fail to 
report the incidents so they remain unknown, reports are not registered or are registered 
inadequately, or registered reports are not included in the reviews that are given to us. 
 
The survey study of experiences of discrimination that was carried out in conjunction with 
the 2009 Racial Discrimination Monitor provides some results that shed more light on these 
three aspects and are useful in understanding the scale of the underreporting problem.12 
Among the categories of discriminatory treatment identified by the researchers there are three 
that are important to this chapter on racial violence: threats; vandalism, damage or 
desecration; and physical violence. These categories together constitute a picture of the racial 
violence that was committed − in this case threats, violence against objects and violence 
against persons − within a period of twelve months in 2008-2009. These results can be 
compared with the results from an earlier study conducted in 2004-2005. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 Percentage of Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans who had 
encounters with racial violence in 2004-2005, according to the categories of 
threats, violence against objects and violence against persons  
 
 
Categories of racial   Percentage   Percentage 
violence    2004-2005 (n = 348)  2008-2009 (n = 271) 
 
Threats    10%    9% 
Violence against objects  7%    10% 
Violence against persons  7%    7% 
 
 
Correlating these percentages with the actual populations of Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese 
and Antilleans in the Netherlands gives us an indication of the underreporting inherent in the 
figures in the following sections.13 By taking inventories of racial violence − that is, making 
up registries of incidents that have been reported or have become known − we arrived at 
numbers of incidents that ran into the hundreds. This survey study (study of victims), 
however, indicates that such incidents actually run into the thousands, possibly the tens of 
thousands. 
It stands to reason that these statistics should be treated with a certain amount of reserve in 
view of the type of research being conducted, where people are asked about their experiences 
of discrimination. The percentages are indicative of the proverbial tip of the iceberg, 
however, and of the iceberg itself. 
 
The Poldis study mentioned earlier shows the figures of incidents with racist overtones that 
have been reported to the police.14 These figures were taken from almost all the police 
regions in which cases of discrimination are being actively registered at the request of the 
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LECD. One problem with the two Poldis studies that have been published so far is that the 
information is reported in different ways. The report on 2008 includes a review of 
discrimination based on race or nationality and the kind of discrimination being perpetrated. 
Information can be drawn from this with regard to the number of incidents of racial violence. 
This information is not provided in the study on 2009, so the number of incidents of racial 
violence cannot be broken down according to type of incident.15 Comparison with our figures 
is therefore not possible. We are confining ourselves to a comparison with the data from 
2008. 
The Poldis study reported 128 cases of assault with discriminatory overtones in 2008 on the 
basis of race or nationality, as opposed to 64 cases in our own data from the same year. 
Poldis also reported 42 cases of overt violence against persons, which may have been 
counted as assaults in our method of categorisation. The Poldis study further reports 221 
threats (as opposed to 53 in our figures) and 69 cases of vandalism (as opposed to 19). 
The categories of racial violence that are used in this study are different than the ones we 
used, which makes it difficult to compare the results of the two studies. The Poldis study is 
based entirely on data from the police, while in our study the police are only one of the 
sources. It is striking that the figures in the Poldis study are much higher than ours. This 
means that the method of data collection used for our study suffers from underreporting by 
the police. One possible explanation for this difference is the search method used. For Poldis, 
the various police regions maintained their own registries, and these were delivered to the 
LECD. The data we received from the KLPD are collected on the basis of search operations 
in the national databases using relevant keywords, which may be less precise. Another 
possible explanation is that we are necessarily more conservative when assessing things than 
the LECD is. We have no knowledge of the data behind the Poldis figures or of the 
underlying police dossiers and we often base our decisions on brief descriptions. As a result, 
some of the violent incidents that we do not count in our research may be included in the 
Poldis study. It should be noted that the Poldis study also calls attention to the possibility of 
underreporting in its own figures: ‘So the figures and results in this report should be 
interpreted with due caution. To a great extent they constitute a reflection of the priorities of 
the various police regions and of the methods of registration, which means the results may 
provide a distorted picture of the actual discrimination taking place.’16
  
 
2.3 Nature and scale of incidents in 2009 
On the basis of our inventories, we have arrived at a total of 148 incidents of racial and right-
wing extremist violence for the year 2009. In table 2.2, the number of violent incidents is 
broken down into various categories. The totals suggest that a gradual drop has been taking 
place since 2005, with a sharp drop in 2009. 
A not unimportant comment should be made at this point. Judging by the Poldis study (for 
2008), it is quite likely that the inventory of violent incidents on which our findings are based 
has suffered from underreporting by the police. Then there are results of the survey taken in 
conjunction with the 2009 Racial Discrimination Monitor. These do not show a trend of 
decreasing violence but of stabilisation. 
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Table 2.2 Racial and right-wing extremist violence, according to category, 2005-2009  
 
Category  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  
 
Targeted graffiti 54  59  32  49  27 
Threats  73  56  49  53  29 
Bomb scares  2  0  3  0  0 
Confrontations 37  41  36  28  29 
Vandalism  42  31  34  19  34 
Arson   13  11  11  3  4 
Assault  70  60  57  64  25 
Bombings  0  0  0  0  0 
Homicide  0  1  1  0  0  
Total   291  259  223  216  148 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Targeted graffiti  
Targeted graffiti can be regarded as a form of vandalism − usually a light form − in which a 
racist or right-wing extremist ‘message’ is applied to a physical surface. It can involve 
anything from drawing a swastika on the wall of a public washroom with a felt-tip pen to 
large-scale racist graffiti on a war monument. Graffiti, especially in the form of minor 
vandalism, is an expression of violence that is relatively common. In this study only the more 
serious cases will be discussed: targeted graffiti. These are acts with an explicit target as well 
as large-scale graffiti. In the case of acts with an explicit target, graffiti may be applied to 
things owned by ethnic minorities, on houses of worship used by religious minorities or on 
the buildings of political opponents.17 In 2009, 27 incidents of targeted graffiti were 
registered, a steep drop compared with 2008 (49 incidents). The number of registered cases of 
targeted graffiti appears to have fluctuated more sharply over the years than other forms of 
violence, for which there is no obvious explanation. The actual practice of applying graffiti 
may increase or decrease, or efforts taken to investigate it may vary. But a copycat effect may 
also be at work in response to the media attention paid to a specific case of targeted graffiti. 
 
A few examples from 2009: 
− In Uden, swastikas were drawn in the snow covering the cars owned by ethnic minorities. 
− Pamphlets were pasted on the walls of a mosque in Twente by the right-wing extremist 
organisation Voorpost. The pamphlets included the words ‘No jihad in our street!’ 
− In Hilversum, two boys of 12 and 13 were arrested after having defaced a mosque and 
other objects with the words ‘Blood and Honour’, referring to a right-wing extremist 
group. 
  
2.3.2 Threats  
Threats are a common form of racial and extremist violence. After an increase in the number 
of registered threats following 2001, a decline has set in since 2005. The 29 threats registered 
in 2009 are a continuation of this trend. 
 
A few examples: 
− In response to the Gaza war between Israel and Hamas in early 2009, Mayor Job Cohen of 
Amsterdam received an anti-Semitic letter in which other well-known persons from the 
13
Jewish community were also threatened. 
− After the Amsterdam Court of Appeals had decided to institute criminal proceedings 
against PVV leader Wilders for violating a number of articles of the anti-discrimination 
laws, some of the people who had submitted reports against Wilders were threatened. 
− An Amsterdam woman who usually wears a burka outside her home says she has grown 
accustomed to people reacting negatively to her choice of clothing and she no longer 
responds to these remarks. One day she was walking down the street with her family. An 
unknown man spoke to her in passing. Because she and her husband did not understand 
the man, she did not know whether it was an insult or a remark that she should respond to. 
Her husband therefore asked the man what he had said. The man walked back to them and 
threatened the family with a knife. 
 
2.3.3 Confrontation  
A confrontation is often spontaneous, but sometimes it consists of organised street violence 
of a more or less racist or extremist character. These can often be described as ‘race riots’. 
Several parties are involved, often young people who get into fights at school or during an 
evening out. It is often difficult to tell the difference between the perpetrators and the victims. 
Until 2007 there was a steady increase in the number of such incidents. Since that year, 
however, a decline has been evident. This declining trend came to a halt in 2009, when there 
were 29 confrontations as opposed to 28 in 2008. 
− At a demonstration of the right-wing extremist animal rights group With the Animals 
against the Beasts (Met de Dieren tegen de Beesten; MDTB), who were protesting the use 
of circus animals, a group of left-wing animal rights activist also showed up to 
demonstrate. The object of their demonstration was not only cruelty to animals but also the 
extreme right. This sparked a brief but violent fight. 
− A racially tinged argument on Hyves (a Dutch social networking website) led to a real life 
confrontation. A group of ethnic minority youths went to a house where a group of native 
Dutch youths were staying. Violence resulted. 
− A tussle broke out between a group of neo-Nazis and a group of Moroccan youths. The 
groups were pulled apart by the police, but the atmosphere remained tense. 
 
2.3.4 Vandalism  
Vandalism is the deliberate infliction of damage with a racist or right-wing extremist motive. 
In 2009 we registered an increase in the number of cases of vandalism back to the 2007 level: 
34. 
− During the Gaza war in early 2009 a number of windows were smashed in a vacant 
synagogue in Oss. 
− An empty home intended for Roma was vandalised because no one in the neighbourhood 
wanted a family from that kind of background. 
− A series of acts of vandalism were committed at the construction site of a mosque in 
Oosterhout. The information board explaining the purpose of the building activities was 
fired at and the fence was destroyed. Building material was also taken away. The newly 
built mosque was defaced with graffiti and vandalised. 
 
2.3.5 Arson  
Arson is a serious form of vandalism. The number of registered cases of arson in 2009 
remained at the low level of 2008, with four incidents. 
− In Zoetermeer, a firebomb was thrown at the same mosque twice within a six-month 
period. 
− In Amsterdam a synagogue received a letter threatening it with an attack. A few weeks 
14
later an attempt was made to set the building on fire. 
 
2.3.6 Assault  
In 2009, the number of assaults with racist or right-wing extremist overtones dropped to 25. 
The number of assaults had fluctuated at around 60 incidents in recent years, which indicates 
a strikingly sharp decline. 
− The left-wing action group Anti-Fascist Action (Anti-Fascistische Aktie; AFA) had plans 
to hold a demonstration in Zoetermeer to protest the activities of a right-wing extremist 
group. The evening before the demonstration, members of the right-wing extremist group 
went to a youth centre that was known for its left-wing clientele with the intention of 
roughing up the individual customers. One member of the right-wing extremist group hit a 
customer on the head with a tile. The victim lapsed into a coma. 
− A man assaulted his ethnic-minority neighbour and told him that Muslims should leave the 
country. He assured him that that is exactly what will happen when Wilders comes to 
power. 
− A youth was called a ‘rotten nigger’ by four youths in Lonsdale clothing and then beaten. 
  
2.4 Trends 
In this section we will look at the most salient developments. 
 
2.4.1 Sharp decline in incidence of violence  
The most striking trend is the sharp decline in the number of violent incidents with racial or 
right-wing extremist motives to a total of 148. This decline is a continuation of the downward 
trend that began in 2005 and is also a ‘historic’ low point, the lowest since 1992 when we 
began collecting violence statistics. But as already noted, findings from other studies do not 
corroborate this decrease. 
There is no easy explanation for the decline. Developments in the identification of the 
perpetrators of right-wing extremist and racial violence may provide a few explanations, 
however. 
 
2.4.2 Perpetrators  
Writing about the perpetrators of racial violence is a complicated business. Most of the cases 
of racial and right-wing extremist violence are never solved, because solving a case involves 
the uncovering of the identity of a perpetrator. Additional information about the offender(s) 
can also be distilled from the registration of an incident. A victim of an assault, for example, 
will be able to supply a lot of information about the offender or offenders without this 
necessarily resulting in such a clear identification that investigation and arrest are possible. 
So the notion of ‘known perpetrator’ is rather elastic. This means that even unsolved cases 
often have a great deal to tell us about the role of the perpetrator. 
 
Sometimes we can tell whether the perpetrator of a registered act of violence was motivated 
by right-wing extremist sympathies by looking at his background. The total number of violent 
incidents in 2009 in which right-wing extremist involvement has been confirmed is 34. This 
is a decrease from the previous year, when there were 54 cases of right-wing extremist 
involvement. It means that after years of increasing right-wing extremist violence, a decrease 
has occurred for the first time. 
The terms ‘right-wing extremist involvement’ and ‘right-wing extremist violence’ require 
some explanation. They assume an involvement in right-wing extremist organisations which 
is by no means indicated in every case. Because many cases are never solved, we can only 
speculate on the role of right-wing extremist organisations. One thing is clear, however: in 
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only a fraction of the cases can a link be made between the committing of racist acts and the 
extreme right. The demonstrable relationship is usually indirect: while the offence cannot be 
attributed to any particular organisation, it can be attributed to persons who in some way are 
part of that organisation. There is no consensus as to the level of involvement of right-wing 
extremist groups in racial violence. It is all a matter of perception and definition. Are we 
looking at individual perpetrators? At the motives? At the impact? At ideological ties? At the 
degree of organisation? Or are we looking at what the victims perceive? 
Right-wing extremist violence may be racially motivated, but not necessarily. A distinction 
can be made between racial violence with right-wing extremist motives and right-wing 
extremist violence that is not racist. As far as the latter is concerned, 22 such cases were 
registered in 2009, which is also a drop in relation to the previous year. A few examples were 
given in section 2.3. Except for these cases, the remaining violence in 2009 can be qualified 
as racist. This brings the total number of cases of racial violence in 2009 to 126. 
This decline in right-wing extremist violence may be related to the internal problems 
occurring within a number of right-wing extremist groups and the drop in the number of 
right-wing extremist street activists in 2009 (see chapter 3, ‘Right-wing extremist groups’). 
This may also partly explain the decline in the total number of violent incidents. 
 
Another phenomenon that has frequently been linked to right-wing extremist and racial 
violence is known as the Lonsdale problem.18 In the 1990s, a youth culture known as the 
‘gabbers’ grew out of the popular gabberhouse (or hardcore) style of music. Over the past 
decade that culture has undergone a revival, reaching its high point in the period 2004/2005. 
At that time there were around 100,000 youngsters involved in this youth culture.19 A 
minority of them − probably a few thousand − held racist and sometimes right-wing extremist 
views.20 During that period the Lonsdale problem was reflected in our registration of violent 
incidents. The number of incidents involving Lonsdale youths increased at first, with the 
growth in the number of confrontations being most striking.21  
Starting in 2006 a decline was observed in the number of incidents in which Lonsdale youths 
were involved. In 2009 the number fell to two incidents, from 21 in 2008 and 44 in 2007. 
There are a number of possible explanations to account for this decline. The gabber and 
hardcore youth culture has decreased in popularity and size over the past period. Naturally 
this decrease in popularity also had an impact on the number of Lonsdale youths, who are 
associated with this youth culture. That could be one explanation for the decline. 
But other factors may also play a role. Gabbers today have a less clearly recognisable 
clothing style, the Lonsdale clothing has as good as disappeared within these circles. It may 
be that because of this lack of external identifying features, fewer fights and confrontations 
are arising between Lonsdale youths and rival ethnic minority groups. Frequently it was the 
recognisable appearance of Lonsdale youths that contributed to the escalations of quarrels, 
since the public associated that appearance with right-wing extremist or racist ideas.22
 
 
The discernible drop in the number of right-wing extremist perpetrators and the drop in the 
number of incidents involving Lonsdale youths seem in part to explain the decrease in the 
total number of violent incidents with right-wing extremist overtones. 
 
In addition to their backgrounds (right-wing extremist or not), the ethnicity of perpetrators of 
racial violence is also of importance. Racial violence can be committed by native Dutchmen 
as well as by ethnic minorities. In 81 cases in the 2009 inventory there was enough 
information available on the ethnic identity of the suspected perpetrators to express it in 
numbers: in 70 cases the perpetrators were native Dutch and in 11 cases ethnic minorities. In 
2008 this was 52 cases of native Dutch perpetrators and 21 cases of ethnic minority 
perpetrators. In the matter of anti-Semitic violence, we found an ethnic minority perpetrator 
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in only one incident in 2009. 
 
2.4.3 Victims and targets  
‘Victimhood’ is a collective term in which finer distinctions can be useful. So it is relevant to 
distinguish between violence aimed at things and violence aimed at people. 
Violence aimed at things includes (religious) buildings, objects that serve as political 
symbols, such as monuments and war cemeteries, as well as the property of particular 
individuals, such as ethnic minorities. Violence aimed at people concerns people who have 
been chosen as targets because of their ethnic, racial, national or religious background. 
Examples are people of foreign − or Dutch − origin, refugees, Muslims or Jews. Right-wing 
extremist actions are also aimed at public personalities. These might be persons who are 
chosen as targets because of their function, office, their activities or the positions they take, 
such as politicians, critical journalists or left-wing activists.  
 
As we can see in table 2.3, a decline is especially evident in violence against persons. 
Violence against objects was the same in 2009 as it was the year before. That is a striking 
deviation from the trend because for years we saw a decline in the number of incidents aimed 
at objects and an increase in the violence against persons. 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Violence against persons and objects, 2008-2009  
 
    2008  2009  
 
Against objects  64  64 
Against persons  152  82 
Mixed or unspecified  0  0 
Total    216  148 
 
 
One relevant question has to do with what might be called the ‘ethnic direction’ of racial 
violence. There are two developments that stand out in table 2.4. The first is the slight rise in 
the number of anti-Semitic incidents, after a number of years of decline in this category. In 
this regard it should be noted that more than half the incidents (11 of the 18) took place in the 
first quarter of 2009. This is probably a reflection of the social commotion regarding the war 
between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.  
A second striking development is the sudden and substantial drop in violence against 
Muslims. In previous years, the level of anti-Islamic violence rose every year. 
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Table 2.4 Racial violence according to ‘ethnic direction’ and categories of incidents, 
2008-2009  
 
 Anti- 
Semitic 
Anti- 
Islam 
Anti- 
refugee 
Anti- 
‘white’ 
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Targeted graffiti 9 2 24 18 0 0 0 0
Threats 1 3 24 10 0 1 2 0
Bomb scares 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Confrontation 0 0 7 3 0 0 1 2
Vandalism 1 10 13 12 0 0 0 0
Arson 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
Assault 2 1 19 7 0 1 6 2
Bombings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Homicide 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 14 18 89 52 0 2 9 4
 
 
 
2.4.4 Possession of weapons  
Since 2005 we have also been registering possession of weapons in the context of right-wing 
extremism, in addition to violence. In 2007 the AIVD (General Intelligence and Security 
Service) noted the following:23 
 
‘Although there is a certain fascination with weapons and violence within right-wing extremist 
circles, there is no indication that weapons are being obtained with the express purpose of using 
them against anti-fascists or other perceived political opponents. The possession of weapons 
within the right-wing extremist scene in the Netherlands is of great symbolic value more than 
anything else. There is no evidence of a development of right-wing extremist terrorism.’ 
 
As far as we have been able to observe, these weapons are not often used in committing acts 
of right-wing extremist violence. It is not clear how widespread the possession of weapons is 
among right-wing extremist activists. As long as the weapons are not used, most of the 
incidents refer to accidental discoveries on the part of the police. 
 
 
 
Table 2.5 Possession of weapons by the extreme right, 2005-2009  
 
2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  
5  6  15  8  10 
 
      
A few examples:  
− A group of 15 neo-Nazis were causing trouble in the downtown area of a Dutch city. One 
of them was caught urinating in public, for which he was fined and searched. He was 
found to be carrying a blackjack. 
− Several different suspects were arrested for planning to blow up a mosque. They were 
found to be in possession of materials that could be used to cause an explosion. The 
suspects had nationalistic tattoos. 
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− An off-duty police officer ran into a group of right-wing extremists. One of them aimed an 
air gun at the officer. After the office had warned his colleagues, the right-wing extremists 
were arrested. 
  
2.5 Conclusion 
The number of violent incidents with racial or right-wing extremist overtones has never been 
so low in the history of our Monitor research project. The continuing decrease in the number 
of incidents since 2005 to the present 148 is quite striking in this regard. 
 
One explanation for this decline may lie in the changes that have taken place in the potential 
groups of perpetrators of right-wing extremist and racial violence. In this chapter we drew 
attention to a drop in the number of violent incidents with right-wing extremist motives. 
There may be a connection here with the sharp decrease in the number of right-wing 
extremist street activists during the same period. And fewer activists mean less violence. 
Another partial explanation is the almost total disappearance of the Lonsdale youth problem. 
Over the past ten years, Lonsdale youth were responsible for a substantial number of violent 
incidents, mainly confrontations. Now that this youth culture has largely disappeared, the 
number of violent offences associated with it has also decreased. Obviously this is another 
case of a cause-and-effect relationship. 
 
When we look at the victims of racial violence, we are struck by the decrease in the violence 
against Muslims and Muslim targets − although it ought to be noted that this is still the 
largest category of victims. 
 
In closing, the following and not unimportant comment should be made. Although our 
research indicates a decrease in the number of violent incidents, two other studies have been 
conducted from which quite different results can be deduced. An examination of the Poldis 
study (for 2008) suggests that the findings on which our own inventory of violent incidents is 
based may suffer from underreporting within the police force. Then there are the results of 
the survey that was carried out in connection with the 2009 Racial Discrimination Monitor. 
These do not indicate a trend of decreasing violence but rather a stabilisation. Because of the 
competing results of these studies, the question of the scale of racial violence in the 
Netherlands cannot be satisfactorily answered. 
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3 Right-wing extremist groups 
 
Willem Wagenaar  
 
Since before the Second World War, classic right-wing extremist groups have been an almost 
uninterrupted presence in the Netherlands.1 But around the time of the millennium, the 
classical right-wing extremist parties, such as the Centre Democrats, dropped out of the 
picture for the most part. 
At that point, new political parties emerged such as the Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn; 
LPF) and the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid; PVV), parties that were frequently 
associated with right-wing extremism.2 Like the classical right-wing extremist parties, these 
parties are opposed to the multicultural society and deliver their political message in a 
provocative way. One obvious difference between them, however, is that the new parties are 
not products of a right-wing extremist tradition. Another difference is that they invoke the 
freedom of expression much more than the classical right-wing groups ever did. What they 
represent, therefore, is a new form of right-wing extremism: a new extreme right.3 
 
The subject of this chapter are the classical right-wing extremist groups. The PVV, a party of 
the new extreme right, will be discussed in chapter 4. 
First I will summarise a few important developments that took place within the classical 
right-wing extremist groups in the period 2009-2010. Then I will address two themes in two 
separate sections: right-wing extremist street activist in the Netherlands and trans-border 
activism. In the interest of readability I will not keep referring to my subject as classical 
right-wing extremism but simply as right-wing extremism. When discussing representatives 
of the new movement, I will explicitly speak of the new extreme right. 
 
3.1 Overview, 2009-2010 
In this section I will briefly review a few of the relevant events that have taken place since the 
eighth Monitor report was published in late 2008. 
 
3.1.1 Elections  
Three elections were held in the Netherlands during the past Monitor period: the European 
elections in 2009 and the municipal elections in March 2010, followed three months later by 
the parliamentary elections. In these elections most of the attention went to participation by 
the new extreme right PVV and the good results it achieved. Participation by other right-wing 
extremist parties in these elections was modest. No classical right-wing extremist party has 
been represented in the Dutch parliament since 1998, and no such party has ever won a seat 
in the European Parliament. 
In the recent European and parliamentary elections, only the Netherlands People’s Union 
(Nederlandse Volks-Unie; NVU) could have participated, theoretically speaking; no other 
classical right-wing extremist party exists at the moment. But that party’s degree of 
organisation and small electoral base stand in the way of electoral success at the national 
level. In the almost four decades of its existence the NVU has never been able to win a single 
seat, so neither it nor any other classical right-wing extremist party participated in the 
national or the European elections. 
Things were different in the 2010 municipal elections. The NVU was present at the polls in a 
number of towns and cities, along with other right-wing extremist parties: the Free Utrecht 
Party (Partij Vrij Utrecht; PVU) and the Centre Democrats (Centrum Democraten) of 
Gelderland.4 None of these parties managed to win a seat, however. 
These results were not surprising. Only once since 1998 has a right-wing extremist party 
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managed to win a seat in a municipal election. New Right (Nieuw Rechts) gained two seats in 
a Rotterdam district council in 2002, but it never happened again.5 
 
In the last municipal elections there were indications that attitudes had changed with regard to 
the participation of the far right. In the recent past, parties like the NVU had often been 
barred from taking part in pre-election activities such as debates and election markets. The 
local governing council, election organisers and action groups would make sure that such 
parties did not have the same chance that other parties had to present their platform. It was 
argued that because of their extremist message these parties had placed themselves outside 
the democratic process. That debate has subsided for the most part. Now it is taken for 
granted that right-wing extremist parties should also be allowed to participate in activities 
such as debates and election markets. Only in Heerlen was the NVU barred from taking part 
in an election debate in 2010.6 Hardly a word of protest against the participation of right-wing 
extremist parties was raised anywhere else. 
Evidently, being able to freely take part in campaign activities did not result in more votes. 
 
3.1.2 Developments on the internet 
Most right-wing extremist groups make use of the internet, mainly to create and maintain 
their own websites, which serve as their digital display as well as a sounding board for their 
own rank and file. More and more possibilities in the realm of digital communication have 
been developed in recent years, and several right-wing extremist groups have availed 
themselves of these innovations. A right-wing extremist radio station, Radio Rapaille, has 
been set up by groups allied with the organisation Voorpost. This station broadcasts 
continuously via the internet.7 The range of programmes is varied. There are several music 
programmes aimed at different youth cultures as well as informative programmes with news 
and reports on right-wing extremism in the Netherlands and Flanders. But there are also 
sports programmes and features on modern paganism, for example. 
 
Other interactive possibilities on the internet are also being exploited. Social networking 
websites like Hyves, YouTube and Facebook are popular among individual right-wing 
extremists, but they are also used as platforms for right-wing extremist groups.8 
The discussion forum, one of the oldest interactive features on the internet, is still important. 
A few groups have their own forums, some of them closed to the general public. But more 
important − at least larger in scale and number of posts − are the various independent right-
wing extremist forums. The most well-known is the American Stormfront forum, with a large 
Dutch-Flemish section. Since 2001, a wide variety of discussions have been carried on on this 
forum by right-wing extremists from several groups. The messages posted there are also very 
diverse, although the majority have an overtly right-wing extremist content and frequently 
seem to exceed the bounds of the legally permissible. In 2009, two persons were summoned 
to appear in court in Amsterdam on account of their activities on the Stormfront forum. One 
of them was suspected of posting various anti-Semitic messages on Stormfront and of making 
threats. The second person was the moderator of the Dutch forum. He was held responsible 
for the placement of the messages by the first suspect, since he had allowed them to be posted 
and did not remove them. The Amsterdam court found the poster of the messages guilty. His 
postings were unquestionably punishable. The moderator, however, was acquitted. The court 
found that evidence of his responsibility for the placement of the messages was insufficient.9 
A number of Stormfront posters were subjected to a period of extensive investigation, but it 
became apparent that this full-scale criminal prosecution was only partially successful.10 On 
the Stormfront forum itself, however, the effect of the prosecution was quite noticeable. In 
2007 the police conducted two house searches in connection with this investigation, in the 
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home of a former moderator and the home of the only moderator still active. No Dutch right-
wing extremist has dared to moderate the forum since then out of fear of being held 
responsible for the discussions on Stormfront. The job was taken over by an American who 
was seldom present and who had only a flimsy grasp of the Dutch language. This meant that 
discussions frequently got terribly out of hand. There were quarrels, abusive language and 
threats, much to the detriment of the forum’s popularity in recent years. In late 2009 a 
prominent Voorpost follower issued an appeal to abandon the Stormfront forum and to create 
a separate place on the internet where ‘Nazis’ could not ‘mess things up’.11 This appeal was 
largely acted upon by Voorpost followers and sympathisers. Stormfront today has changed 
from a forum for a broad range of right-wing extremist activists to a meeting place for NVU 
adherents and anti-Semites. The result has not been greater consensus, however.12 On the 
contrary, differences of opinion are frequently fought out there, mainly by NVU adherents. 
All this has caused the right-wing extremist community in the Netherlands to lose interest in 
the Stormfront forum. 
Another popular discussion forum for right-wing extremists was Holland Hardcore. That 
forum was created in 2003 by groups of Lonsdale youth and became a place where these 
young people could make contact with right-wing extremist ideology and groups. Holland 
Hardcore also ran afoul of the law. In 2008 the police raided the home of the forum’s owner 
because texts with punishable content had appeared on the site, but so far this has not resulted 
in legal action. Holland Hardcore also had problems with discussions and quarrels going 
awry, despite active moderation. Discussions between neo-Nazis and other right-wing 
extremists were often especially vituperative. This plus the dwindling number of visitors led 
the site administrators to close the forum down.13 A new discussion site took its place: 
Theudisk.14 The aim of this site is to issue news reports and support discussions for right-wing 
extremists who are more or less politically aligned with Voorpost. National socialists are 
actively kept away. 
 
‘This forum does not distribute propaganda for totalitarian ideologies (such as National Socialism, 
Islam and communism/Marxism and the like). The same holds for organisations that support or 
distribute such ideas. We refer the followers of such groups to other forums that allow these 
activities.’15 
 
This makes Theudisk the one site where right-wing extremists can discuss things without the 
constant eruption of quarrels. A great deal of effort is required, however. Theudisk is so 
strictly moderated that its range is quite limited.16 
 
In the past, internet forums like Stormfront and Holland Hardcore were specifically intended 
as recruitment instruments for swelling the ranks and directing potentially interested persons 
to right-wing extremist organisations. Such groups could also use these forums to conduct 
discussions and create propaganda. The forums were characterised as digital ports of refuge 
for right-wing extremists who were given more room to manoeuvre in Dutch society, but 
always on a modest scale.17 Now these functions seem to be dwindling in importance. 
Stormfront has become less popular and attractive because of the quarrels and drop-outs. The 
successor to Holland Hardcover, Theudisk, has also become less accessible due to strict 
monitoring. To what extent the forums’ functions have been taken over by other internet 
communities − such as social networking sites like Hyves and Facebook − is not sufficiently 
clear to me, but on the basis of our observations it seems likely that this is happening. 
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3.1.3 Lonsdale problem18
 
 
About ten years ago there was a resurgence of interest in the ‘gabber’ music style. This hard 
electronic music was introduced for the first time in the early nineties and was extremely 
popular. After a few years the gabbers disappeared from view. But when the music 
underwent a revival in 2001 the youth culture came back as well. The culture had changed 
with respect to the first generation, however. In the nineties the gabbers could be recognised 
by their uniform appearance and dress (shaved heads, tracksuits). Back then, when gabbers 
made the news it was for their extreme drug use, anti-social public behaviour and alleged 
racism. Among the second generation of gabbers a new type of clothing was fashionable, 
with the Lonsdale brand predominating. As a result they were commonly known as ‘Lonsdale 
youth’ or ‘Lonsdalers’. The Lonsdale phenomenon as a concept was associated with trouble, 
harassment and criminality. A substantial number of these Lonsdale youths actually held 
right-wing extremist ideas, far more than in the nineties. Often the ideas were not particularly 
profound, but they did serve as a motive or reason to get involved in racist incidents. In the 
past decade, for instance, numerous interethnic confrontations occurred involving groups of 
right-wing extremist Lonsdalers.19 It should be noted that this involvement included 
victimising ethnic minority young people as well as being the victims of aggression by 
others, usually groups of ethnic minority young people. Understood this way, the Lonsdale 
problem formed a substantial part of the broader problem of interethnic tension among young 
people in the public domain. 
In 2001 the problems related to right-wing extremist Lonsdalers began increasing in scale and 
significance, only to take an even sharper upward turn after the murder of the Islam-critic and 
filmmaker Theo van Gogh at the end of 2004. Right-wing extremist youths then became 
involved in a series of racist (violent) incidents, which was covered in detail by the media. 
 
The diversity of the Lonsdale problem was evident not only in its forms of expression but 
also in the reactions it inspired. While one person believed he was witnessing an extremely 
dangerous neo-Nazi group, another saw nothing but an age-old phenomenon: a group of 
youngsters getting into trouble. These diverse perceptions, or different ‘definitions of the 
situation’, led to correspondingly vigorous or weak forms of response by government 
authorities.20 
 
Another firmly held picture of Lonsdalers was that of a group from which young right-wing 
extremists were recruited. Recent research on a number of persons who had belonged to the 
hard core of right-wing extremist street groups shows that half had started out in a youth 
culture.21 In a number of cases they came in contact with right-wing extremist groups via the 
Lonsdale circuit, or they started their own group with like-minded people from that circuit. 
Another important factor was that they became familiarised with a right-wing extremist or 
racist discourse within the Lonsdale circuit, so that moving on to a right-wing extremist 
group was not such a major step. 
 
Now this music and youth culture is on the wane. Lonsdale youths have disappeared from 
view for the most part. Even the big gabber parties, where tens of thousands of young people 
came to experience this youth culture together, is decreasing in popularity.22 The proportion 
of Lonsdale youths involved in violent right-wing extremist incidents has also dropped 
dramatically in recent years (see chapter 2 of this report, ‘Racial and right-wing extremist 
violence in 2009’). 
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3.2 Street activism 
The picture we have of right-wing extremism has changed in many ways in the past decade. 
One of the more striking developments was the emergence of right-wing extremist street 
activism.23 This is by no means a new phenomenon. Since the seventies, many groups and 
parties have periodically strengthened their public image by means of demonstrations and 
other actions, some of them violent. Often the action was secondary, with the actual goal 
being publicity and the recruitment of followers. The past decade saw a rise in right-wing 
extremist groups that were involved almost exclusively in street actions. 
One exception is the Netherlands People’s Union (the Nederlandse Volks-Unie; NVU). The 
NVU is indeed a party, but one with an activist character. In this section I will discuss recent 
developments that have taken place within the various right-wing extremist street groups. 
 
3.2.1 Netherlands People’s Union  
One obvious form of right-wing street activism is the demonstration. Methods of dealing with 
right-wing demonstrations have changed over the past ten years.24 From 1977 to the mid-
nineties it was impossible for right-wing extremist groups to organise public demonstrations 
because they were affected by a ban that was based on the expectation that public order 
would be disturbed. After a short period in the mid-nineties in which demonstrations were 
permitted, all announced demonstrations were prohibited again as a preventive measure. 
Since 2001, however, the right for right-wing extremists to demonstrate has been more and 
more widely respected following a number of court interventions. The most important 
changes have been due to efforts by the NVU. In 2001 the NVU went through the 
administrative courts and obtained permission to demonstrate legally. From that moment on, 
organising demonstrations has become the party’s core business. Since 2001, the NVU has 
expanded the scope of permissible demonstrations by means of legal actions in the 
administrative courts. For example, local authorities may not place any limitations on the 
scheduled time or route, which defeats the purpose of a public demonstration.25 
Consequently, the NVU today can demonstrate in the centre of any city during the busiest 
hours of the day. Naturally that applies not only to the NVU but also to other right-wing 
extremist organisations. They make grateful use of this liberalisation of the free speech 
principle brought about by the NVU. 
During the last Monitor period, demonstrations planned by the NVU for the cities of Den 
Bosch and Venlo were prohibited, but after intervention by the administrative courts the 
demonstrations were given the green light.26 
 
Successfully organising demonstrations is not without risks for the NVU itself, however. 
Because the NVU’s active electoral base is quite small, the party always calls on like-minded 
groups in the Netherlands and Germany to join in their demonstrations. This dependence on 
external groups means that they, too, are able to set the tone of such demonstrations under the 
colours of the NVU. Slogans are shouted and banners are carried with messages that are more 
radical or different in theme than what the NVU itself would like to display. Not only does 
this cause internal division but it also increases the risk of legal action being brought against 
the demonstrators. In addition, these external demonstrators often opt for a consistently black 
clothing style as well as for face coverings, which imbues the demonstration with a spirit that 
is less than desirable for the NVU.27  
All this leads to vehement discussions between the NVU leadership and the demonstrators. 
How the NVU is going to solve this dilemma − the choice between an undesirable spirit and a 
small number of demonstrators − is unclear at the moment. 
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3.2.2 National Socialist Action  
In 2005 in the Haaglanden region some right-wing extremist Lonsdale youth formed a group 
of their own. They began as a group of White Power hooligans, but under the influence of a 
few older right-wing extremists they developed into a group with a National Socialist 
profile.28 From that moment on the group called itself National Socialist Action (Nationaal-
Socialistische Aktie; NSA).29 The NSA ended up in a network of like-minded people in 
which many ideological changes had taken place in recent years, changes that had an 
influence on the NSA. Two sources of inspiration were involved. The first was the Racial 
Volunteer Force (RVF), to which the NSA is closely allied. RVF is originally from Great 
Britain and is represented in the Netherlands by Eite Homan of Groningen. Homan is an 
influential veteran of the European National Socialist circuit. He holds ideas that are 
controversial within the extreme right. His main motivation is his hatred of Jews, and he 
regards all Western political and economic structures as ‘Jewish’. In fighting these structures 
Homan looked to other political extremists for inspiration, even those of a leftist or Islamist 
identity (whenever possible he also sought collaboration, but that is somewhat speculative). 
He touted himself as a follower of the Iranian president Ahmadinejad, of Osama Bin Laden 
and of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, on the assumption that they were carrying out the 
same fight against international Jewry and Israel that he was. 
A second source of inspiration for the NSA are the German Autonomous Nationalists. 
Followers of this right-wing extremist movement base themselves on National Socialism but 
are also inspired by left-wing ‘autonomous’ extremists. The latter are a left-wing movement, 
especially popular in Germany, who are characterised by violent street actions, an informal 
structure and a network within the various popular youth cultures. The Autonomous 
Nationalists copied a number of things from these left-wing groups. On the one hand they 
were interested in strategies: demonstration tactics, such as wearing uniform-type clothing to 
prevent identification by the police, as well as involvement in youth cultures in order to 
recruit the young. On the other hand they also did some ‘ideological shopping’. Themes such 
as the struggle against capitalism, solidarity with the Palestinians and animal rights were 
prominently featured by the Autonomous Nationalists but were placed in their own right-
wing context. The struggle against capitalism, for example, was expressly tied to Jewish 
financial interests, solidarity with the Palestinians was translated into opposition to Israel, and 
animal rights often had to do with ritual and kosher slaughtering practices. 
Because of these two sources of inspiration, the NSA often addresses themes that are not 
directly associated with the extreme right. Obvious examples are open solidarity with 
extreme Islamic and left-wing organisations and a positive attitude towards squatting. On one 
of its websites, the NSA made the following frank statement: 
 
‘The NSA as a collective is in solidarity with the RAF (the German Rote Armee Fraktion terrorist 
group), pro-Islam and a supporter of squatting, and places itself within the tradition of the SA.’ 
 
Not all right-wing extremists agree with these views by any means, including within the 
NSA. Discussions of these themes, along with other differences of opinion, have even 
resulted in a split.30 Some of the NSA supporters thought the original racist hooligan 
character of the group was more important and found the present line too ‘left-wing’. The 
positive attitude towards the squatting of buildings also created discord within the wider 
right-wing extremist circle. This view led to heated discussions on the Stormfront forum.31 
The split within the NSA, combined with ideological hair-splitting, has not done the 
organisation any good. The number of NSA activists has dropped sharply. There may be 
other reasons for this besides internal tension. Some of the NSA supporters were from 
Lonsdale youth circles. As was stated in section 3.1.3, that youth culture has largely 
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disappeared. This may make it more difficult to recruit new followers and to keep up the size 
of the group. 
There is also the possible effect of ageing. A recent study shows that right-wing extremist 
street activists are often in the adolescent phase (15-25 years) and remain active for between 
one and five years.32 Since a significant proportion of the activists first became active in the 
middle of the last decade, they will have reached the age at which many activists leave the 
right-wing extremist circuit − a factor which may play an important role. 
 
In addition to this decline in followers there is also evidence that the NSA is undergoing a 
kind of ‘professionalisation’. The remaining key group is now fully acquainted with the 
ideology as well as with the national and international structures of the extreme right. I will 
be coming back to this in the next section. There is also a ‘professionalisation’ of 
organisation and behaviour, which seems to be reflected in the drop in the number of criminal 
incidents. NSA followers are being arrested less frequently than they once were. In around 
2008, incidents and arrests followed each other at high speed and usually involved violence 
and fights in the context of night-time socialising. NSA members are no longer being arrested 
for such incidents. It is more common to see them seeking confrontations with police and 
political opponents during demonstrations, when arrests do take place. So for the NSA there 
seems to have been a change from quantity to quality. 
 
3.2.3 Blood & Honour  
Blood & Honour is an organisation of skinheads with neo-Nazi views. The organisation was 
established at the end of the eighties in England and now has divisions in many Western 
countries. It is banned in Germany and Spain.33  
 
A few years ago, Blood & Honour in the Netherlands was a group of quite some size. In 
around 2006/2007 there was evidence of national coordination, with a number of ‘divisions’ 
spread out across the country. In early 2007 a fight broke out at a gathering of right-wing 
extremists between Blood & Honour members and left-wing counter-demonstrators. This led 
to mass arrests and a number of convictions for Blood & Honour members.34 As a result of 
the publicity, arrests and convictions, a significant number of key members left the 
organisation. The national coordination disappeared, and the various divisions are active only 
regionally. Since then, a few attempts have been made to launch a new national initiative, but 
so far all of them have failed. This failure has been influenced by both external and internal 
factors. Several national gatherings of Blood & Honour adherents have been prevented or 
dissolved in recent years.35 And in Oost-Groningen, where a Blood & Honour group is active, 
a deradicalisation programme for followers and potential adherents was successfully 
introduced.36 At the same time, internal conflicts and squabbles took place that did the 
organisation no good. Various internal fights and reprisals, some of which took place in 
Flanders, cost Blood & Honour both supporters and sympathy from other groups.37 
 
At the moment there are three Blood & Honour groups active in the Netherlands: the 
‘Nordland Division’ around Winschoten, a small group in the eastern Netherlands and a 
group in northern Noord-Holland. There is also a mixed Dutch-Flemish group called 
‘Combat 18 Nederland & Vlaanderen’ (Combat 18 Netherlands & Flanders) which is among 
the groups belonging to Blood & Honour. All these groups are relatively marginal and do not 
appear to be capable of getting a national organisation off the ground. 
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3.2.4 National Youth Netherlands 
In 2009 a new group with a right-wing extremist identity was formed, National Youth 
Netherlands (Nationale Jeugd Nederland; NJN). The main reason for founding the NJN was 
the large number of arguments taking place within the other groups. The NJN’s profile is less 
markedly ideological than that of the NSA, but it does belong to the National Socialist corner 
of the right-wing map. The NJN organised its own actions against paedophiles, against the 
‘terrorist’ Nelson Mandela and against the building of a mosque. NJN followers often 
participate in other right-wing extremist demonstrations in the Netherlands, Germany and 
Belgium. 
The NJN may be a new group but its recruitment has been limited. Most of the new members 
are former members of other right-wing extremist groups. 
 
3.2.5 Voorpost  
The ‘Whole Netherlandish’ organisation Voorpost (Outpost) is of Flemish origin and has  
had a Dutch section since the late seventies. The Dutch section has had its ups and downs. 
Since 2004, however, the organisation has been going through a stable period. 
Voorpost differs ideologically from NSA and Blood & Honour. While NSA and Blood & 
Honour are decidedly National Socialist organisations, Voorpost places itself more firmly in 
the ‘Diets’ tradition of the extreme right and in that of Flemish solidarism. Solidarism is an 
anti-democratic political ideology that emerged during the 1930s and was inspired by 
Mussolini’s fascism. Voorpost is also known for the well-behaved character of its actions, in 
which it formally rejects the use of violence. The goal of these actions is to influence public 
opinion. The themes that are chosen are sometimes of the classical right-wing extremist 
variety but are also linked to current Dutch topics: opposition to mosques and Islam, 
opposition to left-wing organisations and parties, opposition to drugs and against paedophilia. 
One interesting initiative started by Voorpost circles was a series of animal rights actions that 
involved protesting against circus animals. A separate action group was formed for this 
theme: With the Animals Against the Beasts (Met de Dieren Tegen de Beesten; MDTB).  
Voorpost did not change substantially during the most recent Monitor period. Compared with 
other right-wing extremist groups, Voorpost has a relatively stable management cadre and 
loyal supporters. The organisation consists of various ‘circles’ (Kennemerland, Haaglanden, 
Rijnmond, Midland, Twente and Kempenland). Each circle has a monthly meeting for 
regulars and conducts its own regional actions. There are also small national actions, and 
actions and gatherings in Flanders are attended collectively. 
In 2009 Voorpost seemed to be changing strategy. A demonstration against soft drugs was 
organised in Maastricht with support from Belgian Voorpost followers, which greatly swelled 
the ranks. The demonstration was seen as a big success because of the turnout. A following 
demonstration was held in Gouda but drew only a handful of people. After that failure, 
Voorpost has carried out only small-scale actions. 
A number of counter-actions have been carried out recently against left-wing initiatives. 
These included demonstrating at an anti-Wilders event and disturbing an evening discussion 
on Sharia law being held in Amsterdam. 
 
3.2.6 Right-wing extremist street activism: a review  
The previous sections provided an overview of recent developments in right-wing extremist 
street groups. The picture that emerged is one of marginalisation and fragmentation. I believe 
that picture is correct. These groups are decreasing in size. In addition, a great deal of energy 
is being spent within the groups challenging each other and squabbling over internal 
differences of opinion. One exception to this general picture is Voorpost, which has made a 
stable impression for a number of years now. 
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In its 2009 annual report, the Dutch intelligence service AIVD (the General Intelligence and 
Security Service) stated that active support for the classical extreme right has dropped by fifty 
percent since 2007, from 600 persons to barely 300.38 Working with these observations and 
estimates based on them, I arrive at a lower number with regard to active support (see table 
3.1). By ‘active’ I mean visible support. In some groups there is a difference between the 
number of active members and the number of administrative members. The number of 
administrative members who do not show up for activities is certainly higher for the NVU 
and Voorpost, for example, but I am not in a position to make any meaningful statements 
about the total number of administrative members. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Estimated number of active supporters of right-wing extremist groups, mid-
2010  
 
 
Group     Number of active supporters 
 
NSA − RVF     25 
Blood & Honour − Combat 18 
(various sections)    50 
NJN      15 
NVU      20 
Voorpost and sister organisations*  60 
Total      170 
 
 
* This refers to groups that may be independent from Voorpost but have many ideological points of similarity and 
a substantial amount of personal overlap (Radio Rapaille, Theudisk, Rijnbok). 
 
Another indication of the current state of right-wing extremist street activism is the number of 
demonstrations that are held (see table 3.2). 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Number of right-wing extremist demonstrations held in the Netherlands, 2005-
2010  
 
2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010*   
7  8  12  29  31  10 
 
* until September 2010 
 
After a striking increase in the number of demonstrations in the period 2006-2009, a drop 
seems to have occurred for the first time in 2010. That drop in activities is true for all the 
groups discussed here. Only the NVU seems to have held the same number of demonstrations 
(four) as it did in previous years. But in recent years organising demonstrations has become a 
raison d’être for this party.39 
 
Developments within the neo-Nazi street groups, the decreasing numbers of members and the 
decreasing numbers of demonstrations suggest that interest in such groups is declining. This 
picture is reinforced by the decline in the number of violent crimes with right-wing extremist 
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motives that we observed in chapter 2, ‘Racial and right-wing extremist violence in 2009’. 
 
Coincident with this decline, however, is another development marked by a more 
international orientation for such groups. 
 
3.3 Border traffic 
When it comes to international connections, right-wing extremist organisations in the 
Netherlands have always focused on neighbouring countries Germany, Belgium and, to a 
lesser extent, England. Besides the fact that these countries are easy to reach, there are also 
historic and ideological considerations at work. In this section I will look at the current 
international contacts and activities of right-wing extremist groups, placing them within the 
context of similar activities in recent decades. 
 
Right-wing extremists with a National Socialist tilt see the Netherlands as part of a ‘Greater 
German Reich’ in the tradition of Hitler. Naturally this suggests an orientation towards 
Germany. These groups have traditionally maintained contact with fellow German believers. 
Most of these contacts were incidental until the mid-nineties, when they began to acquire a 
more structured character. Ties with neo-Nazi groups in the Ruhr Area and the rest of North 
Rhine-Westphalia are particularly strong. As the years passed, these contacts have taken 
many different forms. 
The first of these is organisational cooperation. Groups arrange things for each other, for 
example, that are controversial or prohibited in their own country. When a right-wing 
extremist was checked at customs at the Dutch-German border in 1991 it became clear that 
printed matter for the Centre Party ’86 was being printed in Germany. At the same time, 
Dutch right-wing extremists arranged for a postal address for German right-wing extremist 
organisations and publications whenever those groups were threatened by criminal 
prosecution in their own country. Another practical form of cooperation is the organisation of 
gatherings − as a joint trans-border activity, or because of difficulties encountered in one’s 
own country in putting together such an event. The NVU organised a few Hitler memorials in 
the past that were attended by many German visitors. In Germany, such gatherings stand a 
greater chance of being prohibited, and participants are more in danger of being prosecuted. 
The most visible form of cooperation is attending each other’s demonstrations. This, too, has 
been happening since the mid-nineties.40 In recent years, however, there has been a noticeable 
rise in the number of Dutch right-wing extremists attending German demonstrations (see 
table 3.3). A possible explanation for this rise is the emergence of National Socialist street 
groups in the Netherlands and Germany. The influence of the so-called Autonomous 
Nationalists is particularly important in this regard (see section 3.2.2). These groups − mainly 
the NSA in the Netherlands − maintain intensive contact and regularly support each other’s 
activities. 
 
These visits to each other’s demonstrations may mean many different things. In the 
Netherlands the demonstrations number between forty and one hundred participants, and 
sometimes more than half the demonstrators are from Germany.41 On the other hand, when 
Dutch right-wing extremists are present in German demonstrations they are clearly in the 
minority. At these demonstrations it is not unusual to see hundreds, and sometimes 
thousands, of people taking part, among them a handful of Dutch people. Occasionally they 
fulfil a particular function − giving a speech, for example − but most of them walk in relative 
anonymity. From conversations with disengaged right-wing extremists we have learned that 
participating in these demonstrations serves roughly two purposes.42 First, people want to 
acquire international contacts for their own organisation in order to make a better impression 
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on the rank and file. And second, most people experience demonstrations in Germany as 
quite special events. Because of the number of participants − large by Dutch standards − as 
well as the often violent confrontations with the police and with political opponents, these 
actions are greatly valued by Dutch demonstrators. 
One Dutch right-wing extremist who regularly attends demonstrations in Germany seldom 
disappears into the faceless throng. As he models his appearance on that of Hitler (including 
the moustache and the lock of hair), he’s always sure to attract media attention. 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Number of times that Dutch right-wing extremists visited German 
demonstrations per year and vice versa, 2000-2010 
 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2010*
            
Germans in 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 5 4 4 2 
the Netherlands 
 
Dutch people 6 5 2 5 6 6 7 6 9 14 5 
in Germany 
 
* provisional figures, up to September 2010  
There are other right-wing extremists active in the Netherlands besides these German-
oriented National Socialist groups. The Dietsers, for example, believe that the Netherlands 
should be part of a ‘Whole Netherlands’ or a ‘Greater Netherlands’ (Dietsland). This Whole 
Netherlands covers the entire Dutch language region: the Netherlands, Belgian Flanders and 
the French departement of Nord (French Flanders). Such groups are oriented towards 
Flanders and Belgium, of course. The most well-known example is Voorpost. In these circles, 
meetings, demonstrations and actions are also held on both sides of the border. The numerical 
proportions are somewhat similar to the exchanges that take place between Dutch and 
German right-wing extremists. These are relatively well-attended gatherings in Flanders for 
the most part where the Dutch are not really needed for numerical reinforcement. The visiting 
Dutch sometimes have specific functions, such as walking in a flag parade in which they 
represent the region of the northern Netherlands. But conversations with former Dutch right-
wing extremists reveal that for them, visits to Flemish right-wing extremist gatherings were 
like a cosy day at home43 − not only because of the number of attendees, large by Dutch 
standards, but also because most of the attendees are ‘ordinary’ people. The scene is not 
dominated by skinheads and Lonsdale youth, as it is in the Netherlands, but far more by a 
cross-section of the Flemish population: families with children and old folks. 
On the other hand, the Flemish are needed when Voorpost wants to organise a big action. 
That happened in 2009 at a Voorpost demonstration in Maastricht. There were more than 200 
demonstrators and the majority were from Belgium. 
 
Skinheads constitute a separate category of right-wing extremists. Some of them are active in 
political groups, such as those mentioned above. Blood & Honour, for example, was 
originally a British skinhead organisation. Skinheads are mainly interested in participating in 
a youth culture with an accompanying style of music.44 For this reason concerts are 
frequently organised in the Netherlands and abroad for right-wing extremist skinheads. Dutch 
skinheads visit these concerts regularly. 
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Until recently it was exceedingly difficult to organise such concerts in the Netherlands 
because of opposition by local authorities or political opponents. But changes seem to have 
occurred. In 2008 three attempts were made to organise a right-wing extremist concert in the 
Netherlands. Two of those three attempts were thwarted because the police intervened or 
because opponents told the owner of the venue about the character of the concert. In 2009 
four concerts were organised, one of which did not take place. 
Most concert attendance by right-wing extremist skinheads occurs in other countries − 
mainly in Belgium, where organisers of these kinds of concerts encounter considerably less 
opposition than in the neighbouring Netherlands and Germany. So it sometimes happens that 
German right-wing extremists will organise a concert in Belgium with hundreds of visitors in 
attendance, most of them from abroad.1 In addition to Belgium, skinheads also go to England 
to attend concerts given by the Blood & Honour ‘mother organisation’. 
 
Despite a decline in the significance of neo-Nazi groups, there is evidence of a growing 
international orientation during the past Monitor period. Two reasons for this can be 
indicated. The most important reason, but not specific to this period, is that in the surrounding 
countries there are larger and better organised right-wing extremist formations that develop 
activities that are attractive to Dutch right-wing extremists. The second reason is that despite 
the decrease in the size and importance of Dutch right-wing extremist groups, a certain 
‘professionalisation’ seems to be taking place, especially within the NSA. The hard core of 
the NSA has been active for quite some time now and they have been able to build up good 
international contacts. They are also able to organise travel and accommodations for their 
members attending foreign actions. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Interest in the classical extreme right decreased over the past Monitor period. Street groups 
with a National Socialist orientation saw their following undergo a sharp decline, and the 
number of right-wing extremist demonstrations also decreased. The organisation Voorpost is 
an exception to this trend. For a few years now Voorpost has had a relatively stable 
management cadre and a consistent number of followers. 
 
The causes of the decline in size are not easy to pinpoint. It is known that internal quarrels 
and conflicts between groups have caused followers from various groups to withdraw. A 
second cause may have to do with the failure to bring in new followers, which is necessary 
for maintaining the size of the organisation when other members leave. Over the past decade, 
new members often came from among the circles of the so-called Lonsdale youth. This youth 
culture has now largely disappeared, with a consequent drop in inflow.  
 
The disappearance of these visible structures does not mean that right-wing extremism is 
vanishing completely. We may see new manifestations emerge in the coming period. 
Activists from the groups discussed here may also crop up in other organisations. 
 
These developments may also explain the decrease in right-wing extremist violence, which 
we noted in chapter 2. The logical conclusion is that fewer right-wing extremists means less 
violence. We see at the same time, however, that the decrease in followers of the National 
Socialist action group NSA goes hand in hand with a form of professionalisation. The NSA’s 
                                                            
1 It is also striking that Dutch right-wing extremists were also involved in the organisation of a number of these 
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management cadre has acquired better organisational skills. Because NSA members today are 
no longer involved in blatant fights and violence in cafés and clubs, they are also better at 
staying out of trouble with the police. Arrests still take place, but people take that risk with 
greater awareness by deliberating carefully before entering into confrontations with the police 
or political opponents during demonstrations. These developments, too, may play a role in the 
decline I have observed in extreme right-wing involvement in violent incidents. The 
‘professionalisation’ of the NSA can also be seen in the greater international orientation of 
the group. Good contacts are being maintained, especially with Germany. 
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4 The right-wing extremist and discriminatory quality of the PVV  
 
Peter R. Rodrigues and Willem Wagenaar  
 
The eighth report of the Racism & Extremism Monitor came out in December 2008 and 
contained a study of the right-wing extremist and discriminatory quality of the Party for 
Freedom (PVV).1 On the basis of information available at the time, it was concluded that 
under certain circumstances the PVV can be regarded as a right-wing extremist party. A later 
study of polarisation and radicalisation in the Netherlands that was made public in January 
2010 also focused attention on the PVV. It characterised the PVV as ‘new radical right’, also 
under certain circumstances.2 To avoid any misunderstanding: in both studies, ‘radicalism’ 
and ‘extremism’ are regarded as synonyms. 
 
In this ninth Monitor report we will see to what extent the earlier findings are in need of 
adjustment. This chapter will also take a closer look at two particular aspects of the PVV. The 
first concerns an inventory of relations that the party maintains with like-minded political 
organisations abroad. The second is an examination of the legal context of the criminal 
proceedings being brought against the party chairman. 
 
4.1 The new extreme right 
Depending on the definition (see below), the PVV can be seen as the new extreme right (or 
new radical right). This designation should be preceded by two important comments. First, 
the PVV cannot be placed within the tradition of neo-Nazism in terms of ideology. Second, 
not a trace of anti-Semitism can be detected within the PVV’s upper ranks, unlike many 
‘classical’ right-wing extremist groups.3 
 
Whether a group can be called right-wing extremist or not is a question we will examine on 
the basis of three indicators: social genealogy, ideology and magnet function.4 Social 
genealogy has to do with the extent to which a party springs from a right-wing extremist 
tradition. Unlike the ‘classical’ right-wing extremist parties or movements, the PVV is not a 
product of a right-wing extremist tradition in terms of personnel. In terms of ideology, 
however, there certainly are elements of right-wing extremist ideology to be encountered in 
the PVV, such as a positive orientation towards cultural Sameness, an aversion to cultural 
Otherness and to political opponents, and predilection for the authoritarian. 
The aversion to Otherness mostly concerns ‘Islamisation’ and ‘non-Western immigrants’. 
This is expressed in a series of strongly-worded references to these themes in public debate. 
These statements have resulted in criminal proceedings, which we will come back to in 
section 4.3. It should be noted that since the publication of the eighth Monitor report the PVV 
has not become less brutal in its statements, examples being the ‘head rag tax’ (tax on 
headscarves) and the demand that tens of millions of Muslims leave Europe on account of 
criminal activities or burgeoning radical ideology.5 
Unlike many other right-wing extremist groups, the PVV does not include Jews in its notion 
of Otherness. On the contrary, for the PVV, Sameness is a reference to ‘the Judeo-Christian 
and humanistic culture in the Netherlands’. 
The party has also called for expelling the Antilles from the Kingdom and for the unification 
of the Netherlands and Flanders.6 This clearly shows that the nationalism of the PVV is not 
reflected in the present political entity of the Netherlands. There are indications that the PVV 
is striving to create a ‘Whole Netherlands’: a new structure based on a common language, 
culture and history, the borders of which strikingly coincide with ethnic dividing lines. 
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The party platform of the PVV reveals that on some points its ideology is at variance with 
fundamental human rights.7 A prohibition on the Koran, the desire to close all Islamic schools 
and a halt on immigration for all Muslims is in violation of the Constitution as well as 
international human rights treaties. A few of its proposals for limiting immigration ignore 
European law. One such proposal calls for prohibiting Romanians and Bulgarians from 
entering the Dutch labour market, and for reversing the measure that allows Poles to do so. 
The section on security calls for ethnic registration for everyone, including the designation 
‘Antillean’, which is in violation of the anti- discrimination restrictions. 
 
The magnet effect has to do with the appeal exerted by persons or organisations with a known 
right-wing extremist identity. The PVV exercises a partial magnet effect: right-wing 
extremists are attracted to the PVV, but this is less true for those with a neo-Nazi orientation.8 
The international magnet effect will be dealt with further in section 4.2. 
 
Finally, the PVV’s party organisation is clearly not democratic and can be described as 
‘authoritarian’. The party does not admit any new members and there is no transparency with 
regard to such concerns as party organisation or party financiers. 
 
Under these conditions, the PVV can be referred to as new extreme right. It should be noted 
that our designation is not shared by everyone and has become a point of discussion9 − a 
discussion that we believe is bound to continue.10 
 
4.2 The international magnet effect  
One of the indicators we use for determining the right-wing extremist ‘quality’ of a group is 
the magnet effect. This entails looking at the extent to which known right-wing extremists 
and right-wing extremist groups feel drawn to the PVV. Nationally there are indications of a 
partial magnet effect: some people are attracted while others are repelled. One important − 
but not decisive − criterion for feeling drawn or repelled to the PVV is the extent to which 
one is disturbed by the party’s pro-Jewish and pro-Israeli attitude.11 
In our previous Monitor report we paid little attention to the international magnet effect of 
the PVV. The PVV did not begin to adapt a more discernible international orientation until 
2008. Now that we have a better view of the PVV’s international contacts, it is easier to 
undertake an analysis of this context. In doing so, the following questions arise. On which 
themes do foreign group identify with the PVV, and on which do they not identify? Which 
organisations are these? And to what extent does the PVV welcome this association or 
distance itself from it? 
 
4.2.1 Connecting themes  
In order to see how the magnet effect of the PVV works internationally we should look at the 
areas in which cooperation has been successful and those in which cooperation is ruled out. 
Here, four themes are crucial: ‘Islamisation’, freedom of expression, Israel and anti-
Semitism. 
It goes without saying that the PVV’s fiercely negative attitude towards Islam is important to 
all forms of cooperation. It is the primary theme that unites the parties participating in the 
global Wilders network and that attracts people interested in joining. Wilders’ warnings 
against ‘Islamisation’ and his appeal for a worldwide struggle against ‘the advance of Islam’ 
constitute the heart of his presence within the network of radical critics of Islam. He has said 
the following in this regard: 
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‘It is urgent that our story makes its way beyond the local situation, and I see that happening now. 
I am getting invitations from all over the world to tell my story, as far away as Australia.’12 
  
Not all of Wilders’s viewpoints are undisputed among the circles of his international 
followers. His fight against Islam is frequently seen as too extreme when it threatens to limit 
the freedom of expression. These differences of opinion are mainly concentrated on Wilders’s 
desire to ban the Koran in the Netherlands.13 The appeal for a prohibition on the Koran is 
striking because Wilders regularly points to freedom of expression as his second priority. It 
seems, however, that according to Wilders, freedom of expression is not a ‘value neutral’ 
concept and should not be applied equally to everyone. This has met with resistance among 
his supporters. Filip Dewinter, the chairman of the Vlaams Belang party (Flemish Interest), 
thought the plan was not in keeping with the freedom of expression propagated by Wilders, 
and he dismissed it as an unrealistic demand.14 But the plan is also being criticised within the 
network of radical critics of Islam in which Wilders himself is active (see the following 
section). Daniel Pipes, a prominent representative of this network, has written the following: 
‘If he ever becomes prime minister and wants to ban the Koran, I will diametrically oppose 
him.’15 Pipes assumes that at some point Wilders will abandon his idea of a Koran 
prohibition. ‘I don’t want to quote from private conversations, but this is exactly the point I 
submitted to him. If he were to become prime minister, he would have no other choice than to 
strengthen moderate Islam and to weaken radical Islam. All the rest is inoperable rhetoric.’16 
In a few cases the desire to ban the Koran has even resulted in a split with Wilders. The 
American blogger Charles Johnson said the following in Vrij Nederland: 
 
‘I admired Wilders because he warned of the danger of Islamisation without linking up with right-
wing extremist groups like Vlaams Belang or the British BNP. But I can’t support him any longer. 
He’s taking extremist positions. He says that Islam is not a religion, he wants to ban the Koran, he 
wants to deprive citizens of their individual freedom. These are ideas that clash with the 
Constitution. They’re un-American. I’m against radical Islam, but I’m also against curbing 
freedoms in the name of anti-Jihad.’17 
 
One of the PVV’s main platform points in its international contacts is the unconditional 
support of Israel.18 The PVV sees Israel as the ‘central front in the defence of the West’ 
against Islam. According to the PVV, the Israel-Palestine conflict is ‘not a territorial but an 
ideological conflict, a conflict between the reason of the free West and the barbarism of 
Islamic ideology’. The PVV also believes that the Palestinians have no right to the occupied 
territories. According to the PVV, the Palestinians of Israel and the occupied territories can 
make their home in Jordan, Israel’s neighbour.19 
Almost the entire network of radical critics of Islam mentioned here support Wilders’s 
extreme views on these issues. Outside this network, however, they have been the object of 
criticism. Jean-Marie Dedecker, for example − standard bearer for the Dedecker List party 
(Lijst Dedecker; LDD) of Flanders − bases his platform on points that are similar to those of 
the PVV. He’s an interesting conversational partner for the PVV − at least at first glance. But 
in a double interview with the Flemish newspaper De Standaard some differences become 
apparent. Dedecker was opposed to the Koran prohibition, nor could he endorse Wilders’s 
plans for the Palestinians. Dedecker called Israel an ‘apartheid state’ and said that Wilders’s 
idea of sending the Palestinians to Jordan amounts to ‘ethnic cleansing’.20 
 
One final point that features prominently in the party’s foreign contacts is the aversion to 
anti-Semitism. Wilders has explicitly stated on many occasions that he excludes groups with 
an anti-Jewish agenda.21 This also was one of the problems he encountered in forming a 
European coalition and an important reason for refusing initially to admit Vlaams Belang.22 
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Later on, however, Wilders declared that ‘different noises’ were being heard from Vlaams 
Belang and that this party had taken a different course with regard to anti-Semitism.23  
 
4.2.2 Attracting and repelling  
The groups that feel attracted to the PVV can be divided into two categories: European 
groups that see the PVV as a possible political partner, and groups that are interested in 
international cooperation with the PVV on the basis of common anti-Islamic ideas. 
 
The first category, the Europeans, was mainly important to the PVV in its search for 
cooperation at the European level in order to form a ‘European Alliance of European 
Patriots’, to raise common themes for discussion and to build a faction in the European 
Parliament. The parties that the PVV focused on included the Dansk Folkeparti, the Italian 
Lega Nord, Vlaams Belang and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) − parties that are 
considered members of the so-called European right-wing extremist ‘party family’.24 After a 
period of orientation, Wilders characterised the parties he had aligned himself with as a 
‘hornets’ nest’. There were a few parties such as the Front National and the British National 
Party (BNP) that he disqualified entirely.25 
At the moment he seems to be maintaining good relations with only the recently formed Die 
Freiheit party of Germany and the Dansk Folkeparti of Denmark. Wilders visited the Dansk 
Folkeparti a few times, and the party’s success in Denmark inspired him in several different 
areas. His suggestion to offer tacit support to a right-wing minority cabinet in the Netherlands 
was taken from experiences in Denmark.26 
 
The other category has to do with an international group of radical critics of Islam, mainly 
from the United States and Israel.27 This is a network of scientists, bloggers, journalists and 
politicians with radical ideas about Islam. Within those circles, Wilders is seen and valued as 
a successful politician, a leadership figure and a ‘martyr’ for free speech, the latter owing to 
his permanent security protection and criminal prosecution.28 While there are considerable 
differences of opinion within this group regarding the exact scale of the problem (is the entire 
body of Islam a problem, or is the problem limited to radical groups alone?) and the solutions 
(should the Koran be prohibited?), there is general agreement that a worldwide struggle is 
underway between the civilised Judeo-Christian West and ‘barbarian’ Islam.29 This is 
coupled with broad support for an uncritical orientation towards Israel. Radical, violent and 
ethnic solutions are advocated in dealing with the conflicts between Israel, the Palestinians 
and other countries in the Middle East. A typical example of this thinking is Knesset member 
Aryeh Eldad of the Israeli Hatikva Party. Eldad represents an extremist current in Israeli 
politics. He supports the death penalty for people who cede the ‘Land of Israel’, by which he 
is referring to Israeli Prime Minister Olmert who negotiated with Syria on the return of 
occupied territory.30 Eldad and his party are often characterised as right-wing extremist.31 
Extremist views on Israel and the Middle East can also be found within the PVV.32 
This international network supports Wilders on many levels: he is held up internationally as 
an important and visionary politician, he is nourished with ideas, he is given inspiration and 
he is provided with financial assistance, although it is not known to what extent. 
 
Besides the organisations that the PVV has a good relationship with and those that it 
explicitly rejects, there are also a few organisations in which the magnet function is 
somewhat more complicated. Examples are Vlaams Belang, the Lijst Dedecker (LDD) and 
the English Defence League (EDL). The two Flemish parties, Vlaams Belang and LDD, are 
seen as right-wing occupants of the political field; Vlaams Belang is labelled as right-wing 
extremist and the LDD is not. While the image of Vlaams Belang is more moderate than it 
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once was, the party leadership is largely the same as it was ten years ago and the party has 
known anti-Semites among its members, although they are now being kept outside the 
management cadre. The LDD is not only more moderate but it is also comparable to the 
PVV, especially in terms of programme. When Dedecker left the Vlaamse Liberalen (Flemish 
Liberals) in 2006 and started his own party one year later, he declared that Fortuyn and 
Wilders were role models for him now that he was operating on his own. 
Yet in its contacts the PVV seems to prefer Vlaams Belang. Madlener, the leader of the PVV 
faction in the European Parliament, admitted that ‘We have grave doubts when it comes to 
actually cooperating with Vlaams Belang,’33 but he also felt that Vlaams Belang is less 
restrained and sympathises more openly with the PVV. On more than one occasion party 
leader Dewinter has insisted that he sees many similarities between the two parties.34 While 
there is no evidence of formal contact, according to Dewinter there is a lot going on behind 
the scenes. ‘We make sure that Wilders is sufficiently and directly informed about us. [...] 
Slowly but surely our relationship is improving. We also see this in interviews with 
Wilders.’35 Vlaams Belang also organised a solidarity demonstration with Wilders on the first 
day of the trial against Wilders.36 Why Vlaams Belang seems to be more and more accepting 
of the PVV, unlike the LDD, can easily be explained. The LDD probably thought the PVV 
was too extreme. The double interview with party leader Dedecker, quoted earlier, is very 
telling in that regard. He explicitly distances himself from the PVV with regard to the ban on 
the Koran, but even more with regard to Wilders’s views on Israel. For Wilders the opposite 
is probably true: these views constitute the core of his political message in the international 
context. 
 
Wilders’s message enhances his popularity not only within his own network but also among 
followers in other circles. An example is the English Defence League. The EDL was 
established in 2009 from circles of former football hooligans. Members of the right-wing 
extremist BNP also seem to be involved in the EDL.37 The EDL’s most important activities 
include holding demonstrations at places where opposition can be expected, such as 
neighbourhoods with large ethnic minority populations. These demonstrations regularly end 
in violence. Relations between the EDL and the PVV are different than between the PVV and 
the Flemish parties. The EDL openly supports Wilders. The League held a demonstration for 
Geert Wilders when he visited London in the spring of 2010.38 This demonstration confirmed 
the picture that has been sketched of the EDL: football hooligans are an overriding presence, 
the demonstrations are aggressive in character and sometimes the occasional Nazi salute is 
seen.39 Representatives of the EDL were also present at a pro-Wilders demonstration in 
Berlin.40 At the end of October 2010 the EDL announced its plan to hold a demonstration in 
Amsterdam ‘in support of Geert’.41  
In terms of content, the EDL and the PVV have much in common. The EDL is primarily 
opposed to Islam, radical Muslims, mosques and the presence of Sharia courts. The EDL also 
supports Israel. But the EDL is a different kind of group, with an image that is quite different 
from that of the PVV. It is an action group that promotes itself mainly by holding provocative 
demonstrations that frequently end in violence. As far as we know, except for the expressions 
of support there are no other contacts between the PVV and the EDL. In mid-October 2010 
Geert Wilders emphatically distanced himself from the EDL: ‘I only know about them from 
the newspapers and I have never had contact with them.42 
 
When we line these international contacts up and compare PVV to them, a few things stand 
out. The PVV seems to exercise a certain attraction on foreign extremists, including right-
wing extremist groups. The PVV does not always refuse contact with these groups. It has 
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with the Front National and the BNP, for example, but not with Vlaams Belang or the Eldad 
party. Wilders’s criteria for accepting a group or keeping it at a distance seem to be anti-
Semitism and the group’s view of Israel, not its radical or right-wing extremist character. The 
position of the LDD is quite telling in this regard. 
 
4.3 The case against Wilders 
In recent years charges have been brought against Wilders based on the anti-discrimination 
restrictions in the Dutch Penal Code for a number of statements he has made. In June 2008, 
the Public Prosecution Service decided to dismiss several of these charges. The basis of the 
this decision was that Wilders’s statements were critical of a religion without being an affront 
to the believers themselves. In the chapter on the PVV in the eighth Racism & Extremism 
Monitor it was demonstrated that there is quite a bit to object to this decision.43 The contested 
statements by Wilders contain comments in which criminalisation, the application of social 
distinctions and the exclusion of rights are important themes. It is these themes that 
previously have resulted in criminal convictions. The disputed comments have to do not only 
with Islam or Muslims but also with ethnic groups, such as Moroccans. Thus there may be 
evidence of both religious and racial discrimination. The legal notion of race is also based on 
skin colour, descent and ethnic or national origins. Finally, the dismissal is at odds with the 
official instructions in the Discrimination Instruction, which state that in the event of a 
serious charge of discrimination, legal action is to be instituted in principle.44 
 
One by one we will deal with the decision of the court in response to the complaint of non-
prosecution by the OM, the contents of the summons and the international legal aspects of the 
case. 
 
4.3.1 The complaint made to the court  
A complaints procedure under art. 12 of the Penal Code was brought by a number of parties 
against the OM’s decision to dismiss charges. This procedure is an instrument by which 
interested parties can raise objections in court to such a dismissal. On 21 January 2009, the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeals pronounced judgement and ordered that Wilders be prosecuted 
after all on the grounds of inciting hatred and discrimination (art. 137d of the Penal Code).45 
Thus the court came to a different conclusion than the Public Prosecution Service, and in its 
decision it stated that Wilders’s comments may be punishable when viewed together. The 
court did not consider the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in its decision. 
Regarding the offensive character of the comments (art. 137c of the Penal Code), the court 
ruled that this criminal provision is only applicable in comparisons between Islam and 
Nazism. 
The judgement of the court of appeals was striking in many respects and caused a 
considerable stir.46 Normally speaking, the decision of a court of appeals regarding a 
complaint of non-prosecution consists of a few pages in which it is concluded that there is a 
ready chance of successful conviction. In this case, the court wrote a detailed statement to 
justify its decision. For this the court was accused of speaking out of turn. Indeed, dealing 
with the contents of the case is not the job of the court of appeals but of the Amsterdam 
District Court. The impression that the court of appeals had already come to a decision 
concerning criminal liability was reinforced by the strong wording that was used.47 Criminal 
law scholar Leijten was led to wonder, ‘What happens if an appeal is filed later on and the 
case appears before the same court?’48 
 
An important point of contention among commentators was whether a parliamentarian could 
be prosecuted for his political message.49 We take the position that if it can be reasonably 
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assumed that the charges concern a violation of an anti-discrimination restriction, then the 
case should be brought to court. The rules concerning the prosecution of cases of 
discrimination leave almost no room for discretionary dismissal, and this includes 
parliamentarians. Transaction settlements in cases of discrimination are only possible for 
minor cases having to do with slight grievances in combination with impulsiveness of 
action.50 In this respect it is striking that the Amsterdam Court of Appeals does not refer to 
the Discrimination Instruction in its decision. 
 
It can be reasonably assumed that the charges concern violation of the anti-discrimination 
restrictions. Whether the comments are punishable, or whether the perpetrator is also subject 
to punishment, are questions that should be decided by the criminal courts. This also applies 
to a parliamentarian who makes his comments outside parliament.51 Contrary to what is 
commonly assumed, a politician does not have licence to discriminate in the public domain.52 
A local politician from the National Alliance was also convicted in court for the 
discriminatory texts that appeared on the party website.53 Nevertheless, there is a school of 
thought among legal experts that would limit hate speech to inciting violence.54 This view is 
not compatible with the anti-discrimination restrictions and the human rights treaties that the 
Netherlands has subscribed to on this point. The International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the European Convention on Human 
Rights both pose major obstacles to this line of thought. Those who hold this point of view in 
fact are calling for a revision of the legislation and are arguing that exceptions be made to a 
treaty that has already been ratified. There is also a 2008 framework decision under European 
Community law concerning the use of criminal law to combat certain forms of hate speech 
and xenophobic expression (European Framework Decision).55 This decision makes it 
compulsory to prosecute in the event of reasonable suspicion and to criminalise the public 
incitement of hatred (or violence) against a group of persons on the grounds of their race, 
skin colour or religion. On 28 November 2010, member states were required to alter their 
legislation in accordance with this framework decision.56 Dutch law is already in compliance 
and should also be implemented.57 
 
4.3.2 The summons  
After the decision made by the Amsterdam Court of Appeals on 21 January 2009, the OM 
was called to prosecute Wilders. On 3 December 2009 he was issued a summons for insulting 
a group of persons on the grounds of their religion (art. 137c of the Penal Code) and inciting 
discrimination or hatred (or both) on the grounds of race and/or religion (art. 137d of the 
Penal Code). Unlike the dismissal, the summons was based not only on religious 
discrimination but also on racial discrimination. Also noteworthy is that Wilders was charged 
only once with violating art. 137c of the Penal Code (group defamation), and that the other 
charges (four) concern art. 137d of the Penal Code (inciting hatred). The fact that after 
making the comments for which he is being charged Wilders went on to make other 
controversial comments is not being taken into account in these criminal proceedings. 
 
Shortly after the ruling of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals was handed down, the Supreme 
Court passed an interesting judgement in cassation having to do with the scope of art. 137 of 
the Penal Code. 58 According to the Supreme Court, art 137c of the Penal Code penalises the 
making of insulting remarks ‘about a group of people on account of their religion’ but does 
not penalise the making of insulting remarks about a religion as such, even if it occurs in such 
a way that the religious sensibilities of the followers are offended. All criticism − even sharp 
criticism − of views shared by that group or of the behaviour of people belonging to the 
group are outside the scope of art. 137c of the Penal Code. The matter at hand in this case 
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concerns a window poster issued by a distinctly right-wing extremist party, the National 
Alliance, containing the words ‘Stop the malignancy known as Islam’. 
 
In his conclusion, the advocate general in this case mentioned its relevance for the criminal 
case against Wilders but thought that Wilders had gone further in his statements. In his 
commentary on the ruling of the Supreme Court, Mevis notes that as a result of this 
judgement the OM will be reluctant to resort to art. 137c of the Penal Code when pressing 
charges.59 In his critical remarks on the ruling, Veraart says that the Supreme Court should 
not have taken on the case itself but should have referred it back to the court of appeals to 
decide whether secondary charges of inciting hatred or discrimination could also be brought 
(art. 137d of the Penal Code). The Supreme Court did not issue an opinion on this point. The 
Norwood case in the European Court of Human Rights bears a striking resemblance to the 
case of the National Alliance poster. A member of the right-wing extremist BNP hung up a 
window poster bearing the text ‘Islam out of Britain − Protect the British People’. 
  
The accused was convicted of discrimination in England, and the complaint he had lodged 
with the European Court of Human Rights was dismissed. The appeal to freedom of 
expression (art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights) had failed because the 
core values of the convention had been violated by his comments.60 
 
Wilders’s attorney petitioned the procureur- general to submit a demand to the Supreme 
Court for cassation in the interests of the law concerning the decision of the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeals of 21 January 2009. Cassation in the interests of the law can only be 
submitted by the procureur-general. The purpose of this extraordinary means of recourse is to 
enable the Supreme Court to give an opinion on questions of law in cases that do not reach it 
through normal procedures, if such a response is desirable from the point of view of unity of 
law or development of law. The attorney had put forward several such arguments but they 
were rejected by the procureur-general, and − according to the press release of 20 May 2009 
− he held that there were no grounds for cassation in the interests of the law.61 
 
Then Wilders lodged an objection against the summons. He claimed that the order to 
prosecute by the Amsterdam Court of Appeals was superseded by the judgement pronounced 
by the Supreme Court in the case of the National Alliance poster. After an order to prosecute 
has been issued, an objection against a summons is only admitted if there is evidence of new 
facts or circumstances. New case law, however, is not regarded as such evidence by the 
district court.62 
 
On 20 January 2010, a pre-trial review of the Wilders case was held. In this review, in 
response to the defence of the attorney, the district court deemed itself competent and held 
that the OM had the right to institute proceedings. The requests by Wilders to hear the 
testimony of experiential experts was refused because it was not clear what they could add to 
the proceedings. The district court would not hear the testimony of legal scholars, either, 
because according to the judges the defence had sufficient options for presenting its legal 
point of view to the court. However, Wilders was given the opportunity to present the 
testimony of three experts on Islam and the Koran − only three out of the 18 persons that he 
had submitted to the court as witnesses. On 22 October 2010 the panel of judges from the 
Amsterdam District Court who were hearing the challenge granted the request for a 
challenge.63 The criminal proceedings against Wilders would have to be redone by a new 
court yet to be composed.64 
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4.3.3 International law  
Whether the remarks that Wilders made on behalf of the PVV are punishable or not is 
decided under Dutch law. The specific articles of the law are the prohibition of group 
defamation (art. 137c of the Penal Code) and inciting hatred and discrimination (art. 137d of 
the Penal Code), which are included in the summons. As was indicated earlier, the 
penalisation of these offences is partly based on the ICERD and is endorsed by the European 
Framework Decision. It is also important that by making the remarks punishable, the right of 
freedom of expression is not unlawfully curtailed, and for this some kind of touchstone is 
necessary. The European Convention on Human Rights not only protects freedom of 
expression, 65 however, but it also prohibits discrimination.66  It is established case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights that an appeal to freedom of expression fails if it appears 
that the person requesting such protection is himself guilty of violating the core values on 
which the European Convention on Human Rights is based. The complaint is then dismissed 
on account of abuse of law.67 In the Leroy case, the European Court let it be known that 
abuse of law may be indicated if the remarks express ideologies such as fascism, anti-
Semitism or Islamophobia.68 Racial discrimination is also included. Whether politicians are 
to receive more protection than other persons under the European Court of Human Rights 
when they make remarks was investigated by Lawson.69 What his nuanced answer boils 
down to is that while there is more freedom of expression for politicians, they are also 
assigned more responsibility. Inciting hatred or religious intolerance is not covered by 
freedom of expression. It should also be noted that the European Court of Human Rights does 
not decide on punishability; that is a national matter. The court only inquires into whether the 
member state reasonably could have reached a conviction in the light of freedom of 
expression on the one hand and the prohibition on discrimination on the other. In making this 
assessment, the European Court of Human Rights allows the member states their own margin 
of appreciation. 
 
Since Lawson’s analysis, two new judgements have been pronounced by the European Court 
of Human Rights having to do with right-wing extremist politicians who have incited hatred 
and discrimination. These concern the cases against the Belgian parliamentarian Féret of the 
Walloon Front National and the case against Le Pen, the chairman of the French Front 
National. Both parliamentarians were sentenced by their national courts and their appeals to 
freedom of expression were rejected by the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
In the Féret case, the court ruled that the conviction was not a violation of the fundamental 
right of freedom of expression.70 The European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that 
political debate requires a high level of protection, such as parliamentary privilege and the 
prohibition on prosecution for opinions expressed in parliament. Political parties have the 
right to openly express their opinions on issues such as immigration, for example, even if in 
doing so they offend, shock or alarm one particular population groups. But the European 
Court of Human Rights imposes a clear restriction on such practices. Fighting racism and 
discrimination in Europe is of the highest priority. It is crucially important that when 
representatives express themselves in public, they avoid reactions that promote intolerance. 
According to the Court, the remarks made by Féret over a period of a few years were 
sufficient to arouse feelings among the public of distrust, rejection or even hatred of 
foreigners. In addition, these remarks could undermine trust in the democratic institutions. 
The European Court of Human Rights therefore concluded that a discourse that incites hatred 
is a danger to the social peace and political stability of democratic states, and that taking 
action against it is an ‘urgent social necessity’. During 1999-2001 Féret had distributed 
various posters and pamphlets and made remarks in which he came out against the 
44
‘Islamisation’ of Belgium and called for an end to integration subsidies, for the repatriation of 
immigrants and for the exclusion of non-European immigrants from social security 
programmes. Most of these themes are recognisable aspects of PVV party programme.71 
Féret was sentenced by the Belgian court to 250 hours of community rehabilitation and 
deprivation of electoral eligibility for at least ten years. The European Court of Human Rights 
left the two sentences intact, but in this case it ruled with the maximum division of opinions: 
four judges for and three against. 
 
The Le Pen case had to do with a remark made in an interview in 2003 in which he said that 
if Muslims ever take control of the country, the French will shuffle along the walls with their 
eyes lowered. He paid for this statement with a fine of € 10,000 for inciting hatred and 
violence. Le Pen appealed the judgement all the way to the European Court, but without 
success.72 This time the judges ruled unanimously that Le Pen’s complaint was inadmissible. 
The court found that the importance of freedom of expression is vital for political debate and 
that restraint should be exercised when applying criminal restrictions. However, the European 
Court of Human Rights stressed that politicians may not use their freedom for inciting hatred 
and discrimination. In this case this assessment did not work to Le Pen’s advantage. 
 
We will have to wait and see how the Dutch judges rule in the Wilders case. As of the time of 
this writing the OM has not yet announced the punishment it is demanding. Deciding whether 
there is evidence of punishability is still a national matter. The European Court of Human 
Rights can only check to see if the freedom of expression has been short-changed if it is 
evoked upon conviction.73 The Netherlands does have its own margin of appreciation in this 
regard. In any case, the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of 
Féret and Le Pen show that convicting a politician who is found guilty of inciting hatred and 
discrimination is possible within the testing capacity of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This follow-up study leads us to conclude that according to our definitions the PVV can be 
described as new extreme right. Because Wilders has not tempered his remarks in recent 
years, and given the contents of the PVV’s party platform, we regard the label as all the more 
applicable. It is ‘new’ because the party deviates from the classical extreme right. In terms of 
ideology, the PVV has no neo-Nazi orientation with the attendant anti-Semitism.  
 
With the PVV there is evidence of a certain international magnet effect. That is, Wilders’s 
ideas also exert an attraction on right-wing extremist groups abroad, and these groups identify 
positively with the PVV. This picture is not unambiguous, however. Just as in the 
Netherlands, these groups are mainly attracted by Wilder’s remarks on Muslims, immigration 
and Islam. For Wilders, the distinction between groups with which the PVV would like to 
collaborate and groups that he would like to keep at arm’s length is not based on radicality or 
the measure of their right-wing extremism, however. The distinction has far more to do with 
their view of Israel and the presence of anti-Semitism. Collaboration is out of the question for 
groups that differ fundamentally from the PVV on these points. 
 
The criminal proceedings against Wilders have been turbulent. After the dismissal, the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal ordered that the case be prosecuted. Cassation in the interest of 
the law, and the objection to the summons, were not able to keep the case from appearing 
before the Amsterdam District Court. In response to a successful challenge by the defence, 
the case will now have to be dealt with by a new court. The Public Prosecution Service has 
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brought charges of inciting not only hatred and religious discrimination but also ethnic 
discrimination. In international law, such a clash between the right of freedom of expression 
and the prohibition of discrimination is a frequent occurrence. Judgements by the European 
Court of Human Rights show that even a politician can be prosecuted under national law if 
there is evidence of inciting hatred and discrimination. 
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5 Islamic extremism in the Netherlands 
 
Ineke van der Valk  
 
This chapter is about Islamic extremism. Since the terrorist attacks that took place during the 
first years of the new millennium, research on this phenomenon has rapidly gained 
momentum. This is true worldwide, but it is certainly true in the Netherlands, where the 
murder of Theo van Gogh sent out shock waves that are still reverberating. The seventh 
Monitor report contained a discussion of the radicalisation of Muslim youth. The eighth 
report dealt with the deradicalisation of radical Muslims in a chapter on deradicalisation. This 
ninth Monitor looks at the general background of the phenomenon based on literature studies, 
followed by the current state of affairs in the Netherlands. Finally, to provide more insight 
into how the phenomenon has manifested itself in recent years there will be a discussion of 
ideological backgrounds. A brief analysis of texts from the Dutch networks, which are known 
as Hofstad Group and the Piranha Group will also be included. Here the focus is mainly on 
Muslim youth in the Netherlands who find this ideology especially appealing. 
 
At a time when there is an increasing tendency to regard Islam as a political ideology, it is 
very important that a clear distinction be made between the religion of Islam and the 
extremist political ideology that is based on certain notions about Islam. When references are 
made in academic and media reports to this political ideology, the term ‘political Islam’ is 
often used. To obviate this confusion between religion and political ideology as much as 
possible, the term ‘Islamic extremism’ will be used in this chapter. In addition, no strict 
distinction is made between extremism and radicalism. 
 
5.1 A political ideology 
Islamism is to be regarded as a political ideology that has its foundations in a particular view 
of the Islamic faith. Islam in this view is seen not only as a religion but also as a political 
system. Islamists advocate a fundamentalist return to the roots of the faith and an orthodox, 
literal interpretation of the Koran. This ideology is currently supported by a social movement 
that has followers worldwide. It is a relatively recent phenomenon that came about in Egypt 
at the beginning of the last century. It then spread throughout the Islamic countries, and in 
recent decades it made its way around the world.  
 
It is a modern phenomenon linked to processes of globalisation and processes of 
individualisation.1 It can be seen as a reaction to globalisation, a reaction to the increasingly 
dominant presence of the West in the Islamic world, symbolically and materially, and the 
impact of that presence on the daily lives of ordinary people. Migration is an aspect of 
globalisation that has played an important facilitating role in the development of Salafism and 
Islamic extremism in European countries. Migration has greatly stimulated the development 
of Islamism into a transnational phenomenon that is manifested worldwide. 
 
Islamic extremism in the Netherlands is almost exclusively Salafist in its orientation. The 
concept of ‘Salafism’ refers to first generation Muslims. Followers of this school of Islamic 
thought regard themselves as the only true Muslims. Other Muslims are equated with 
apostates. The Salafist worldview is dualistic: good versus evil. In their view, the Salafists 
stand for the good. The method they advance for implementing their ideology can be divided 
into three currents: an apolitical current that is mainly focused on the religious experience, a 
reform movement that would like to take part in the political process, and violent jihadism.2 
Salafists separate themselves from the rest of society. Religiously speaking, there is a desire 
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to return to the original texts and to reject all later additions and interpretations. In this view 
the main focus of life is on religion, and all other facets of life, including politics, are 
exclusively determined by religion and dependent on it. Followers advocate a structure for 
society that complies exclusively with Islamic laws and rules (Sharia). Everything else is 
sinful (haram), the work of infidels or apostates. For a long time, Islamic extremist 
movements in the Arab world saw the secular and dictatorial forms of government that were 
dominant there as their enemy. The goal was to replace them by an Islamic state. Ever since 
the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, these movements have gradually broadened the 
scope of their attention to include Western, foreign interventionist forces in Islamic countries. 
Finally, in recent decades, the enemy image has been expanded even further to include all 
‘enemies of Islam’, infidels and apostates worldwide, including Muslims who reject the 
extremist message.  
 
Often it is thought that Islamic extremism is exclusively an imported problem that originated 
in Islamic countries. The reality is quite different. In recent years it has become clear that 
Islamic extremism is a social phenomenon that also has roots in Western countries: a ‘home-
grown’ variety. 
Some of the people who follow this ideology were born and raised in European countries or 
lived their adult lives in Europe. Converts also play a striking and sometimes a leading role. It 
is well known, for example, that 180 Germans have visited training camps in Pakistan. There 
are also several converts among the members of Dutch networks: the Hofstad Group and the 
Piranha Group. The psychological factors that lead to extremism are partly related to 
reactions to local situations that are experienced as unjust. Examples are structural forms of 
discrimination and the social exclusion of migrant communities, which make young Muslims 
feel socially marginalised. The fundamentalist views of Islam held by extremists often differ 
sharply from the religious views held in their countries of origin. The religious views of 
ordinary people in the lands of origin and of the first generation immigrants are not always as 
fully developed and are frequently imbued with centuries-old, pre-Islamic ideas. This is 
another reason why Islamic extremisms should not be seen as an import problem. This social 
phenomenon, which also has roots in Western countries, is sustained there by networks of 
activists. The difference between a network and an organisation or group is that a network 
lacks a formal (hierarchical) structure, it has an informal and flexible membership and it has a 
fluctuating leadership. Within networks there are individuals or small groups who work 
together. Sometimes, but not always, a core group provides coordination.3 Who populates 
these networks? 
 
5.2 Networks 
Islamic networks often consist of a complex mixture of actors of various kinds. De Poot 
speaks of the interlinkage, mutual dependence and receptivity of actor categories. She 
conducted a study of networks that were active in the Netherlands between 2001 and 2005, 
based on twelve judicial criminal investigations. Out of the total of 120 activists, some were 
what are called ‘heartland-oriented’ actors,4 others were ‘reborn believers’, and still others 
were local activists.5 The networks were also quite mixed in character. They consisted mostly 
of men, although there were also a few women; there were young people as well as old, many 
people without residence permits, former criminals and addicts. In addition there were 
converts and second-generation young people. The networks were not hierarchically 
organised, but they did have leadership figures of a certain status who often served as role 
models. These were mostly older ‘heartland-oriented’ actors with a knowledge of Islam and 
Arabic who derived their ideological orientation from the Islamic world. The outlook of the 
members of these networks was trans-border and global, with little focus on Dutch society. In 
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fact, most of those involved had little connection to Dutch society at all. According to De 
Poot, this also explains the shift in accent in recent years to jihad abroad.6 
 
The subjects of the research conducted by De Poot et al. were not equally well-versed 
ideologically and politically. What they had in common was their religion and a political 
ideology with an explicit enemy image. According to the researchers, only a small number of 
them could be regarded as political activists working with an ideal. There were also ‘seekers’, 
especially young people, who were looking for meaning and social relationships. 
 
5.3 Muslim youth and their motives 
International research on Muslim youth has shown that the process of radicalisation leading 
to extremism is linked to a search for identity, a need for companionship and social 
connection, public protest and a desire for revenge fanned by propaganda.7 The ties that 
young radical Islamists have with their family, their community and their place of origin are 
often weak, so that new social ties tend to replace dysfunctional or nonexistent family ties 
and friendship relations.8 By forming a connection with radical Islam, they are linking up to 
an ‘imagined community’ within a worldwide movement that gives them the sense of 
belonging they are missing in their daily lives.9 
 
In Dutch research on factors that play a role in the processes of radicalisation among young 
people, the perception of injustice, insecurity and group threats are prominent factors in 
addition to the need for social connection.10 These elements play an especially important role 
among young adolescents. Their thinking is often black-and-white and rather unnuanced, and 
they are uncertain about themselves, their social identity and their future in a society that is 
characterised by social polarisation along ethnic lines. This makes them particularly 
vulnerable to group threats, symbolic or not. To their way of thinking, such threats are bound 
up with the physical threat that they believe is experienced by the citizens of Islamic 
countries who are suffering under Western domination.11 The activists who are attracted to 
radicalisation as a result tend to impose their own local colour on opinions, views, points of 
special interest and jihadist activities. 
 
In this way a radical Islamic youth culture has gradually developed in recent years. The 
followers of this youth culture are strongly opposed to Dutch society. The Hofstad Group is 
still a source of inspiration within a radical Islamic youth culture that has developed apart 
from small groups of extremists. Some Muslim youth identify with young people from the 
Hofstad Group and try to imitate their clothing style and − to a certain extent − their 
behaviour. Their radical remarks and conduct are mainly an attempt to belong and to shape 
their social identity, and in this respect they are no different from many young people who 
organise themselves into right-wing extremist groups.12 But in doing so they sometimes make 
themselves vulnerable to the extremist message of preachers and recruiters, and to the 
propaganda that can be found on the internet. 
 
The internet, which has undergone rapid development since the mid-nineties, has done a great 
deal to facilitate the accessibility of extremist group and ideologies. Its relative anonymity 
has added an extra dimension to the value of the internet for extremists. The internet has 
rightly been called ‘the biggest megaphone in the world’.13 The website of the Salafi 
movement in the Netherlands is known to be very user friendly; it contains a great deal of 
information and its administrators are very prompt in responding to questions that are 
bothering young people.14 Thus the internet has played a major role in the spreading of 
Islamic extremism and the development of a Dutch variety of that extremism, as embodied by 
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the Hofstad Group and the Piranha Group. Somewhat facetiously, Muslims radicals who 
dabble in agreeable interpretations of their own faith are described as followers of a ‘cut-and-
paste’ religion. They quote passages out of context and construct their own story by placing 
them in a new one. That is, they use a new story to construct their own truth. 
But does this also mean that they have no link to society, that their extremism is a sign of a 
lack of integration? There are strong indications that the opposite is actually the case. The 
German anthropologist Schiffauer stressed this in his case study of a young, second-
generation Turkish Islamist.15 His reasoning runs as follows: integration implies the promise 
that a person will one day be accepted, which makes it all the more painful if the person is 
discriminated against and excluded. These young people also compare themselves with their 
native Dutch peers, who are better off in many respects. This can contribute to processes of 
radicalisation. Young people want to be seen and appreciated. They want to make a 
difference. Schiffauer explains that this kind of search for recognition is actually strengthened 
by Western views in which great importance is attached to the individual. Like their native 
Dutch peers, second-generation young people are educated in Western schools, where such 
views on the role of the individual are passed on. If they do not receive the recognition they 
desire, they may demand it − by violence, if necessary. In the most extreme case they will try 
to assert themselves by committing terrorist acts. Or as Adraoui points out in his study of 
nonviolent Salafism in France, by reversing the roles those who previously had been 
discriminated against as a minority are no longer judged according to other people’s 
standards; rather, they themselves become the judges − at least in their own minds.16 
 
5.4 Scale and scope  
Shedding light on the scale and scope of Islamic extremism in the Netherlands is no simple 
matter, 17 at either the national or the local level.18 The sources are limited, and often they are 
not scholarly. Information is not usually gathered for the sole purpose of obtaining 
knowledge and insight but from the viewpoint of other perspectives, such as security policy. 
In this section use is made of a broad range of reports from national government services, 
such as the AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service), the NCTb (National 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism) and the police, supplemented by research commissioned 
by the various municipalities. But even these government agencies regularly come up against 
factors that make it difficult to fully grasp what is going on. Sometimes the radicalisation 
process takes place individually or in very small groups, such as living room gatherings or in 
the anonymity of the internet. Naturally this interferes with identification and any attempt that 
might be made at tracking people down. In addition, Salafist organisations may adopt façade 
tactics.19 This possibility is also mentioned in a recent report on Salafism in the 
Netherlands.20 Some preachers have toned down their message and have sought to connect 
with Dutch authorities. The need to give Islam a positive face given the present political 
climate certainly plays a role in such a choice. Preachers moderate their message and distance 
themselves from jihadism out of tactical considerations. Finally, some radicalised Muslims 
adapt their appearance after a period of presenting themselves outwardly as Islamists. They 
go back to wearing the prevailing fashion so as not to attract the attention of the criminal 
investigation service.21 Any depiction of the presence of Islamic extremism in the 
Netherlands must be aware of these factors. 
 
The networks of Islamic extremists have undergone various developments over the years. 
Until 2002 there were international networks that used recruitment to enlist and direct 
potential jihadists. Then local networks arose, however, which had their own agendas. In 
recent years there have been signs of the re-emergence of international networks, with 
jihadists focusing on foreign struggles such as those in Afghanistan and in Iraq. A shift has 
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also taken place within the Salafist movement. Back in the eighties, Salafist preaching and 
missionary work in the Netherlands was directed from Saudi Arabia and took place in 
mosques and schools. The Salafi centres today are set up with Saudi support, and the first 
preachers came from that country. At the moment, young preachers with Salafi training are 
active in the Netherlands. They travel to mosques and Salafi centres to propagate their 
message. 
 
According to the AIVD, local jihadist networks in the Netherlands (of which the Hofstad 
Group22 and the Piranha Group23 are the most well known) are now becoming less 
prominent.24 The AIVD has a number of explanations for the weakening of these networks, 
besides judicial intervention. Lack of leadership could play an important role.25 Earlier 
leaders were often older figures who came from abroad and brought with them a knowledge 
of the Arabic language and Islam as well as international contacts, such as the Syrian activist 
who inspired the Hofstad Group. He had prestige because in Syria he had been a member of 
the prohibited Muslim Brotherhood, for which he had to flee. He managed to draw potentially 
radical Muslim youths from the mosques they were attending, such as the Al Tawheed 
mosque in Amsterdam and the Sunah mosque in The Hague.26 In addition, well-known 
leadership figures have left the Netherlands in recent years (voluntarily or involuntarily), and 
apparently there are no other potential leaders in the country who are willing to assume a 
central role.27 This probably means that the networks have had to struggle with internal 
divisions and dwindling memberships more than in the past.28 
 
The availability of an alternative discourse may also have influenced the shrinking of the 
jihadist networks. Nonviolent alternatives to jihadist ideology are now being offered.29 In 
addition, political Salafism may have undergone a certain process of professionalisation. The 
message today is more geared to specific target groups and local conditions. In the opinion of 
the authorities, this puts an end to any immediate threat of violence and acute danger to the 
democratic rule of law. The AIVD is still attuned to signs of insidious processes that would 
undermine social cohesion and community solidarity and threaten basic rights. But the radical 
Islamic message is receiving little response within the Dutch Islamic community, where 
resilience and active resistance are growing.30 Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the possibility 
that this current might develop into a force of political activists, as it did in Belgium in the 
case of the young organisation Sharia4Belgium. This organisation wants to introduce the 
caliphate in Belgium, with Islamic laws and rules (Sharia).31 
 
What are the actual numbers involved? In 2002 there were a few dozen persons involved in 
the recruitment process, according to the AIVD.32 There were mostly men between the ages 
of 18 and 32. In 2005 the Ministry of Justice reported that the hard core of radical Islam was 
small and numbered no more than a few hundred persons.33 This seems to have been the high 
point of the local networks. Since 2006 there has been a marked reduction in the threat that 
these networks have posed. The AIVD reported that there were between ten and twenty 
independent structures that could be regarded as jihadist networks in the Netherlands at that 
time.34 A few Turkish Dutch people are also still actively distributing radical texts via 
websites and by personally approaching candidates for conversion. The Hofstad Group 
remains a source of inspiration for a radical Islamic youth culture.  
While the domestic threat is decreasing, the influence of transnational jihadist networks has 
picked up in recent years. Almost all the activities of Dutch jihadists in 2010 were directed 
towards fighting jihad in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia.35 Recent academic research 
shows that the proportion of strict orthodox believers from Islamic countries of origin is 
between 4 and 7%. Strict orthodox believers are more apt to legitimise the use of violence, 
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and for this reason they may be more susceptible to radicalisation.36 Concrete data on the 
number of persons that can be regarded as extremist are lacking, however. 
 
5.4.1 Municipalities  
Research on local Muslim extremism has been carried out in a number of Dutch 
municipalities in recent years. Radicalisation exists in the city of Utrecht, but it seems to be 
limited to a small group of individuals. There is no indication that jihadist organisations are 
active there, although a number of persons have attracted the attention of special services.37 
The Institute for Training and Education (Instituut voor Opleiding en Educatie; IVOE), which 
offers various courses in Islamism, has been criticised for making certain statements.38  
In Flevoland little visible radicalisation has been observed, with only a few exceptions.39 
Tilburg reports that about twenty young people between the ages of 15 and 30 may be 
undergoing radicalisation. They are thought to be sympathetic with the jihadist variant of 
Salafism, but they do not form a coherent group.40 The anti-integration activities of the 
Islamic Foundation for Education and Transfer of Knowledge (Stichting voor Opvoeding en 
Overdracht van Kennis) and its Salafist predecessor, which is widely known throughout 
Europe, is also a cause for concern.41 
The situation in Rotterdam has been brought to light thanks to the Radicalisation Help Desk 
(Informatie Schakelpunt Radicalisering; ISPR).42 The nature of the information being 
reported provides insight into what the broader public experiences as radicalisation. In 2006 
there were 51 reports: 41 about men, three about women and three about organisations. The 
nature of the reports is highly varied: clothing with provocative texts; a call to jihad on an 
Arabic site that had originated in Rotterdam; a building being used as a mosque in breach of 
the zoning plan; students who show their opposition to Dutch society by means of extremist 
remarks; sudden drastic changes in conduct and appearance; persons at a reintegration agency 
who were caught visiting internet sites with instructions on how to make explosives; as well 
as reports of persons who are not working, not receiving any government assistance and are 
not attending school. Between April 2007 and April 2008 the ISPR in Rotterdam received a 
total of 21 reports. Three had to do with a mosque, two with an organisation and one with an 
ideological movement; fifteen reports had to do with persons. Twelve reports were about men 
and three about women. A number of reports concerned persons with psychological 
problems.43 In general the reports were more serious than in previous years, and for this 
reason some of them were immediately passed on to the police.44 
The picture that emerges from the signals in Rotterdam is not easy to translate into a 
quantitative statement about the scale of radicalisation. It is striking, however, that in most 
cases there are indications of a many-sided problem. In addition to radicalisation, problems 
such as truancy and petty crime also play a role.45  
 
This gives us an idea of the situation based on available data. It is somewhat fragmented and 
mainly reflects global developments. But there is another route we can take that will provide 
us with even more insight into the phenomenon of Islamic extremism in the Netherlands . 
This involves taking a closer look at the ideological aspects. 
 
5.5 Ideology 
What does the ideology of Islamic extremism offer its followers (and potential followers) in 
European migration countries? What follows is a point-by-point summary in which 
distinctions are made between negative aspects − elements that Islamic activists reject − and 
positive aspects − elements they support. We’ll narrow the field down to the Salafist jihadist 
current within Islamic activism. It is striking that everything that does not belong to the group 
or ideology itself is rejected. This absolutist ideology results in a strongly separatist attitude, 
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even within the Islamic community. 
 
Negative aspects of Islamist ideologies rejected by followers. 
Islamist extremism: 
− denounces non-jihadist currents within both Islam and Salafism; 
− condemns other religions; 
− rejects Western culture and its underlying values; 
− rejects the democratic rule of law; 
− denounces all existing political systems of human design and the government institutions 
that maintain them, including parliament and judicial power. 
 
Positive aspects of Islamist ideologies supported by followers. 
Islamist extremism offers: 
− an ideology of justice; 
− the construction of a group identity that opens the way to identification with Muslims 
worldwide; 
− ways to find social connection and companionship; 
− a framework for interpreting social and political problems and relations, both nationally 
and internationally. This conceptual framework is characterised by absolutism, dogmatism 
and dualism; 
− clear rules and guidelines for a correct, morally sound and pious life; 
− a position as a chosen people with a certain religious authority in the vanguard of 
worldwide jihad, the armed struggle against all social forces that do not endorse jihadist 
ideology, with the will of Allah as legitimation. 
  
The next section describes a small, closed group of young radicalised Dutch Islamists in 
terms of the local colour they have imparted to their visions and viewpoints. They have 
interpreted the faith in their own way and were inspired by the ideological focal points listed 
above. The texts that were found on the computer of the members of the Hofstad Group and 
the suspects in the Piranha case are of primary importance here.46 For the individuals 
involved, the internet has proved to be an important instrument. It has provided group 
members with the information they were looking for and has answered their questions. The 
internet enabled them to express a process of radicalisation that strengthened their self-image, 
to assume a political identity and to construct a sense of belonging. On the internet they 
found people who recognised their frustrations, acknowledged their contributions and 
confirmed them in their convictions. With the help of this instrument, they tried to persuade 
others of the truth of jihadist ideology while hiding behind pseudonyms. By means of the 
internet they could easily conceal their personal identity and their deeds from the outside 
world. What themes did they advance in their texts on the internet? How did they combine 
religion with social themes, Salafist jihadism and Dutch context? 
 
5.6 Texts from the Hofstad group and the Piranha group  
Before the Islamic extremist group to which Mohamed B. belonged was labelled the Hofstad 
Group, it had given itself both a name and a logo: the Lions of Tawheed.47 Within the circular 
logo are two orange Dutch lions, each facing an open Koran with a rising sun in the 
background wreathed by the text Leeuwen van Tawheed (Lions of Tawheed). In the 
foreground at the bottom are two crossed swords with Poldermujahideen (Mujahideen of the 
Polder) written between them.48  
Both the texts, with their reference to native symbols such as ‘the polder’ and ‘lions’, and the 
visual depiction of two orange lions of Holland are apparently an effort on the part of the 
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designers to underscore the Dutch character of the group, which the logo is supposed to 
represent. It doesn’t get any more Dutch than that. The use of these symbols should be seen 
as an attempt to inhibit the group’s own isolation. It is interesting that Hans Janmaat, the 
former politician who led the right-wing extremist Centre Party, made use of the same 
symbolism to undergird his message. He promised he’d get the Dutch lion to roar.49 The lions 
of Tawheed express their threats with similar imagery: ‘the roaring of the Lions of Tawheed 
will never cease.’50 
 
For the trial against the Hofstad Group and the Piranha case, Arabists have analysed the 
contents and ideological meaning of documents found on the computers of both groups. The 
following summary makes use of their findings.51 
 
Meijer divided the documents that were found into general Salafist, political-Salafist and 
jihadist-Salafist texts. A number of the Dutch texts may have been written by network 
members themselves. Other texts were from authoritative, classical authors, Saudi Salafist 
sheiks and twentieth-century fundamentalist thinkers. 
 
The general Salafist texts concern original Islamic materials and discussions of belief, 
disbelief and idolatry. Texts in the category of political Salafism have to do with texts with a 
political message that is not revolutionary or violent. In the jihadist-Salafist texts, jihad is the 
central theme. The aim of jihad is to strip political and religious authorities of their power by 
violent means and forcibly to overtake everyone else who does not belong to the jihadist 
group or ideology. Muslims are specifically singled out as being part of this target. Muslims 
who participate in bodies and institutions of Western society and who work and associate 
with non-Muslims are regarded as infidels by jihadist-Salafists. 
 
In the case of some members of these Islamic groups, hundreds of documents and audiovisual 
productions were found. Among these were pamphlets calling for an election boycott. But 
other pamphlets called on people to boycott working in supermarkets. An autobiography and 
a last will and testament video were found of someone who apparently was planning to give 
up his life in an attack on parts of the Dutch population. According to him, members of the 
public were collaborators in ‘the war against Islam’, and that justified an attack. Also found 
in this jihadistic category were instructions for guerrilla tactics and visual material used to 
propagate jihad and martyrdom. The quotes that are cited below give us an idea of the texts 
and the way the ideological points are verbalised.52  
 
Included among the found texts were Lions of Tawheed productions, such as practical 
instructions for staying clear of the police and security services. A few rules from a ten-point 
checklist read as follows: ‘cleanse your house of all evidence’, ‘be inconspicuous’ and ‘don’t 
disclose group secrets to your wife or to others’. The Lions of Tawheed also recite a recorded 
poem: 
 
‘We are marching under the black flag / We fight neither for power nor bread / But for the Word 
of Allah / No can harm us / Longing for the martyr’s death [...]’ 
 
Open letters were found addressed to individual politicians as well as to groups such as the 
Islamic youth. There is a separate booklet for explaining Salafist doctrine to children in 
which they are warned against associating with people who do not believe in Allah. 
 
The polder jihadists appear to be obsessed with the borders between true believers − jihadists 
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− and the rest of society, be they secular, Christian or Islamic. The ultimate consequence of 
their way of thinking is a separatist division from regular society, which is the basis of the 
call to stop working in supermarkets. Supermarkets must be boycotted because unlawful 
products are sold there. 
 
‘Just ask yourself: how many products do you run across the scanner every day? A thousand? Five 
thousand, perhaps? Every Haram product that you sell is one more sin! Is the salary worth that to 
you?!!! The sins your customers commit, and the illnesses and accidents that result from them, lie 
partly on your shoulders! When people commit adultery, attack each other or even commit murder 
under the influence of alcohol, it is your fault as well!’  
 
Separatism is also expressed in the avoidance of institutions. Even mosques are avoided, and 
believers get together in small living room gatherings. Not only are extremists forbidden to 
come in contact with unbelievers but they are also required to hate them, as the next quote 
reveals: 
 
‘The believer cannot be an alliance [sic] with the enemies of Allah, and it is impossible for a 
person to combine love for Allah (swt) with love for His enemies, because this is a combination of 
opposites. Therefore: he who loves Allah (swt) must also hate His enemies.’ 
 
With regard to religion, four guiding principles are followed: the monotheistic oneness of 
God (tawheed); the absolute rejection of polytheism and idolatry; exact guidelines for the 
Right Way − life according to the teachings; and jihad. According to this view, jihad is the 
only path to both self-realisation and social change. 
 
Of the four principles, the rejection of idolatry is the one in which religion and social 
problems are most strongly connected.53 This is because idolatry is understood in very broad 
terms. It includes not only the gods of other religions but also all worldly authorities such as 
national and local governments, the police and the judicial authorities. Democracy and the 
rule of law are rejected and also fall under the notion of ‘idolatry’ because they are developed 
by human minds, and the people who created these systems equated themselves with God. 
Moreover, Western society, which is founded on these democratic institutions, is regarded as 
morally depraved and corrupt. Evidence of this depravity can be seen in prostitution, the 
toleration of adultery, the acceptance of homosexuality, drugs and coffee shops, the payment 
of interest and all other temptations of the Western world that are so hard for even a pious 
Muslim to resist. The next quote shows how jihadists view Dutch society, which in their eyes 
is morally corrupt: 
 
‘No, the Netherlands is not a land of freedom for everyone. It is for alcoholics, drug users, the 
immoral, etc., with all the consequences [of such behaviour]. They can do as they like, and when 
they go too far their punishment is light: ‘they also have rights’ and ‘they had a difficult 
childhood’. It is a brutal, upside-down world where the gentle, honest and kind-hearted people are 
often the victims. The psychiatric institutions are full, suicide is common, people complain bitterly 
and they grudge each other everything. Rape, child pornography, abuse of women, theft, 
discrimination, bullying, disrespectful behaviour, etc., etc. is the order of the day. No, the 
Netherlands is far from civilised, and it is time that people looked in the mirror and left innocent 
Islam alone.’ 
 
It goes without saying that integration in this depraved society is to be absolutely repudiated. 
In his text ‘Islam and integration’, Mohamed B. uses compelling images to encourage women 
to resist integration: 
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‘Society has dragged you into all kinds of discussions on integration, and you even have become 
pawns in the hands of wicked people who carry on political campaigns in your name, appointing 
themselves the liberators of the Islamic woman. Your husbands are accused of having committed 
all kinds of crimes against you, and despite this enormous social pressure you stand firm in your 
principles, as a rock in the surf defies the pounding waves. Your sacrifice, your silent suffering, 
your perseverance and your determination has not been in vain. It will lead your soul to unknown 
heights, while society drowns in its own arrogant, selfish desires and base passions, and thinks that 
this is amusement and a liberation from all chains and limitations.’ 
 
The polder jihadists are convinced that they are the only ones who represent the truth and that 
they carry on the struggle for a legitimate cause as resistance fighters in a war of liberation. 
This is attested by the concepts used in the last quoted passage such as ‘perseverance’, 
‘determination’ and the Dutch metaphor ‘rock in the surf’. Opponents are portrayed as 
‘wicked people’ with ‘arrogant, selfish desires and base passions’. The media are also targets 
of criticism. The media are ‘satanic accomplices’ who take the masses hostage and cram lies 
down their throats. In the piece ‘This is the way’, Mohamed B. articulates this view under his 
pseudonym Mohamed Zubair. 
 
‘[...] And as we have noticed all around us, the Satanic media has done its work. This great Satan 
makes itself known to us as soon as we awaken from sleep. Under the guise of news and current 
affairs, the lies are forced on the masses. In the Netherlands it has gone so far that that these lies 
are offered to us for free at all the bus stops and train stations. Just look: people are not given a 
single chance to catch their breath in order to free themselves from this deceitful hostage taker.’ 
 
Then there is the ‘crusade’ that the West is carrying out against Islam in the eyes of the 
jihadists. For the jihadists the war is being fought on many fronts. In this war, which is an 
apocalyptic battle between good and evil, they are the chosen martyrs for a righteous cause. 
Paradoxically enough, the prospect of death is meant to give direction to the lives of these 
social desperados, who see themselves as part of a transnational vanguard of the umma, the 
community of believers. Awaiting them is a plentiful reward in the heavenly paradise. The 
depravity of everything Western extends far beyond non-Islamic religious and secular 
authorities and Western institutions. The target of jihadistic thinking and the potential victims 
of terrorist acts are not only these institutions and those who direct them, but all individuals − 
men, woman and children. After all, these are the citizens who elected the authorities and 
established the depraved institutions. That makes them collaborators at the very least. In the 
following quote, these citizens are being addressed: 
 
‘You all want democracy, which means you all are responsible for the deeds of your government. 
Your army, which slaughters our brothers and fighters and defenders of the oneness of Allah in 
Iraq and delivers them up to the Americans and the British. You have seen the images of the 
prison in Guantanamo and the prison of Abu Ghraib, the things they are committing there. You 
will be held responsible for those things. By Allah, we will take revenge for every tear that has 
been shed by the mothers and children of the Muslims [...].’ 
 
In this view, there are no innocent citizens. The violent attacks that emerge from Islamic 
extremist groups are not random or haphazard, as is often claimed in the media. Indeed, 
almost everyone is a target because almost everyone is excluded in the jihadist vision of good 
versus evil. This is just as true for Westerners as it is for Islamic believers who reject 
jihadistic ideology. It is not surprising, then, that the support and influence of this ideology is 
dwindling in the Islamic world. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
Islamic extremism is a worldwide socio-political movement whose most radical elements, 
such as the followers of internationally-oriented Salafist jihadism, express themselves in 
terrorist acts. This form of extremism is based on an ideology that is best characterised by 
mechanisms of exclusion, an ideology that also has followers in the Netherlands, particularly 
among Salafist believers. The most important factors that have played a role in the 
development of Islamic extremism from an internal Islamic phenomenon to an international 
phenomenon are the growth of the presence of the West in Muslim countries and the 
increased migration from Muslim countries to the West. In this chapter, special attention is 
paid to young people. Some second-generation young people see a third way in radical 
Islamic views, an alternative for the traditional values of their parents on the one hand and the 
values of a secular society in which they must learn to find their way on the other. The 
Islamic networks that have been the objects of study in recent years consist for the most part 
of young people. For young people, a search for identity and a need for social connection 
figure prominently in the process of radicalisation. Social protest is also important, inspired 
to a significant degree by the experience of social discrimination and exclusion. The internet 
has done a great deal over the past ten years to simplify the accessibility of extremist groups 
and ideology. It has enabled young people to construct their own versions of their faith and to 
establish trans-border contacts. 
In this chapter attention was paid to the situation that has evolved here in the Netherlands in 
recent years. Shedding light on the scale and scope of Islamic extremism in the Netherlands is 
no simple matter. Sources are limited and often they are not scholarly. After a period in 
which local networks were busy with their own agendas, a shift has taken place in recent 
years towards a more international orientation. Local networks became weakened by 
repression, lack of leadership, internal divisions and dwindling support caused by the growth 
of an alternative, nonviolent approach within Salafism. 
 
To illustrate the ideological elements of extremist doctrine, an analysis was conducted of 
texts issued by Dutch networks (now dismantled) in which young people participated. These 
networks − the Hofstad Group and the Piranha Group − tried to portray Islamic extremism as 
a movement with Dutch roots. A variety of Dutch texts were found on the computers of the 
group’s members. This chapter provides some examples of these texts and discusses their key 
ideological points. With regard to religion, the core teaching is the monotheistic oneness of 
God and the rejection of polytheism and idolatry. The rejection of idolatry is mainly 
concerned with worldly authorities and authoritative institutions such as democracy and the 
rule of law. Western society is regarded as morally depraved and corrupt, so Muslims should 
take a stand against integration. In a dualistic struggle between good and evil, the jihadists 
see themselves as the resistance fighters for a legitimate war to defend Islam. All non-
jihadists, including Muslims, are ‘evil’ and are therefore the targets of violent, jihadist 
actions, which means that exclusion should also be seen as a central element of this extremist 
ideology. 
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6 Islamic extremism in police practice 
 
Mark Dechesne and Jaap van Donselaar  
Incidents acquire meaning when they are interpreted in relation to general developments and 
trends. It is for this reason that the systematic documentation and analysis of extremist 
incidents is so important. A Monitor approach can also be of relevance to the many different 
expressions of extremism. So it is striking that Islamic extremism has yet to be dealt with 
from a Monitor angle, even though radical Islamic ideology is seen as the greatest terrorist 
threat of the last decade.1  
In this chapter the focus is on radical Islamic incidents.2 As a way of initiating a Monitor 
study of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands, the incidents are discussed as they were 
reported by the National Police Services Agency (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten; KLPD) 
with regard to the year 2009. There are two important advantages to analysing police reports. 
First, analysing the report sheds light on the nature of the incidents and helps identify 
possible trends. Second, the analysis of police data is a good opportunity to reflect on the 
benefit and design of a Monitor study of Islamic radicalism.  
 
6.1 Islamic extremism in a nutshell 
Islamic extremism has figured heavily in the way the public perceives expressions of 
extremism in recent years and in the development of counterterrorism in the Netherlands. 
Special attention has been paid to ‘Salafist jihadism’. This ideology spread throughout the 
Western world during the eighties and early nineties, when it was organised into a movement. 
Since then it has developed in both content and appearance. Al-Qaida is perhaps its most 
salient form of expression. 
 
The International Crisis Group3 has identified three combat theses for this movement: 
1. An internal struggle within the Islamic world in which the present regimes are 
believed to have allowed true Islam to have been overpowered by egotism and 
material gain. 
2. An irredentist struggle aimed at restoring the old caliphate in which the role, and 
sometimes the rule, of non-Islamic governments in the Islamic world is criticised and 
challenged. 
3. A worldwide struggle to defend ‘true’ Islam against outside influences. 
 
In these combat themes, the characteristic Islamic struggle (jihad) is interpreted in terms of its 
militant variant. Another important feature has to do with the puritanical interpretation of 
Islam. The true believer submits himself to the absolute sovereignty and oneness of God 
(tawheed), and moderate Muslims and nonbelievers are to be excluded or punished (takfir). 
In the eighties, subsidies from the Arab world funded the construction of new, internationally 
oriented mosques in Europe. These mosques gave Salafist jihadist preachers a platform for 
expressing and spreading their ideology. The message of victimhood (the message that Islam 
is being threatened and Muslims around the world are being oppressed), absolutism (the 
message of the ‘oneness’ of God) and battle readiness (a number of preachers had fought in 
Afghanistan or in other hotbeds of unrest) inspired young Muslim immigrants in particular, 
leading to the emergence of militant social networks with the mosques as their hub. 
 
On 11 September 2001 the danger of this development became evident. Al-Qaida had been 
heard from before after the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the attack on 
62
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the attack on the American embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in 1998. But the attacks of 11 September 
2001 amounted to an escalation in terms of size and gravity, and they also drew both the 
politicians and the populations of Europe into the struggle against Salafist jihadism. After all, 
the airplane hijackers had been radicalised in Hamburg. Concern for Islamic extremism in the 
Netherlands was increased after the first large-scale attacks on European soil in Madrid in 
2004, and especially after the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004. 
 
Because of the prominent place that Islamic radicalism has come to occupy in the public 
discourse, answering questions about jihadist networks in Europe, the motives of individual 
members and effective ways to combat such radicalism has become top priority for policy 
makers, law enforcement officials and academics. With the support of the National 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding; NCTb), 
established in 2005, and of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry 
of Justice and the Ministry of Education, several studies were conducted that examined the 
content of Salafist jihadism, support for the ideology, the nature of radical networks, the 
psychology behind radicalisation and deradicalisation, and the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism. Most of these studies involved phenomenon analysis. Trends and 
developments in jihadism in the Netherlands were given less attention. 
 
There are exceptions, however. In several of its reports, the AIVD (General Intelligence and 
Security Service) did focus on trends in jihadism in the Netherlands. The report De 
gewelddadige jihad in Nederland, actuele trends in de islamistisch-terroristische dreiging 
(Violent jihad in the Netherlands, current trends in the Islamic terrorist threat), which came 
out in 2006, describes in general terms how the original exogenous Islamic struggle became a 
European struggle. In addition, jihadists from European countries are increasingly joining up 
with Al-Qaida on their own initiative, and they are also organising themselves, often inspired 
by internet videos. A second exception is the study published on a quarterly basis since 2005 
by the NCTb, Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland (the Terrorist threat in the Netherlands; 
DTN), a global analysis of national and international developments with regard to threats. 
Every six months the NCTb also publishes the counterterrorism progress report, which deals 
with the most important developments in counterterrorist measures. In April 2010 the 
twentieth DTN was published. In June 2010 the twelfth semi-annual report came out. 
 
6.2 Monitor study of Islamic extremism 
The AIVD and NCTb reports are general descriptions of threatening developments. What is 
still lacking is a description of the incidents and a numerical summary of the number and 
nature of those incidents. A Monitor approach can help formulate the discussion of Islamic 
radicalism in more concrete terms. What are we actually talking about? What kinds of 
incidents are taking place? 
 
For the benefit of our research, the IPOL Service4 of the National Police Services Agency 
agreed to give us access to their report of incidents that took place in 2009 and that are at 
least suspected being connected to Islamic radicalism. The incidents are quite diverse in 
nature. They include not only actual incidents but also spurious reports and reports that 
turned out to be false alarms. Within the context of terrorism it is very important that spurious 
reports and false alarms be reported, since terrorism is a form of psychological warfare whose 
tactics consist not only of actual attacks but also of threats. 
The almost four hundred reported incidents form a good basis for exploring the possibilities 
and impracticalities of conducting Monitor research on Islamic radicalism. The data provide 
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us with an interesting look into the kind of Islamic radicalism that the police in the 
Netherlands are now dealing with. 
 
The material that was made available to us for our research is in need of further explanation. 
The almost four hundred incidents are not described in a single uniform way. Some of them 
take up no more than one sentence (such as ‘report of missing passport’) while others go on 
for several paragraphs. All in all, the information is rather meagre, an impression that is 
strengthened by the fact that it is anonymous. The identities of the perpetrators, victims and 
other persons involved were withheld from us. Sometimes the identity of contextual elements 
was also hidden, such as that of a target. Locations and place names are not always clear. 
Moreover, the file contains duplicate counts that cannot all be eliminated owing to the 
aforementioned restrictions, and there are cases that offer so few clues as to possible 
identification that we had to set them aside. There is also some contamination in the file in 
the form of incidents that belong to another category of radicalism. Last but not least, while 
the outcome of some of the incidents is crystal clear − a suspicious suitcase that turned out to 
be a false alarm − in many others the outcome is far from evident, at least to us. 
We decided to accept the file as it is and not to try to initiate a series of improvements right 
away. There is another side to the coin, however: although we can manage quite well with 
questions about the nature of the incidents, questions about the scale of the incidents are 
more troublesome. In general, the research data in the current file do not easily lend 
themselves to quantitative analysis. For this reason we have handled the numbers with 
caution and have limited ourselves to numerical indications, wherever possible. 
 
6.3 Islamic extremism in 2009 
In breaking down the incidents of Islamic extremism, we were not able to avail ourselves of 
the kind of data used in the Monitor study Racial and right-wing extremist violence, which 
were the result of years of tested typology. So we attempted to create a suitable typology 
based on what we found in the 2009 file. Because the resulting structure is based on incidents 
from 2009, it may be of limited relevance. Conceivable types of incidents, such as bombings 
or attempted murder of a specific person, are not included in this typology simply because 
they did not happen in 2009. An overview is given below. 
 
Islamic extremism in police practice, according to category in 2009: 
− threats; 
− bomb scares; 
− white powder letters (or ‘anthrax hoaxes’) 
− assault; 
− possible indication of extremist violence; 
− missing identity document. 
 
In the rest of this section, the various categories will be examined more closely and a number 
of incidents will be described. 
 
6.3.1 Threats  
Threats are defined here as threatening to use violence against a person, a group or an object 
belonging to that person or group. Under criminal law, threat of violence is understood as ‘to 
induce persons to do something or not to do something against their will or against their 
orders.’5 Threats can be defined from the perspective of ‘the threatened’, in which the latter’s 
assessment is decisive for determining what is or is not a threat. Threats can also be defined 
in terms of a distinction often used in criminology between instrumental and expressive 
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offences. According to Bovenkerk et al., this distinction can be effectively applied to the 
phenomenon of threats. ‘The concept of instrumental threat corresponds nicely with the 
definition used in criminal law. The person making the threat wants to exact a concrete result. 
In an expressive threat, the perpetrator is mainly interested in expressing himself 
demonstratively.’6 In our research, we have chosen an approach that comes close to the 
criminal definition: inducing someone under threat of violence to do something or not to do 
something against his will. We have made this choice because it enables us to more clearly 
identify the incidents we were given access to. If we had chosen the perspective of the person 
threatened, for example, then the many reports of suspicious suitcases would have to be 
characterised as threats. Below is a list of example of threats that occur in our inventory. 
 
− Serious threats made by a young Muslim towards a fellow student. The person making the 
threat was known to the police because he was undergoing radicalisation. At school he 
was said to have become more and more isolated and to have a preference for violent 
films, which he watched on the school computer. The suspect emphatically denied any of 
this. 
− An airline pilot was threatened by a member of his crew. Both were Muslims, but the 
person making the threat allegedly thought his colleague was neglecting his religion. The 
question was understandably taken seriously because the conflict could lead to dangerous 
situations during a flight. 
− A Muslim was threatened for associating with Christians. 
− A Muslim was threatened supposedly because he wanted to convert to Christianity. 
− A report came in about a woman who received threatening voicemail messages: 
 
‘Allah is the greatest and you’re going to bleed. We’re going to get you.’ 
 
− Report of an employee at a drug rehabilitation centre who was seriously threatened by a 
(radical) Muslim from his prison cell. 
− A threat was received by a school in Amsterdam where headscarves had been banned 
under the dress code. The father of a Turkish student did not agree. The conflict escalated 
and resulted in serious threats directed towards the teacher. Attempts to calm things down 
proceeded with difficulty. 
 
6.3.2 Bomb scares  
A bomb scare is a message sent by telephone, or sometimes in writing, warning that an 
explosive device is about to go off. Most bomb scares are false alarms. Sometimes a 
distinction is made between bomb scares, which are serious by definition, and bomb threats 
rather than false alarms. In every case the incident contains an announcement. In this study 
we prefer the use of the term ‘bomb scare’ in order to avoid confusion with a bomb threat, 
which is the result of, say, finding a suspicious suitcase without a possible perpetrator having 
reported the existence of the suitcase. The number of incidents in this last category, to which 
we will return later on, is fairly large in our database. In our inventory we came across a 
number of bomb scares which − as far as we can tell − were all false alarms. No explosives 
were found. Below are a few examples. 
 
− A Dutch-speaking man announced by telephone that he had placed a bomb in an eating 
establishment on Rembrandt Square in Amsterdam. The bomb was supposedly enclosed in 
a plastic bag near the lavatories. An investigation yielded nothing. The caller called again 
and discovered that he was not being taken seriously. His telephone number was traced 
and he was arrested. 
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− In January 2009 telephone calls were made to several places (central call centres, the 
media) by a man who said: 
 
‘Allah is great. Greater than our fallen brothers in Gaza. We are going to take revenge. Within 600 
minutes, bombs will explode at three railway stations.’ 
 
− A telephone bomb scare was made by a man speaking barely understandable Dutch to a 
restaurant in Amsterdam: 
 
‘I cannot say who I am. A plastic bomb is going to explode in 94 minutes. Now I am going to call 
the police.’ 
 
The restaurant was not cleared. The motive behind the call was probably not extremism. 
− A bomb scare was made to the Amsterdam Arena. The stadium was not cleared, partly 
because when the call was made it was already emptying out. 
− A bomb scare was called in by an unknown caller who had shielded his caller ID. 
According to the information in our file:  
 
‘The message was very hard to understand. We made out that it was a Dutch-speaking man who 
said that he had placed bombs in all the police stations. You’ve all had it. Watch out. Bye-bye!!!!! 
And the man hung up.’ 
 
− Bomb scares made to various hotels. The messages were anonymous and made by 
telephone in broken English. ‘The man called in the name of Allah and said that he would 
be at the hotel within fifteen minutes and would then set off a bomb,’ according to one of 
the messages. 
 
6.3.3 White powder letter 
A ‘white powder letter’ or ‘anthrax hoax’ may be in indication of so-called ‘CBRN terrorism’ 
(Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear), which, according to the NCTb, is ‘committing 
a terrorist attack by using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials (CBRN 
agents)’. CBRN terrorism does not necessarily involve weapons of mass destruction. It can 
also consist of small-scale attacks that result in few or no victims. CBRN terrorism often 
creates great anxiety among the local inhabitants.7 A white powder letter is a letter that may 
contain (deadly) biological material, such as the anthrax letters that were found in the United 
States at the beginning of the last decade. It is generally presumed that this phenomenon has 
never occurred in Europe. What does happen with quite some frequency − also in the 
Netherlands − is that the suggestion of such an attack is evoked by sending letters containing 
powder that, upon closer inspection, turns out to be harmless, such as laundry detergent. Our 
inventory contains a small number of incidents with white powder letters, which have not 
posed any danger as far as we know. 
 
− A white powder letter was found in Amsterdam. After further investigation the letter 
turned out to contain laundry detergent. 
− A white powder letter was sent to an office in Amsterdam (this had happened at least once 
before). The envelope contained a small plastic bag with power, which proved to be 
harmless. 
− The third incident also took place in Amsterdam. After the letter was opened and the 
powder was discovered, the letter was shut up in a cabinet and the police were alerted. 
 
Whether these anonymous incidents with white powder letters were indications of Islamic 
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extremism or not is something we were not able to deduce from the information made 
available to us. We are dependent on an assessment by the police in this regard. 
 
6.3.4 Assault  
Assault can be defined as deliberately inflicting physical injury or pain on someone against 
his will. In our research we are also looking for any kind of connection with Islamic 
extremism. In the inventory we came across a number of cases of such assault, a few 
examples of which are provided here. 
 
− Report of grievous assault in an asylum seeker centre of a former Muslim who had 
converted to Christianity. 
− Report of the assault of an Afghan woman by her husband, mother-in-law and sister-in-
law. According to the woman, her husband was ‘still normal’ during their engagement, but 
he changed after their marriage. A statement made by the victim reads as follows: 
 
 ‘I knew he was a Muslim, but not that he was so extreme in his beliefs. From the day that we 
began living together he demanded that I wear a headscarf and clothing with long sleeves. I wasn’t 
allowed to speak with other men, either. If I did, I was beaten. I told him I didn’t want to do this, 
and that no one in my family did. From that moment on I was regularly beaten by his mother. If I 
were to leave, he would look for me and murder me.’ 
 
The second example involves domestic violence. In the database there are more cases of 
domestic violence that take place within a religious context, to a greater or lesser degree. 
There is violence with religious motives, but in most cases it is not clear whether extremism 
is also involved or not, at least not from the information available to us. 
 
6.3.5 Possible indication of extremist violence  
The inventory of incidents from 2009 contains a large number of cases that could indicate a 
possible attack or be interpreted as such. The variation is considerable in more than one 
respect. These incidents concern many different kinds of behaviour and situations that can be 
regarded as suspicious. The indications may be rather strong, but some are also what are 
called ‘weak signals’. Some of the cases have not been cleared up, at least as far as we can 
conclude on the basis of the available information, but that is not true in all cases. The cases 
that have been cleared up are often false alarms. Let us begin by giving a number of examples 
from this subcategory, which is relatively extensive: 
 
− A resident of Amsterdam came home to discover an abandoned bag that had been left in 
front of the house. She thought the bag was suspicious. On further investigation the bag 
turned out to be empty. 
− An abandoned, suspicious suitcase was found at an Amsterdam hotel. On further 
investigation the suitcase proved to be empty. 
− A report came in of a suspicious bag that had been left at a children’s playground. The 
perpetrator was still walking around the playground, according to the report. A ‘bomb 
scout’ was sent to the site but nothing was found. 
− A report came in of a suspicious suitcase on a parking level on Arena Boulevard. By the 
time the police arrived at the scene it appeared that the owner had forgotten his suitcase 
and had come back to pick it up. 
− An abandoned, suspicious bag was found on the platform of a train station. It turned out to 
be a forgotten bag containing sports clothing. 
− A hand grenade was reportedly found in a street, but it turned out to be the rubber bulb of 
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a bicycle bell. 
− A report was made about a suspicious bag that had been left behind in an insurance office 
by an angry customer. It was said to contain a hand grenade (handgranaat in Dutch). 
Because of miscommunication, a pomegranate (granaatappel) was mistaken for a hand 
grenade. 
− A report came in of a suspicious package in the lift of an apartment building. It turned out 
to be a homemade explosive, a smoke bomb or a fireworks bomb. 
− A report came in of a suspicious bag at the Van Gogh Museum. The bag turned out to 
contain a blanket. 
− During a Friday evening prayer service in a synagogue, security agents saw a car ride up 
onto the pavement between the street poles and park close to the facade of the synagogue. 
They spoke to the driver, who responded in anger. The police were then notified. The 
driver turned out to be the person who cleaned the nearby school. Parking on the pavement 
was customary. To avoid any more misunderstandings, it was agreed that the driver would 
no longer park there on Friday evenings. 
− A fake bomb was found at a supermarket: a metal can wrapped in tape and with a string 
sticking out. The can contained stones and sand.  
 − An empty suitcase was found in a doorway. It was suspected that the suitcase was put 
there to test the attentiveness of the police. 
− An ammunition chest that had been soldered shut was the cause of great consternation. 
Neither tracker dogs nor X-rays provided an explanation. Finally the chest was found to 
contain stones and had been used as a weight for a large tent. 
− An abandoned grey metal suitcase was found on a square chained to a pole at a tram stop. 
After further investigation the suitcase was found to belong to a street performer. 
 
A second subcategory concerns a few reports of an impending attack or possible preparations 
for such an attack. Here are a few examples: 
 
− Thirty gas cylinders were stolen from a company, each one containing 10.5 kilos of 
propane gas. The cylinders were stolen from the closed grounds of the company. Access to 
the grounds had been gained by means of a simple hole cut in the fence. 
− Security guards for a company in Rotterdam Europoort reported that installations were 
being photographed from a car in the car park. 
− A came in report announcing impending attacks by car bombs to be carried out at four 
different locations. The cars would be bearing fake taxi registration numbers. 
− A report came in from someone who said he was planning to commit an assault at the Gay 
Pride parade. 
− A report came in of a car that was parked near the fence of a gas distribution station. The 
report read: 
 
‘The passengers were a man of about 50 with a beard and a woman of about 35 wearing a 
headscarf.’ 
 
− A report came in of an incident of vandalism in which a hand grenade was quite likely 
used. 
− Two suspicious cars were observed at the site of the NAM (Nederlandse Aardolie 
Maatschappij / Dutch Petroleum Company).  
− A report came in of an Arabic-speaking man who was acting suspiciously (taking 
photographs) in the vicinity of a synagogue. 
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The file contains other reports of the behaviour of persons being monitored by the 
government (or bits of information concerning them). These concern moving house, for 
example, or travel.  
 
A third subcategory consists of ‘weak signals’. This is related to the previous category, but 
the indications are less strong: 
− Various reports of persons with psychological disorders who make remarks of a radical 
religious nature. 
− Many reports of persons who make more or less radical remarks that mention outer 
physical characteristics, mainly beards and traditional clothing. 
− A report that a group of Afghan youths were possibly being radicalised, and a report that a 
young Afghan boy had gone missing. 
− A report about a man who went to the video rental shop and asked to see DVDs about 
terrorist attacks. 
− A report about a knowledge migrant of Algerian origin who was said to be an expert 
electrotechnician. The man had become an object of attention for committing domestic 
violence. There seemed to be uncertainty as to whether he was studying in the Netherlands 
or was working in France. 
− A report about a student who was very interested in terrorist attacks and who wanted to 
follow a course of study that ‘at least’ included a course in chemistry. 
− Radical remarks were overheard during a fight involving Moroccan youths at a first aid 
station. 
− A report from a man who was worried about his brother and thought he was becoming 
radicalised. The brother had asked him: 
 
‘What would you think if I were to become a martyr?’ 
 
− A report from a father who was worried about his son. The son had become acquainted 
with an Algerian via the mosque who was exerting great influence on him. The son had 
lost interest in school and would probably fail his final exams for the second time. He had 
become a strict believer, had stopped watching television and was withdrawing further and 
further. He had also tried to talk his sister into wearing a headscarf. 
− A report from a woman about her ex-husband, who said he wanted to say good-bye to 
their children before leaving the Netherlands. 
− A suspicious envelope was left at a post office. According to the reporter: ‘It seemed to be 
a gun by the feel of it. The envelope was opened with great care on account of possible 
fingerprints. It contained a very rusty weapon of the Walther PPK brand.’ 
 
6.3.6 Missing identity documents 
Ever since 11 September 2001, great value has been placed on personal data in the struggle 
against terrorism. Because so much terrorist activity is transnational, the registration of 
personal data, also known as PNR data (Passenger Name Record), is of great importance. 
PNR data are linked to travel, usually by air, and include passport data, name, address, 
telephone number, travel agent, credit card number, history of changes in the flight schedule, 
seat preference and other information. Any missing PNR data may be connected to malicious 
intent. In our inventory for the year 2009 there is a relatively large number of reports of 
missing identity documents − more than forty − which justifies the creation of a separate 
category. These reports are based not only on the loss itself but also on one or more clues 
indicated in the context of that loss. It should be noted that because the data have been 
rendered anonymous we were not able to assess these indications ourselves. These are a few 
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examples of the reports from our inventory: 
 
− Report of a declaration filed of a missing driving licence. In 2004 the person involved had 
also filed an official declaration of a missing driving licence. 
− Report of a declaration filed of a missing passport, also in 2008. 
− Report of a declaration filed of a missing Afghan passport. 
− Report of a driving licence lost in Iran. 
− Report about someone who had lost his travel documents four times within a span of a few 
years. 
− Report about someone who claimed to have lost his identity document six times. 
 
6.4 Trends: incidents over time 
In addition to breaking down and describing the individual incidents, we also were curious as 
to how the incidents can be placed over time. Figure 6.1 shows how the incidents developed 
chronologically. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Number of incidents 
 
  
 
The time line contains only data that is mentioned in the database, which explains why the 
time line is condensed. There are no incidents mentioned for the period from 20 February to 
19 May and in the month of December, so these time periods are not shown in the graphic. 
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This observation strengthens the impression that can also be deduced from the figure: the 
incidents are concentrated around a number of peaks that consist of no more than a few days. 
 
The period 5-6 January is the first incident peak. These were different sorts of incidents that 
mainly took place in Amsterdam. The police found a few suspicious suitcases and expressed 
concern about individuals from a few problem families in Amsterdam who were becoming 
radicalised. 
 
The days 16 and 17 January were mainly marked by a number of reports of possible attacks 
or preparations for attacks. The reports were varied in nature and origin. Follow-up 
investigations were deemed unnecessary. 
 
The period 13 to 20 February was mainly characterised by questionable travel documents 
and identification papers. On 19 February a number of suspicious suitcases were also 
checked. 
 
The days of 8-9 June contained a concentration of incidents without any clear theme. A 
person without a residence permit was checked, for example, and a noisy troublemaker was 
questioned. 
 
The period 23 June-3 July was marked by a striking number of bomb scares and reports of 
suspicious suitcases and objects. This was also the period following the elections in Iran, and 
demonstrations against the political situation there were also held in the Netherlands. 
 
In the period 14-18 July there were a large number of cases of missing identity documents, 
possibly as a result of the beginning of the summer holiday. The rest of the incidents were 
related to problems of a social nature. 
 
In the period 13-25 August the largest increase in incidents occurred. These consisted mainly 
of a large number of lost passports or of identity checks. There were also a few cases in 
which ethnic minorities were threatened because they expressed their preference for a non-
Islamic lifestyle. 
 
In the period 19-29 October there were various reports of suspicious suitcases. In a number of 
incidents, commercial establishments (call shops and eating establishments) and persons were 
regarded as suspicious. 
 
The period 19-21 November contained mainly bomb scares that were false alarms. A few 
disturbed persons making religious comments were also noticed and registered. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In the beginning of the chapter we tossed up these questions: what do we actually mean when 
we say ‘Islamic radicalism’ and what kinds of incidents have occurred? 
We tried to answer these questions based on a file of police data for the year 2009 (which is 
limited in several ways). The types of incidents can be broken down into threats, bomb 
scares, white powder letters, assaults, missing identity documents and possible indications of 
extremist violence. The last category is more diverse than the others and could be further 
broken down into the subcategories ‘indication but false alarm’, ‘indication of an attack’ and 
‘weak signal’. 
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Islamic extremism in police practice, according to category in 2009: 
 
− threats; 
− bomb scares; 
− white powder letters; 
− assaults; 
− missing identity documents; 
− possible indication of extremist violence: 
• indication, but false alarm; 
• indication of attack; 
• weak signal. 
 
We made a number of striking research findings: 
 
− We found no clear indication of an actual attack. We do not rule out the possibility that 
serious indications did take place outside the database made available to us. 
− We found few cases of actual violent incidents. 
− From the incidents it can be deduced that in 2009 there was a high level of perceived 
threats. 
− In actual practice, this sense of threat appears to be related to religious orthodoxy and 
outer characteristics of such orthodoxy. 
− In actual practice, drawing a border between the threat of religious violence and that of 
extremist violence is not easy. 
− The perceived threats have been the focus of intense police attention, in which it later was 
established that the vast majority were false alarms. 
− Thus in the case of false alarms, the connection with Islamic extremism consisted of the 
fear of the phenomenon alone. 
 
Although a good number of the incidents did have a possible connection with Islamic 
extremism, many proved to be spurious reports or false alarms. None of the incidents resulted 
in an actual attack or was even an indication of an elevated risk. 
 
But can we gather from this that there is no danger of Islamic extremism? Or that all the 
efforts to combat Islamic extremism have been for naught? It can well be argued that the 
major attacks of 11 September 2001 and later in Madrid and London, as well as the murder of 
Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004, partly spurred by the media, created a climate of fear 
or moral panic, so that even trivial events are seen in the light of the danger of terrorism. An 
abandoned suitcase can quickly be seen as a threatening attack, and a man with a beard as a 
potential terrorist. An example from our inventory is mistaking an abandoned rubber bulb 
from a bicycle horn found in the street for a hand grenade.  
This brings us to the question whether there might not be far fewer incidents if less attention 
was paid to combating terrorism. But it’s not that simple. Terrorism is essentially intended as 
a form of psychological warfare in which the aim is not so much killing people as creating 
fear. We see this effect reflected in the incidents of 2009. But even if terrorism were to 
disappear from sight under the influence of large numbers of false alarms, the effect of an 
actual attack would be considerable. Despite all indications to the contrary, vigilance is still 
in order. 
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1 See Ideologie en strategie van het jihadisme, The Hague: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding 2009, 
p. 3, <http://www.nctb.nl/Images/NCTb-JihadismeNL1_ tcm91-239748.pdf> (8 October 2010). 
2 The concepts of ‘radicalism’ and ‘radicalisation’ have come into full use in the Netherlands. It sometimes 
happens that ‘radicalism’ is used when ‘extremism’ might be preferable. Opinions may differ as to whether 
radicalism and extremism are identical or different as concepts. This discussion will not be conducted or 
repeated here. In this chapter, extremism and radicalism are regarded as the same and are used synonymously. 
For a more detailed discussion, see for example J. van Donselaar, Rechts Radicalisme, in: H. Moors et al., 
Polarisatie en radicalisering in Nederland. Een verkenning van de stand van zaken in 2009, Tilburg: IVA 
Beleidsonderzoek en Advies 2009, pp. 78-88, <http://www.iva.nl/uploads/documents/166. pdf> (8 October 
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7 See Vraag en antwoord CBRN-terrorisme: antwoord op veelgestelde vragen over CBRN-terrorisme 
<http://www.nctb.nl/Diverse_vragen_en_antwoorden/ CBRN_terrorisme/overzichtspagina_faq_CBRN.aspx> (7 
October 2010). 
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7 On gas chambers, Jewish Nazis and noses  
 
Evelien Gans 
 
Antisemitism1  has a long history, with the Holocaust of the Second World War as the low 
deep point. This chapter2 is an examination of the way in which antisemitism has developed 
in the Netherlands since that war. Important factors in this development have been the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict (section 7.2), the ‘blaming the victim’ paradox (section 7.3), the 
dominance of the Shoah (section 7.4), Philosemitism (section 7.5) and football hooliganism 
(section 7.6). Section 7.7 will treat the fatal triangle consisting of antisemitism, anti-Zionism 
and criticism of Israel, and section 7.8 will discuss the impact of the ‘new Dutch’ on 
antisemitism. But first the introduction (section 7.1), with an explanation of antisemitic 
utterances as a phenomenon. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
‘The entire Utrechtsestraat was filled with people. An especially large number of middle-aged 
women in traditional Moroccan clothing with headscarves (you don’t see that very often in the 
Utrechtsestraat, since Amsterdam is quite segregated). I remember thinking: all those women have 
come out of their houses and neighbourhoods; they’ve come for this demonstration, but otherwise 
it’s not allowed.... People were shouting the most appalling things, like ‘all Jews to the gas 
chambers’. I was more angry than scared, and I walked up to one of the young men and said 
something like, ‘Do you have any idea what you’re saying?’ It was a feeling of powerless rage, 
mixed with depression and a bit of anxiety. The crowd was really massive, even more so because 
of the narrow street, which was full as far as the eye could see.’3 
 
The speaker was a chance spectator, an Amsterdam woman with a Jewish background who 
lives with her family not far from the Utrechtsestraat and sometimes does her shopping there. 
On Saturday afternoon, 13 April 2002, the centre of Amsterdam became the backdrop for a 
massive pro-Palestinian or anti-Israel demonstration billed as ‘Stop the war against the 
Palestinians’. With about 15,000 participants (estimates ran from 10,000 to 30,000), the main 
organiser, the Nederlands Palestina Komitee, succeeded in mobilising the largest number of 
demonstrators in the Netherlands since the protest against the Euro summit in 1997.4 The 
composition of the demonstration was varied, but Moroccan and Turkish Dutch people were 
in the majority. The speakers included representatives of Turkish and Moroccans 
organisations as well as politicians from D66 (Democrats ’66, a national political party), 
GreenLeft (GroenLinks) and the Socialist Party. The International Socialists called for 
participation, as did Another Jewish Voice and Women in Black. The demonstration received 
a great deal of media coverage because of its size and the unprecedented number of non-
native demonstrators, but it attracted at least as much attention because of the controversial 
content of some of the banners and slogans. At the end of the afternoon the demonstration 
returned to its starting point at Dam Square, where it got out of hand. A visibly Jewish man 
(with yarmulke) was beaten up. A group of Moroccan youths clashed with the police; there 
were nineteen arrests. 
 
On the Marokko Community website the mood was euphoric. ‘I just got home from 
Amsterdam and it was a fantastic day. Everyone felt a sense of oneness. There were also 
many native Dutch people walking with us and people from every kind of background.’ And, 
‘the media made it sound as if there were riots following a demonstration ... but there was a 
demonstration with a few minor disturbances at the end.’ A third participant applauded the 
‘unity among so many cultures’ but complained about ‘that Jewish press! Sub7anallah! Now 
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I’ve seen with my own eyes how they twist the facts!’5 On 20 June 2002 questions were 
asked in the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament about various punishable comments 
made during the demonstration. The Amsterdam Discrimination Reporting Centre counted 75 
swastikas. Other attempts were also made to assess the scale of the comparisons between 
Nazi Germany and Israel: banners featuring Sharon with a Hitler moustache, ‘Israel Nazi 
state’, ‘Stop the Palestinian holocaust’. Among the outright antisemitic slogans such as ‘Jews 
are dogs’ and ‘Juden raus’ was the ever-popular ‘Hamas, Hamas, alle joden aan het gas’ 
(‘Hamas, Hamas, all Jews to the gas chambers’). How is this slogan to be interpreted in the 
year 2002, in which the Jews are being sent retroactively to the gas chambers? April 2002 
was not the first time it was heard. Who introduced this catchphrase? What is its history? 
What is its function? And why is this antisemitic curse linked to Hamas, the Palestinian 
extremist party and Islamic rival of the PLO? In short, what happened to the memory of the 
gas chambers, where the Jews of Europe were massively and industrially exterminated? 
 
7.2 The globalisation of the Israel-Palestine conflict  
On the face of it, the Amsterdam demonstration of 13 April 2002 was only about foreign 
politics. On 28 September 2000, Ariel Sharon, the leader of the opposition in Israel at the 
time, along with hundreds of Israeli soldiers and security personnel, visited the Temple 
Mount in Jerusalem, a historic site that had already been the object of heated confrontations 
between Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Until the first century CE it was the location of the 
Second Temple, of which the so-called Wailing Wall at the foot of the mount, a holy site for 
Jews, is a reminder. On the mount itself is the Al Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site for 
Islam after Mecca and Medina. Seven years had passed since the Oslo Accords were signed 
between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993, partly as a result of the first Palestinian Uprising 
(Intifada), which had erupted in 1987 in response to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank 
and Gaza. 
After the initial optimism and the first actual steps, such as the transfer by Israel of the 
territory on the West Bank to the so-called Palestinian Authority (PA), the peace process 
quickly stagnated. In the Palestinian camp, which had the most to win, the disillusionment 
was especially great and hopes for a just peace evaporated. Sharon’s visit, with its military 
display, was interpreted as a provocation and marked the beginning of the Second Intifada. 
Israel and the now partly autonomous Palestinian territories found themselves in a spiral of 
violence in which many civilians were killed on both sides as a result of military offensives 
and liquidations on the part of Israel and suicide attacks on the part of Palestine. Israel was 
and remains the dominant party. By mid-2005, three to four times more Palestinians had died 
than Israelis.6 It was January 2005 before Sharon − now prime minister of Israel − and the 
Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas agreed to cease hostilities. 
 
Right from the start of the Second Intifada, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict spread far beyond 
its actual borders and stayed there. Both population groups − Jewish Israelis and Arabic 
Palestinians − were adopted, as it were, by companion, co-religionists and sympathisers 
around the world. The conflict was globalised. Other events that triggered the demonstrations 
of 13 April 2002 (similar events were held in London and other cities) were the Israeli attacks 
on Palestinian cities such as Bethlehem and Ramallah (the headquarters of Yasser Arafat) 
and, on 3 April, on the refugee camp near the Palestinian city of Jenin, which Israel claimed 
was a hotbed of terrorism and the whereabouts of two perpetrators of recent suicide attacks. 
Palestinian sources spread the rumour that the Israeli army had carried out a bloodbath at 
Jenin, with 400 to 1,400 Palestinian victims. This led to worldwide indignation. 
After initial opposition, Israel allowed the organisation Human Rights Watch to enter the area 
at the end of April. They determined that 52 Palestinians (among them 22 civilians) and 23 
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Israeli soldiers had died: considerably fewer Palestinian dead than had originally been 
claimed. Israel was accused of human rights violations, however, such as insufficiently 
distinguishing between military and civilian targets, attacking and killing medical personnel, 
using civilians as human shields and disproportionate destruction of the civilian 
infrastructure. The indictment against the Palestinian militants was that they had endangered 
their own population by placing explosives in the homes of civilians.7 
 
‘Jenin’ can be seen as a symbol of the hopeless pattern in which the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has become embroiled. Moreover, it is yet another example of a propaganda war in 
which Israel’s modern, state-of-the-art media and information machine is pitted against a 
much more primitive Palestinian apparatus, which nevertheless is sometimes extraordinarily 
effective. The demonstration of 13 April did not protest the suicide attack that had preceded 
‘Jenin’, carried out by Hamas on 27 March against a group holding a Seder in Netanya (29 
dead), nor the suicide attack that followed on 9 April in a bus in Haifa (8 dead). The dead on 
the Israeli side are more quickly dismissed by world opinion than the much greater number of 
dead among the Palestinian population (the same is true for the wounded on both sides, which 
is a separate category). Weighed against the arbitrary nature of the suicide attacks is the 
military superiority of Israel, which does not shrink from taking civilian victims and 
administering collective punishment, pushing the Palestinians into a corner economically and 
humiliating them psychologically. The repressive, corrupt and extremely violent character of 
the leading Palestinian organisations − the PLO and Hamas − which oppose each other and, 
after the 2006 elections, became openly hostile, pales in the shadow of the Israel’s arrogance 
and power. The exercise of this power seems to be shaped not only by its sweet taste and the 
advantages it provides but also by a sometimes valid but more often irrational fear that is 
partly rooted in the past.8 The latter, however, is of secondary importance to those who are 
victimised by it. The same is true for the many outsiders who, for various reasons, declare 
their solidarity with the Palestinians and identify with those whom they regard as the 
prototypical underdog. 
 
7.3 Antisemitism in the Netherlands after Liberation  
‘Hamas Hamas, all Jews to the gas chambers.’ Although the stage of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is located in the Middle East, part of the drama that is being played out there consists 
of texts, terms and ideas that originated in Europe, where the Shoah (i.e. the Holocaust) − the 
twentieth-century genocide of European Jews − took place. The connection between Jews 
and gas chambers is not from Palestine, Egypt or Iran, but from Nazi Germany, and was 
taken up in the countries from which the Jews were deported to the gas chambers − and that 
includes the Netherlands. Over the course of the German occupation, antisemitism there 
increased. Ancient antisemitic stereotypes were made to conform to a different historical 
context. Rumours that were making the rounds during the occupation came out in the open 
after liberation. Jews who had been in hiding were said to have treated their hosts in a way 
that was reckless, treacherous and miserly. After their return, it was said that the Jews 
immediately dug up their bank notes, took the best jobs and drove around in the biggest cars. 
They were playing first fiddle all over again (often literally) instead of adopting a humble 
attitude and showing gratitude to those who helped them at great risk to themselves.9 
 
Many of these accusations had a hidden materialistic connotation that could be traced back to 
those who made them (such as those bewariërs who refused to return Jewish property).10 But 
it was projected onto the Jew himself, the materialistic Jew, the cowardly, sly and neurotic 
Jew: Judas and Shylock in one. Besides being a product of systematic Nazi propaganda, 
antisemitism in the liberated Netherlands could also be explained both psychologically and 
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socio-economically. Psychologically, because Jewish survivors, by the mere fact of their 
return, reminded people of their own failings. The mechanism of blaming the victim offered a 
way out: the Jews had not deserved any help. Antisemitism also served an economic and 
social function. In the time of scarcity after the war, Jewish survivors came back to claim 
their houses, jobs, customers, money and other possessions. For some non-Jewish Dutch 
people that was a threat; they saw the Jews as competitors. Since the disappearance of more 
than 100,000 Jews − about 75% of all the Jews in the Netherlands had been killed − they had 
become used to living without them.11 
 
For the record it should be stated that the Netherlands had by no means degenerated into one 
big messy antisemitic swamp. Rather, two camps had developed: those who were quite open 
with their prejudices and those who vigorously suppressed them: Jews and non-Jews, 
journalists, Zionists, opinion leaders, politicians − on an individual basis that is,  For the 
government as such did not take a clear position against what it regarded as ‘latent 
antisemitism’. It did use anti-Jewish sentiments as an argument for deciding not to take 
certain measures to benefit Jews, such as admitting Jewish refugees. That, after all, would 
reinforce antisemitism. In that sense it implicitly confirmed the prejudices already shared by 
the rest of the population. 
 
While most of the anti-Jewish stereotypes in 1945 could boast of a history dating back 
centuries, one was unarguably a newborn. The curse ‘They forgot to gas you’, which became 
popular immediately after liberation, is an antisemitic stereotype from the post-Holocaust era 
in which the Jew is seen as someone ‘to be gassed’. Those who availed themselves of the 
imprecation ‘they forgot to gas you’ identified themselves, consciously or unconsciously, 
with the Nazis who deported the Jews to the gas chambers. Linking Jews with gas can also be 
seen today in the existing reservoir of sick ‘Jewish’ jokes that gradually replaced the 
traditional Jewish ‘Sam and Moos’ jokes: ‘What’s the difference between a Jew and a 
sandwich? [in Dutch: een joodje en een broodje] A sandwich doesn’t scream in the oven.’12 
The purpose of these kinds of jokes is probably to keep the actual horror at a distance. It’s 
similar to the Israeli practice of referring to the Jews murdered in galut (exile) as opposite to 
‘soap’  militant Zionists and ghetto fighters. A stereotypical and contemptuous reduction that 
was also meant to veil that the Zionist movement itself had not succeeded in convincing the 
majority of European Jews to immigrate, nor  been able to save them during the years of 
annihilation.13  
 
In the Netherlands, the expression ‘They forgot to gas you’ is a perverse starting point for the 
identification of Jews with the Shoah: perverse because it is not reflective and historical but 
stereotypical and antisemitic. When the atrocities of the Shoah became better known at the 
end of the forties, antisemitism became taboo. From the mid-sixties on, with the publication 
of Jacques Presser’s Ondergang: de vervolging en verdelging van het Nederlandse 
Jodendom, 1940-1945 (Downfall: the persecution and extermination of Dutch Jewry, 1940-
1945), the Jewish persecution gradually became the focus of the Second World War in the 
public memory.14 But the expression ‘They forgot to gas you’ is still very much alive as a 
vulgar profanity and is heard during explosive quarrels on the street, in bars and on the 
telephone. 
 
7.4 Secondary antisemitism 
In the eighties there was more and more grumbling about the dominance of the Shoah in the 
Netherlands’ view of history and collective memory. The filmmaker and columnist Theo van 
Gogh gave his own pornographic twist to the connection between Jews and gas. Van Gogh 
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became the embodiment of political incorrectness in the Netherlands. In his self-declared 
crusade against the ‘4 May industry’ (4 May being Remembrance Day for the dead of the 
Second World War) and for free speech − which he called ‘one and indivisible’ − he wrote a 
pamphlet in 1984 that was repeatedly published in later years, ‘A Messiah without a Cross’, 
against the Jewish filmmaker and writer Leon de Winter. There he introduced the image 
(which he put in De Winter’s mouth) of an animated film about two copulating yellow stars 
in a gas chamber and the joke, ‘It sure smells like caramel in here, doesn’t it? Today they’re 
only burning the diabetic Jews.’15 In several columns in Folia, the newspaper of the 
University of Amsterdam, he also gave a pornographic twist to the persecution of the Jews, as 
in his fantasies about the ‘Feldwebels (sergeants) of the circumcised police’ and about De 
Winter, ‘who made love the Treblinka way, with barbed wire wrapped around his cock’.16 In 
a long line of lawsuits Van Gogh was either convicted or acquitted of antisemitism. 
 
Theo van Gogh always took great pleasure in calling his opponents members of the NSB 
(Dutch National Socialist Movement) or the SS, especially if they were Jewish.17 In the mid-
nineties he chose another target for his tirades: he switched from Jews to Muslims, whom he 
referred to as goat fuckers. He probably had been inspired by a nonexistent book18 of 
fictitious sayings of the Ayatollah Khomeiny that freely made their way onto countless anti-
Islamic websites.19 Now he deployed his anti-Jewish stereotypes in another way. For Van 
Gogh, the Jewish mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, was the personification of the despised 
multiculturalism. Van Gogh gave him the role of a modern Judas, of an NSB member and 
collaborator. ‘Of all the crooks who have tried to sell us the Fifth Column of the goat fuckers 
[...] Cohen is the most cunning.’ According to Van Gogh, Cohen ranks as the ‘Jew you can 
count on’ among ‘Allah’s butchers’. He was a ‘mayor in wartime’ and ‘a natural born NSB 
man’.20  
The stereotype of the Jew in league with his Middle Eastern cousin by marriage, the Muslim, 
in a war against the Christian West, dates from the Middle Ages.21 Van Gogh also picked up 
on the stereotype of the Jew as conspirator, as presented in the Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion, which was fabricated at the end of the nineteenth century and is still very influential. 
Working behind the scenes, the Jews are preparing to take over the world, and they know 
how to mobilise others in the most devious ways.22 
 
Van Gogh’s digs against Jews are an example of the concept of ‘secondary antisemitism’ 
introduced by the Frankfurter schule of Adorno and Horkheimer at the end of the fifties, 
which received a great deal of attention in Germany but little or none in the Netherlands. It 
concerns an antisemitism that emerged from defence mechanisms and is often veiled, and that 
after 1945 was aimed at the Jews not in spite of but because of the Holocaust. It is called 
‘secondary’ because the stress is shifted from antisemitism during the war period to an anti-
Jewish attitude regarding the way we deal with the past and the way the past continues to 
affect the present. What it boils down to is that the Jews are perceived as a nuisance: their 
mere presence keeps alive the painful and guilt-laden memory of Auschwitz. The fact that 
they block the path to a ‘normalisation’ of the past causes ill-will: Jewish victimhood diverts 
the attention and resources that could be directed towards others. After all, they aren’t exactly 
angels either; secondary antisemitism has a great deal in common with the ‘blaming the 
victim’ phenomenon.23 Examples of secondary antisemitism could also be found in the 
Netherlands right after the war, such as blaming the Jews for capitalising on their suffering 
and thinking they should be given preferential treatment.24 More recent forms consist of 
making the persecution of the Jews look ridiculous or pornographic (as Van Gogh did), and 
downplaying the Shoah or trying to relegate it to the past (the so-called 
Schlussstrichbedürfnis).  
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‘The war is over and done with’ was the headline and tenor of an article in Vrij Nederland in 
2003 by the historian and journalist Chris van der Heijden. In his work on the Second World 
War, Van der Heijden conducts a kind of historical levelling in which being on the ‘right’ 
side and the ‘wrong’ side, being victim and perpetrator, are drawn closer together. Man is the 
plaything of fate and individual choice is exceedingly limited. With his book Grijs verleden 
(Grey Past; 2001), Van der Heijden is a symbol, literally and figuratively, of what has come 
to be called the ‘grey’ view of the Second World War in Dutch historiography.25 What makes 
Van der Heijden a special case is the way he approaches the Shoah and the Jews − or the way 
he avoids or ignores them. Riding the waves of the prevailing climate of political 
incorrectness, he depicts himself as the champion of ‘historical incorrectness’. Grijs verleden 
opens with this statement: ‘First there was the war, then the story about the war. The war was 
bad, but the story made the war even worse.’ With this he suggests that public perception and 
historical narrative have painted a picture of the war that is more dramatic and horrible than it 
actually was. The question, of course, is for whom? Did ‘the story about the war’ make the 
persecution of the Jews worse than it was? Van der Heijden doesn’t know what to do with the 
Shoah and can get no further than to describe it as ‘that one inconceivable phenomenon’. ‘Is 
the murder of the Jews really as unique as is always claimed?’ he wonders. He does not give 
a straightforward negative answer, but by coming up with a long list of mass murders from 
world history − from the Indians of South America in the sixteenth century to the mass 
slaughters in Srebrenica and Rwanda in the twentieth − he implies so much. He also plays 
down the Shoah by systematically raising questions about the victims: the Jews. When Grijs 
verleden is placed next to other publications by Van der Heijden, such as Joodse NSB’ers: De 
vergeten geschiedenis van Villa Bouchina in Doetinchem (Jewish members of the NSB: The 
forgotten history of Villa Bouchina in Doetinchem; 2006) and Israël: Een onherstelbare 
vergissing (Israel: An irreparable mistake; 2008), what emerges is a stereotypical image. Jews 
figure as docile lambs, as partial and total collaborators, and as perpetrators. In Joodse 
NSB’ers, a handful of Jews on the ‘wrong’ side serve to polish up the image of NSB leader 
Anton Mussert.26 
 
While both Van der Heijden and Van Gogh reproach others for having a ‘Holocaust 
obsession’, they themselves are the first this obsession applies to. Which has something of a 
boomerang effect. Van Gogh recasts the gas chamber as a form of satire − ‘Doucht allen mee 
/ onder Zyklon B’27 (‘Everybody in the shower / with Zyklon B’) − while for Van der 
Heijden the gas chamber functions as a political metaphor. He argues that those who criticise 
the ideas of Geert Wilders (leader of the Party for Freedom; PVV) with regard to Muslims are 
abusing the frame of reference of the Second World War, with the murder of Jews as the 
‘quintessential spectre’. ‘Compare today’s immigration policies with the thirties and the gas 
chambers come looming up’, says Van der Heijden. As long as Wilders stays within the 
limits of the law, he can say and think whatever he likes. ‘Any suggestion that this is 
tantamount to building a new set of gas chambers is not only unwarranted but also 
counterproductive.’28 It is Van der Heijden himself, however, and no one else, who has slid 
the term ‘gas chamber’ into the integration debate. 
 
Van Gogh and Van der Heijden both struggled (the latter still does) with the envy non-Jews 
feel towards supposed Jewish characteristics, talents and privileges, which in Dutch is called 
gojse nijd.29 In the post-Holocaust era, gojse nijd took the form of envy of the ultimate 
victim: the Jew. While Van Gogh accused his fellow filmmaker Leon de Winter of exploiting 
Jewish suffering, Van der Heijden noted that before the Nazis made a scapegoat of Jewry it 
was an almost unknown phenomenon outside of Amsterdam. It wasn’t until the mid-
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twentieth century that Jews became ‘the centre of attention’.30 In an interview with NRC 
Handelsblad in 2001, he let slip the remark that ‘We all could have been in the gas chambers, 
and on either side of the door,’31 thereby stripping the gas chamber of its historic context and 
misappropriating it for his own end,  in the present day. The gas chamber belongs to 
everyone, including Chris van der Heijden. 
 
The journalist-filmmaker and the historian are both part of a new generation that rose up in 
protest against what it saw as the outdated and disproportionate dominance of the Second 
World War and the Shoah in the Dutch collective memory. Take for example the turbulence 
caused by the 1987 production of the controversial play Garbage, the City and Death by the 
famous German director Werner Fassbinder. Most of the protest against the play came from 
Jewish circles and was aimed partly at the main character, who was referred to simply as ‘the 
Rich Jew’. The director and pupils at the Toneelschool Amsterdam  (Amsterdam Theater 
Academy), who were preparing for the production, faced the protest by contending that they 
had had enough of the (Jewish) ‘dictatorship of suffering’. This was not entirely surprising. 
Their grievance with respect to the Jew as the ultimate victim was partly aroused by the 
‘Jewish narcissism’ of their opponents, the tendency to reduce their own self-image to two 
poles: suffering and pride. Most of the Jewish demonstrators called Fassbinder’s play 
antisemitic without ever having read it.32 
 
The most extreme form of secondary antisemitism is, by definition, the denial that the Shoah 
as such ever took place. Such a denial is sometimes followed by the assertion that the 
Holocaust is a lie concocted by Jews (or Zionists) to support the founding and preservation of 
the Jewish state. Holocaust denial can be found mainly among those on the extreme right. 
Neo-Nazis and related groups, driven into a corner by legislation against antisemitism and 
racism, have found a new and fertile field of activity in the internet. On a website such as that 
of the Dutch branch of the neo-Nazi group Stormfront (White Pride / World Wide) − the 
provider is in the United States − trivialisation and denial of the Holocaust is quite normal.  
 
But even on an ordinary internet forum that presents itself as the largest of its kind in the 
Netherlands, Fok!, anonymous chatters enter otherwise civilised discussions on the Holocaust 
and raise questions about the existence of gas chambers as instruments of industrial 
extermination. Take Zaan_23: 
 
‘What gas chambers? They were delousing chambers. I think you’ve watched Schindler’s List too 
many times [...]. Santa Claus or the Holohoax, no difference. Both of them are ways of bringing in 
a bit of cash (for the commercial capitalist and the stingy nose).’33 
 
To be perfectly clear: ‘nose’ here is a code word for Jew.34
 
 
 
7.5 Philosemitism and red Jewish noses 
Until the present day, opinions differ as to whether the Party for Freedom (PVV), with its 
desire for ethnic homogeneity, aversion to Islam as an ‘ideology’ and anti-Muslim 
stereotypes, should be seen as part of the extreme right or the right-wing radical spectrum, or 
whether it can best be described as populist or as a ‘“social-nationalistic” movement’.35 Is it 
not a neo-Nazi movement, if only because there is not a trace of antisemitism in its 
programme. On the contrary, its spokespersons come out publicly as bosom friends of Israel 
and opponents of antisemitism in Islamic circles, and should rather be characterised as philo-
Semitic. 
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Philosemitism can be understood as genuine sympathy for Jews but also as the mirror image 
of antisemitism: Jews are valued or even glorified (instead of despised, envied or hated) for 
the mere fact that they are Jews. So in the negative sense, Philosemitism is the other side of 
the same coin.36 Moreover, philosemitism − like antisemitism − can be instrumental: it can 
serve to realise certain objectives, political or not, that have little or nothing to do with Jews 
and Jewry. In Jewish circles, the response to Wilders and his followers has been both positive 
and negative.37 
 
Until now there have been no public expressions of anti-Jewish stereotypes by prominent 
PVV followers − with one exception. In June 2009, parliamentarian Martin Bosma made a 
slip of the tongue in his answer to the question posed by a PVV voter, who asked what the 
PVV was going to do about the NOS (the Netherlands Broadcasting Company), where ‘the 
same red noses’ were making sure that the PVV had no input. Bosma replied:  
 
‘You say there are so many red noses. Unfortunately we can’t chop them all off from Hilversum 
[the principle centre for radio and television broadcasting in the Netherlands], although it would 
give me enormous pleasure to do so. Oooh, I can just see Clairy Polak lying there.... No, I’m 
shutting up. No fantasies.’38 
 
Why did Bosma mention Polak by name? He probably unconsciously linked ‘nose’ with 
‘Jew’, which has been the custom for centuries. The connection between ‘red’ and ‘Jew’ also 
fits in with a stereotype that has existed since the rise of socialism.39 
 
During the same period, Fleur Agema, another PVV parliamentarian, made the following 
statement during a parliamentary deliberation on ‘Moroccan problem youngsters’: 
‘Antisemitism and homophobia are not Dutch phenomena. They are imported to a 
depressingly great extent from Morocco.’40 
 
Agema’s grasp of history was far less accurate than that of the person who took her to task 
digitally with this rejoinder: ‘Never knew that Anton Mussert and his mates were 
Moroccans.’41 
 
7.6 Football hooliganism 
During the eighties − the same decade that Theo van Gogh published his pamphlet ‘A 
Messiah without a Cross’ − the link between Jews and gas was made in a very different social 
context. This was the beginning of large-scale football hooliganism, when supporters from 
the big city football clubs in particular fought each other with increasing verbal and physical 
violence. Ajax, the Amsterdam football club located in the eastern part of the city, has a 
Jewish image, mainly because many of its pre-war supporters were Jews. Ajax supporters are 
the target of slogans like ‘It’s Jew-hunting time’ and ‘Death to the Jews’. They themselves 
have turned the designation ‘Jewish club’ into a proud sobriquet, announcing themselves in 
chorus as ‘Jews’, ‘We’re Jews’, and carrying banners bearing the Star of David. They insult 
their opponents by calling them ‘Farmers’ and call for the bombing of Rotterdam. The link 
between Jews and the gas chamber was introduced the moment Ajax supporters were greeted 
with massive hissing and ‘Jews to the gas chamber’ was added to the repertory.42 Opinions 
are strongly divided as to whether this is an example of (secondary) antisemitism or not. 
Those who disagree say that the Ajax hard core consciously provoke these cries by parading 
around as the ‘Jewish club’, that the Jews here are ‘symbolic’ and not ‘real’, and that physical 
violence against Jews themselves is out of the question. Those who agree say that just 
because Ajax identifies itself as ‘Jewish’ does not mean that its opponents are justified in 
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shouting ‘Jews to the gas chambers’ at them. They also question the assertion that no 
antisemitic views or feelings are involved, and they argue that all negative connotations 
regarding Jews in and around the stadiums are silently converted into antisemitism.43 
 
A certain political element crept into the confrontations in 1982 (the year of the Lebanon war 
and the slaughter in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila), when the supporters 
of Feyenoord, the Rotterdam club, flew Palestinian flags opposite Ajax’s Israeli flags and 
adopted slogans from banners used in anti-Israel demonstrations. In the mid-nineties the 
slogan ‘Hamas, Hamas, alle joden aan het gas’ (Hamas, Hamas, all Jews to the gas 
chambers) was raised for the first time in the Feyenoord and FC Utrecht stadiums. Supporters 
of FC Utrecht who shouted this slogan upon arriving at Centraal Station in Amsterdam in 
2003 were put right back on the train and sent home. Now ‘Hamas, Hamas, alle joden aan 
het gas’ has taken root among groups of ethnic minority youths, who identify profoundly 
with the Palestinians in the territories occupied (once again) by Israel, as the demonstration of 
13 April 2002 would also seem to suggest. CIDI, the Centre for Information and 
Documentation on Israel − itself a highly concerned ally of Israel − reported that in 2002, 
shortly after the beginning of the Second Intifada, a few groups of Moroccan boys and youths 
chanted the slogan ‘Hamas, Hamas, alle joden aan het gas’.44 During the same period, it was 
mainly Moroccan youths in Amsterdam who attacked Jews (identifiable as Jews) both 
verbally and physically. Among young people, especially in the VMBO (lower secondary 
vocational school), ‘Jew’ gained popularity as a term of abuse. 
 
7.7 The Jew as Nazi  
There has always been a paradoxical aspect to the stereotypical Jew. ‘The Jew’ as pariah and 
Satan, the Jew as waste product and powerful conspirator.45 ‘The Jew’ is inferior and superior 
at the same time, and arouses loathing as well as admiration and envy. The stereotypical link 
between Jew and Holocaust also has this two-faced aspect: the Jews in the gas chamber and 
the Jew as Nazi. The link between Jew and Nazi, like that between Jews and the gas chamber, 
goes back much further than Van Gogh, football hooliganism and the anti-Israel 
demonstration of 2002. It can be traced to the actions of Dr F. Hollander, a Jewish public 
prosecutor. Some felt that Hollander’s energetic approach to the special judicial procedures 
following the end of the war (at which collaborators were tried) was disproportionately 
severe. Instead of returning from his ordeal a ‘chastened’ man, Hollander was full of 
bitterness and ridden with ‘symptoms of Nazism’, according to De Telegraaf in 1954. 
In addition, after liberation it soon became apparent that the temptation to compare Zionism 
with Nazism, especially in orthodox Catholic circles, was too great to resist. In 1949 the 
Netherlands’ most extreme exponent of Catholic antisemitism, the Dominican J.P.M. van der 
Ploeg, later a professor of Old Testament in Nijmegen, labelled Zionism ‘colonisation linked 
with robbery and murder’ and ‘a new form of Nazism’. Elsewhere the Zionist military 
operations against the British and the Palestinian Arabs were called ‘Hitlerian’ and 
‘Goebbelesque’.46 
 
But as antisemitism lost its legitimacy after the war, so sympathy grew for Israel, hand-in-
hand with feelings of concern, guilt and shame. This reached its high point in 1967, when 
Israel (‘David’), succeeded in slaying ‘Goliath’ after years of being harassed by the violent 
war rhetoric of the surrounding Arab countries, and even managed to increase its land area by 
annexing East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights. That victory meant 
that the so-called occupied territories, which had a large Palestinian population, became a 
dominating factor in Israeli politics. So 1967 was a paradoxical year. It led to widespread 
solidarity with brave little Israel but it also carried within it the germ of growing unease, 
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increasing indignation and a distaste for Israel’s attitude towards the Palestinians.47 Criticism 
of Israel, anti-Zionism (denying the legitimacy of the existence of Israel as a Jewish state) 
and antisemitism operated independently but also showed a strong tendency to flow into one 
another. They formed a fatal triangle − just like Jew, Zionist and Israeli.48 
 
Naturally it is tempting to see Nazism and Zionism as interchangeable. It’s the temptation of 
simple explanations in a world that is infinitely complex, but it’s also the desire for a 
passionate release: to be able to say ‘We’re even’. Apparently ‘the Jew’ is also capable of 
carrying out war crimes, so the accounts have been squared − of the failure of the non-Jew 
with regard to the Jew. This is a reversal of the ‘right side’ and ‘wrong side’ frame of 
reference that gradually came to dominate the West after 1945. The ultimate victim of the 
Nazi of old, the Jew, has now become a Nazi, and the Palestinian has become the Jew. The 
radical left, moreover, is very sensitive to solidarity with the Palestinians from the 
perspective of Israel as one of the last bastions of colonialism. The equating of Israel with the 
Third Reich on banners at the demonstration of 2002, which was made so much of at the 
time, had already taken place in 1979 for VPRO radio. The writer Anton Constandse, 
originally an anarchist, called the Israelis the Nazis of the Middle East.49 Parallels between 
Zionism and Nazism are constantly cropping up in De schaduw van de ster (The shadow of 
the star; 2002), an anti-Zionist pamphlet by Peter Edel that goes beyond the limits of 
antisemitism in a mixture of old and new antisemitic myths and conspiracy theories. It wasn’t 
only at the demonstration of 2002 that Moroccan and Turkish Dutch youths chanted ‘Hamas, 
Hamas, alle joden aan het gas’. It happened at the demonstration of 3 January 2009, too, 
after Israel’s attack on Gaza. Thus the Jew goes from being a Nazi to being a gassed Jew 
again, and later on − ‘Israel is a Nazi state’ − back to being a Nazi. It’s a variation on a theme 
that was composed in Europe before becoming a big hit in the Arab world, and the 
demonstrators in Amsterdam seem to sing it with gusto. 
 
7.8 The new Dutch and the Shoah  
But why? What does that whole Holocaust − gas chambers and all − have to say to them? 
The Second World War wasn’t the war of their parents and grandparents, or of themselves 
(apart from the rare exception). What we have here is a cynical paradox. On the one hand, 
antisemitism is readily accepted by groups of immigrants who derive most of their 
information and entertainment from Arab broadcasting services, where anti-Zionism, 
antisemitism and criticism of Israel are mixed up in an intricate tangle. On the other hand, 
playing the antisemitic card is a sign of integration, assimilation. There seems to be a desire 
to strike at the West in terms of its own frame of reference, that of being on the ‘right’ side 
and on the ‘wrong’ side − to touch a very raw nerve. By way of illustration, take the reaction 
of the Arab European League (AEL) to the Danish Mohammed cartoons, which were seen as 
highly offensive in the world of Islam. In 2006 the AEL itself put a number of cartoons in 
circulation. In one of them it is suggested that the estimate of six million murdered Jews is far 
too high, but that the Jews have a vested interest in ‘getting to’ that number. This cartoon, 
which was placed on the Dutch branch of the AEL website once again in 2009, triggered 
several law suits. In the most recent developments of April 2010, the court in Utrecht did 
deem the cartoon especially offensive but acquitted the AEL of insulting the ‘Jewish segment 
of the population’. It gave greater weight to freedom of expression − the principle which the 
AEL had evoked. In August 2010 the case was heard again on appeal. This time the Arnhem 
Court of Appeal called the cartoon ‘unnecessarily offensive’ and ordered the AEL to pay a 
fine of 2,500 euros, 1,500 of it conditional.50 
 
The cartoon is no less than a trivialisation or even a denial of the Shoah. The question is why 
83
this particular cartoon was used as a response to the ridiculing of Islam. What does the 
murder of the Jews have to do with the mocking of the prophet Mohammed? To begin with, 
the Jews and the Shoah (and memory of the Shoah) are the Achilles heel of the West. No 
‘new Dutch’ person can fail to notice that message. The West has taken the thing that marked 
its most unparalleled failure and ‘canonised’ it. The AEL reasons thus: if you’re going to 
besmirch that which is holy to us, we’ll take that which is holy to you and drag it through the 
mud. In addition, the League is making it known − fixing its gaze on Israel and the 
Palestinians − that it’s high time the Jews were forced to relinquish their place in the 
hierarchy of suffering to the Palestinians. This opinion, by the way, is one that is shared by 
more and more ‘old Dutch’ people. In closing, Dutch Muslims prefer to identify with an 
Islamic or Arabic minority group such as the Palestinians − who are being repressed by the 
Other, ‘the 'Jew’ − than with an Arabic-Islamic underdog who is suffering under the 
repression of its ‘own’ elite.51 
 
7.9 In conclusion 
In conclusion − it’s not for the first time that les extrêmes se touchent. In a second cartoon 
from the AEL entitled Hitler goes Dutroux,52 we see Hitler in bed with Anne Frank and 
saying to her, ‘Write this one in your diary, Anne’. It’s a typical example of secondary 
pornographic antisemitism in which a sexual relation is suggested between the Jewish victim, 
or any Jew at all, and the Nazi: a perverted relation, it goes without saying. Here a peculiar 
encounter takes place: between the opponent of assimilation, the fiercely anti-Zionistic 
founder of the AEL, Abou Jahjah, an Antwerp Belgian of Lebanese origin, and Theo van 
Gogh, who became skilled in pornographic antisemitism as well as Islamophobia. He once 
called Abou Jahjah ‘the Prophet’s pimp’.53 Who would have thought that Jahjah would have 
posthumously extended a hand to Van Gogh by translating his criticism of the West, of Jews, 
of Israel into a visual language done in Van Gogh’s own style? Jahjah didn’t design the 
cartoon, by the way. That was done by a kindred spirit, Abdou Bouzerda, who had grown up 
in the Netherlands and since 2008 was the chairman of the Dutch branch of the AEL. He 
drew both of the contested cartoons.54 
 
And then there was Theo van Gogh himself, murdered by the Muslim extremist Mohammed 
Bouyeri in November 2004. The cause for the gruesome murder was Van Gogh’s directing of 
the controversial anti-Islam cinematic pamphlet Submission, made by parliamentarian and 
Islam critic Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Van Gogh’s murderer left behind an open letter addressed 
directly to Hirsi Ali but indirectly to all the residents of the Netherlands. In the letter, it 
wasn’t only the Muslim apostate Hirsi Ali and the pernicious West who had to take the rap, 
but also the Jews, whom it accused of dominating Dutch politics. Bouyeri was just as 
merciless when it came to Job Cohen − the same man that Van Gogh had once called a 
member of the NSB: ‘What do you make of the fact that in Amsterdam there is a mayor at the 
helm who supports an ideology in which Jews are permitted to lie to non-Jews?’55 This side 
of the murder case received little press attention. When compiling his statement, Bouyeri 
probably did just what Van Gogh most likely did with his goat fuckers: he plundered it from 
the internet, in his case from an Islamic website where antisemitic interpretations of the 
Talmud stand an excellent chance of being featured. In today’s era of globalisation, the 
internet is an exceptionally effective instrument for spreading antisemitism, with cross-
references to the most diverse groups and individuals. Antisemitism is multifunctional: 
there’s something in it for everyone. 
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8 Antiziganism 
 
Marija Davidović and Peter R. Rodrigues  
 
The marginalisation and racial discrimination of Roma and Sinti is called antiziganism. This 
term, which means ‘hatred of gypsies’ (the root ‘zigan’ is the basis of the word that is used 
for the Roma people in many European languages), is the one we will use here. In 2004 the 
report Roma and Sinti was published as part of the Racism & Extremism Monitor project.1 
There it was found that while Roma and Sinti do experience marginalisation in the 
Netherlands, it is rarely reported to the country’s anti-discrimination services or other 
authorities such as the police. It was also noted that there is considerable mutual distrust 
between the groups of Roma and the community surrounding them. Another conclusion − 
and this still applies − was that little systematic knowledge of the Roma is available in the 
Netherlands that can be used for the Monitor project. Without attempting a repeat of this 
study, this chapter will look at the most important developments that have taken place with 
regard to the marginalisation of Roma and Sinti in the Netherlands since 2004.2  
 
8.1 Current status, 2010  
The deprivation and marginalisation of Roma in Europe has received constant attention over 
the past decade.3 In 2006, for example, the Council of Europe issued a report on human rights 
and Roma, Sinti and travellers, and in 2010 this was followed by a report that dealt 
specifically with Roma.4 The Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) published reports on 
Roman and education (2006), housing (2009), freedom of movement throughout the EU 
(2009) and discrimination statistics for this community (2009).5 More recently, France was 
given a rap on the knuckles by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), which monitors the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD), partly for the massive expulsion of Roma in the autumn of 
2010.6 In the same year, the European Commission insisted on the social inclusion of Roma.7 
Earlier the Dutch government came out in support of this view.8 
 
This chapter will examine the current situation in the Netherlands. In its third report on the 
Netherlands (2007), the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) of the 
Council of Europe has focused special attention on the position of Roma.9 The ECRI has 
observed that Roma are being marginalised in several areas of society and has called on the 
government to break the vicious circle of prejudice and distrust. 
During the discussion of the 2010 budget, the Minister of Housing, Communities and 
Integration (WWI) was asked what kinds of measures he was going to take to tackle the 
discrimination of Roma and Sinti in particular.10 The minister responded by referring to the 
extra efforts he was planning on behalf of the Roma as contained in his letter of 28 June 
2009.11 In that letter the word ‘discrimination’ was indeed used once in the following 
sentence: ‘Numerous problems have been identified within a portion of the Roma population 
such as poverty, illegality, minimal participation in the job market, dependence on 
government assistance and discrimination.’ However, we were unable find any indication in 
the letter of extra efforts being planned to tackle discrimination. The tone of the letter is 
repressive rather than curative and mainly has to do with the so-called Roma municipalities. 
This is the term for Dutch municipalities that took in people who came to the Netherlands in 
the seventies. Because of the subject of the letter, its contents will be discussed further in 
section 8.2. 
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Roma and Sinti, the Monitor study from 2004, contains a call to put a stop to prejudice and 
thereby break the cycle of mutual distrust. Special responsibility was assigned to the national 
government.12 In the study of incidents and problem areas from recent years that follows 
(section 8.2) we will also look at possible changes in attitude or policy that have influenced 
prejudice and mutual distrust between Roman and the ‘general public’. For the incidents we 
consulted the databases of the Anne Frank House, and for the problem areas we looked at the 
aforementioned forms of marginalisation and unequal treatment. 
The study of 2004 also recommended that this target group be made visible in the registries 
of the anti-discrimination services (ADVs), the police and the Public Prosecution Service. 
Minority organisations were called on to collect complaints of marginalisation, to document 
them and to record them.13 This previous study also emphasised the importance of access to 
education and the duty of the government to provide sufficient trailer parks.14 For this reason 
we will first deal with these subject: registration, education and housing. 
 
8.1.1 Registration  
The Dutch Complaints Bureau for Discrimination on the Internet (MDI) has traditionally 
registered the reports of discrimination (or alleged discrimination) of Roma and Sinti. The 
numbers fluctuate per year, with peaks of 15 and 16 in 2006 and 2008 and dips from 1 to 4 in 
the other years.15 In the national review of the ADVs, the Roma and Sinti are not listed as a 
separate category.16 Since 2005 the OM has been keeping records of the Roma on the basis of 
the registration of discriminatory offences maintained by the public prosecutors’ offices. In 
2009 these records noted for the time that this category counted for 1% of the registrations.17 
In the first national registration of police statistics on discrimination, Poldis 2008, figures for 
Roma and Sinti were included and amounted to four.18 This report also listed 14 incidents 
against persons from Eastern Europe. It is unclear whether or not they also were Roma. 
 
The small number of registered complaints should not be surprising. First, they concern a 
relatively small ethnic community in the Netherlands: around 8,000 persons. Because Roma 
and Sinti feel threatened − not least because of the deportations during the Second World 
War − they rarely identify themselves as such, and the estimates of their numbers are 
extremely varied. According to an estimate by the European Union, the community numbers 
22,500 individuals.19 The number therefore remains an educated guess, and since the report 
of 2004 it has increased due to the influx of more Roma from the new European member 
countries, such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.  
Second, according to the Monitor study of 2004 the willingness of Roma and Sinti to report 
incidents, certainly to public authorities, is practically nil. Research shows that such 
willingness among victims of racial discrimination is already low: less than 10% choose to 
report.20 Additional causes for the unwillingness of Roma and Sinti to report is the lack of 
trust in ‘civilian society’ and the tradition of solving problems among themselves. There is 
also evidence of a certain acclimatisation: growing accustomed to the marginalised life.21 
Because of these two conditions (small community and few complaints), the cases that are 
registered produce a very modest number of results, if any at all. Yet it is recommended that 
the registration continue, since recovery of trust is a slow process and is necessary for 
creating a basis for a successful government policy.  
 
The recommendation that minority organisations also register complaints and conduct 
inventories was taken seriously by the Triana Foundation in Utrecht, one of the few to do so. 
Triana’s volunteers attempt to help the Roma in Utrecht in situations that they themselves can 
no longer manage. In 2005 Triana set up a reporting centre in Utrecht, and the results of this 
work are described in a report on the activities covering the intervening five years.22 The 
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most important problem areas that are identified have to do with statelessness, housing, the 
labour market, education, access to health care and the media. The report also notes that 
institutionalised discrimination is still a major cause of marginalisation for Roma. Triana was 
not able to find regional financing for its useful activities. 
 
8.1.2 Education  
Education remains a point of concern. Research shows that the self-confidence of children 
from the Roma and Sinti communities is lower than that of the children of asylum seekers.23 
They also feel less at home at school. The scores of their final Cito tests (exam for secondary 
school placement) are lower, and so are the recommendations they are given as to which sort 
of secondary school to attend. The chance of marginalisation becomes smaller if this gap is 
actively dealt with. The importance of education is endorsed by representatives of the Roma 
and Sinti communities as well as by the local and national governments. Truancy is a 
particularly thorny area.24 Minority organisations should be more involved in tackling 
truancy. 
 
When Roma experts of the Council of Europe visited the Netherlands in 2008, the Institute 
for Multicultural Affairs FORUM, also focused attention on education for Roma and Sinti.25 
One of the things that worried the participants is segregation in schools and specially adapted 
curricula for Roma children. The challenge lies in finding separate facilities that meet the 
needs of a certain group without reinforcing prejudices and exclusion. The European Court of 
Human Rights raised the bar in the recent Oršuš case.26 Complaints had been raised by 
people of Roma origin concerning a primary school in Croatia where their children were 
being taught largely in separate Roma classes due to an alleged language disparity. The Court 
argued that in some situations, such as taking positive action to combat disparity, separate 
classes could be justified. But in this case the Court said there was evidence of 
discrimination, because, among other things, the monitoring of progress, aimed at returning 
the children to regular classes as soon as possible, was lacking. Croatia insisted that this was 
how it treated all children with a language disparity and not just Roma children. The upshot 
was that in some situations, equal treatment can lead to discrimination. Finally, the Court 
seemed to oblige member states to guarantee school attendance. 
In a positive development in this regard, the Association of Dutch Municipalities (Vereniging 
van Nederlandse Gemeenten; VNG) has put together project proposals from a few 
municipalities aimed at promoting school attendance among Roma children.27 This was in 
response to a one-off grant of € 600,000 from the Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment (VROM) / Housing, Communities and Integration (WWI) and the Ministry 
of Education, Cultural Affairs and Science (OCW). The ministries stipulated that the money 
had to be spent on the innovative enforcement of the Compulsory Education Act.28 According 
to the project proposals, however, the funds were not going to be spent ‘directly on school-
related objectives alone’, and quite a bit of it would be used to follow up on existing 
programmes.29 In addition, the exact numbers of Roma involved in the municipal project 
proposals raise questions about the way the data were obtained and manipulated.30 
The desire to gather information about Roma communities in a systematic way must not be 
allowed to degenerate into ethnic registration. In the autumn of 2010, an investigative 
journalist revealed that a few cities had compiled separate lists in which all the Roma in that 
municipality were noted by name and surname.31 Moreover, some of the lists have been 
‘enriched’ with information on previous convictions, government assistance and residence 
status. This is in violation not only of the law concerning the registration of personal data but 
also of the anti-discrimination restrictions. 
The law for the protection of personal data and privacy prohibits the registration of ethnicity 
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unless the person involved has given his permission or there is evidence of compelling social 
interests.32 In that case there should be a legal basis for the registration (or parts of it) or 
permission by the Dutch Data Protection Authority. In addition, ethnic registration of a 
population group is in violation of the anti-discrimination restrictions as laid down in article 1 
of the Constitution and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination. 
 
8.1.3 Housing  
When the Caravans Act of 1999 was repealed, it resulted in a shortage of caravan pitches for 
Roma and Sinti, among others. The repeal was partly inspired by the desire to pursue a 
general policy rather than a policy aimed at a specific minority and at obtaining a stronger 
hold on these groups. Here, too, enforcement was decentralised. However, the financial 
resources made available for implementation by the municipality authorities are part of the 
general budget and are not earmarked for the allocation of caravan pitches. There is also 
generally strong resistance to assigning new pitches. The combination of these two factors 
has put a damper (to put it mildly) on the incentive to actually use the resources for Roma 
housing.33 So the shortage of satisfactory caravan pitches has yet to be solved.34 Municipal 
policy on this point is stagnating, and the authorities seem to be insufficiently aware that 
there is an obligation under European law to provide adequate caravan pitches. Those who do 
not meet it are in violation of the European Directive concerning the principle of equal 
treatment of persons regardless of race or ethnic origins, the so-called Race Directive.35 This 
directive obliges member states to make housing accessible and available irrespective of 
race.36 Providing sufficient caravan pitches should be understood as part of this obligation.37 
 
The Roma and Sinti in the Netherlands are sometimes caravan dwellers, but not necessarily. 
Some Roma and Sinti live in conventional homes. In 2009 the GPD (the association of 
regional daily newspapers) announced that caravan dwellers were still being discriminated 
against. They are often regarded as criminals, and for this reason it is difficult for them to 
obtain mortgages and insurance. A tour of government agencies, politicians and interest 
organisations confirms this.38 Municipalities still try to place caravan dwellers in brick 
houses, too often against their will. On 5 May 2009, a comparable incident took place in Den 
Bosch when an empty dwelling owned by the ‘Brabant Wonen’ housing corporation was 
destroyed out of fear that people of ‘gypsy’ origin would come to occupy it. 
As far as the Roma are concerned, placement in normal housing is not always without 
problems. The residents of Sterrenwijk, a neighbourhood in Utrecht, became so upset about 
the arrival of a Roma family that they smashed the windows in the house even before the 
family had settled in.39 Not surprisingly, the Roma family finally turned down the offer of the 
house. 
Housing problems have also occurred among the Eastern European Roma. The Amsterdam 
police found 26 Roma living in one flat40 and paying € 50 per person per week for this 
housing facility. 
 
8.2 Incidents and stumbling blocks  
The arrival of people from states that have recently joined the European Union has resulted in 
new Roma coming to the Netherlands from Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. For the 
Bulgarians and Romanians, selling the ‘homeless newspaper’ was a popular activity. But the 
Straatkrant Foundation, the organisation that publishes and distributes the homeless 
newspaper, decided to bar these sellers in a number of cities (Rotterdam, Leiden and 
Dordrecht).41 The reason was that the Bulgarians and Romanians are not yet exempt from the 
work permit requirement, which is difficult to obtain. For this reason they are not being 
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allowed to serve as homeless newspaper sellers. 
It is mainly the Romanian Roma who perform as street musicians in the Netherlands. This 
creates a number of problems. Some musicians are still too young and of compulsory school 
age, and should not be put to work in this way.42 Other musicians disturb café and restaurant 
owners, or pay little attention to the rules for street musicians. As a result, shopping streets 
have to contend with noise pollution, begging and petty crime.43 It is important, however, that 
the measures taken to fight these problems not be discriminatory or encroach on the freedom 
of movement of EU citizens. This also applies to Roma who have longer residence in the 
Netherlands, of course. 
 
8.2.1 Heavy legal artillery  
Article 140 of the Penal Code prohibits participation in a criminal organisation and carries 
with it a maximum prison sentence of six years. It gained a great deal of publicity when the 
OM − unsuccessfully − tried to use it to convict the notorious Hells Angels. The ultimate 
objective was to be able to ban the Hells Angels as an organisation. In the opinion of the 
Supreme Court, however, the Harlingen Hells Angels could not be banned because their 
behaviour could not be sufficiently regarded as an actual and serious violation of the 
principles of our legal system.44 The prosecution of the Maastricht Hells Angels failed for 
similar reasons.45 Owing to the preserving of tapped telephone calls between the suspects and 
their lawyers, OM vs. the Amsterdam Hells Angels was finally declared inadmissible and the 
charges were dismissed.46 
 
In order to convict on the grounds of art. 140 of the Penal Code, there must be an indication 
of long-lasting collaboration, a certain structure and the intention of committing crimes. The 
list of organisations against which this article has been applied includes not only the Hells 
Angels, CP’86 (Centre Party ’86) as a racist organisation (1995),47 squatters in the 
Mariënburcht district of Nijmegen (1997) and potential hooligans at the Euro summit 
(1997),48 but also Roma families. 
It is astonishing that this heavy legal artillery should be brought to bear specifically against 
Roma families.49 As an example, the Assen district court convicted a mother, two daughters 
and a daughter-in-law of robbing elderly persons in 2003.50 By means of cunning ruses they 
entered their victims’ homes and then attempted to rob them. According to the court there 
was structural collaboration, hierarchy and method. This led the court to conclude that what 
we had here was a textbook example of a criminal organisation. The chief suspect, ‘as head 
of the family’, was convicted to 42 months in prison. 
The Arnhem district court handed down an even more severe punishment in another case, in 
part for participation in a criminal organisation.51 The parents who introduced their offspring 
and those of others to a life of crime, and who themselves were guilty of currency 
counterfeiting, fraud and receiving stolen goods, were sentenced to five years in prison. The 
head of the family and his fellow suspect had founded and directed the organisation. In the 
context of family relations that hardly seems surprising to us, and is separate from the 
criminal character of the activities or the suspects’ ethnicity. 
According to the Den Bosch district court, even if several members of a family commit 
crimes together it does not indicate the existence of a criminal organisation. This is only true 
if the family members resolutely support these crimes and if the power relationships within 
the family are intentionally and systematically utilised for criminal purposes. In this case the 
crimes included theft, handling stolen goods and whitewashing. The court ruled that 
participation in a criminal organisation was applicable, and sentenced the single mother of the 
family to 20 months in prison.52 
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Clearly, art. 140 of the Penal Code makes it possible to impose heavier sentences than might 
be charged for the other offences under general criminal law. That is probably why this 
article of the law was applied in the first place. It is beyond dispute that the offences, which 
are often quite serious, are deserving of persecution and punishment. The use of art. 140 of 
the Penal Code is surprising, however, all the more so because it has never before been used 
in a family context. The question is whether by selectively applying it to Roma families the 
court does not make itself vulnerable to accusations of arbitrariness or even discrimination. 
This line in the case law seems to have come to an end. One question that arises is what 
further steps might be taken: dissolve the family and put it under a prohibition? Roma can 
probably count on increased judicial attention in view of the plan to increase the expertise on 
Roma within the police’s National Expertise Centre for Diversity. A research proposal has 
also been announced in order to shed light on the scale of criminality among the Roma.53 It is 
essential in such an effort that the total size of the Roma community first be clearly 
understood, without creating a registry that can be converted into a list of individuals (only 
anonymous numbers for the purpose of statistics). 
 
8.2.2 Statelessness  
A considerable portion of the Roma community in the Netherlands finds itself in a marginal 
position when it comes to housing, work and income,54 and statelessness only complicates the 
situation even further. One estimate places the number of stateless Roma at 1,000 persons.55 
With their immigration history and the often inadequate documentation regarding their 
identity, nationality and residence rights, many stateless Roma in the Netherlands go through 
long periods of vulnerable uncertainty. This increases the risk of deportation and exploitation. 
They have no right to social services or to a work permit, either, which means they are 
blocked the supporting themselves in a legitimate way. Most worrisome is the fact that 
because of Dutch law, the statelessness of the parents is transferred to children born in the 
Netherlands, which only increases the problem. 
 
According to the statistics in the Municipal Personal Records Database, in 2007, 1,463 
children were registered as ‘stateless’.56 A number of children were also registered as 
‘nationality unknown’. In these cases it is assumed that the person does have a nationality but 
that it has been insufficiently demonstrated. We are not able to determine how many of these 
are Roma children. According to Ius Sanguinis, the policy applied in the Netherlands, 
children take the nationality of their parents, which in principle means that children of 
stateless parents are stateless as well. The Netherlands has decided not to grant Dutch 
nationality to stateless children born in the Netherlands as a right at birth. 
In article 6 of the Netherlands Nationality Act, the children of stateless parents are granted a 
right of option. This right of option can be exercised by any foreigner who is born in the 
Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba, who has been granted admission and who 
lived there as his principal place of residence for an unbroken period of at least three years. In 
addition, the foreigner must have been stateless since his birth. 
The condition mentioned in this article − that the foreigner must have been granted 
‘admission’ (or approval of permanent residence by a competent authority) − has serious 
consequences for children living illegally in the Netherlands. Although their connection with 
the Netherlands is stronger than with any other country, they do not qualify for the right of 
option so they cannot obtain Dutch nationality. 
Art. 1 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, however, rules that every 
contracting state is to grant its nationality to those who were born on its soil and who 
otherwise would be stateless.57 This can occur as a right at birth or on request (right of 
option). The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness provides a limited number of 
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grounds on which this right of option can be withheld. The required ‘admission’ is not 
mentioned, and Dutch law is in violation of the Convention on this point. The Netherlands is 
a signatory to this convention, which means that the required ‘admission’ must be held 
inapplicable. If the persons in question are children, the question is whether this requirement 
is not also in violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. For this convention 
recognises the right of every child to obtain a nationality. 
According to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, countries themselves may 
decide in what way statelessness is to be assessed. The Dutch government does this as part of 
a request for a residence permit in the so-called ‘no-fault procedure’.58 Attached to this 
procedure is a heavy burden of proof. There can be no doubt with regard to the person’s 
identity, and it must be demonstrated, using objective and verifiable means, that the 
authorities in the land of origin or the land of previous residence will not grant permission for 
repatriation. A stateless person must demonstrate himself that he has no nationality, and an 
assessment will have to be made of the relevant nationality legislation from the country of 
origin. Each year only a few dozen persons obtain residence permits on these grounds. It is 
impossible to determine from the figures alone how many stateless Roma are among them. It 
can be assumed that the number is very small. 
 
The recently published brochure Stateloos maakt radeloos (Statelessness leads to 
desperation) explains that stateless Roma are in a particularly vulnerable position.59 They do 
not enjoy the civil right that would provide them with minimal social security and protection, 
and they live on the margins of society. A stateless person simply does not exist in the eyes of 
the law. He or she has no passport and no identity papers so they cannot work, study, travel 
or marry, open a bank account or get a driving licence. This often leads to a life separated 
from family and to estrangement, while having a nationality is one of the basic human rights. 
In addition, the condition of statelessness seems to promote criminality and an informal 
economy. So it is in the interest of the government and of all citizens to find a solution to the 
problem of statelessness. 
 
8.3 Relations with national and local governments  
In this section we will discuss the refusal of the Dutch government to recognise Roma as a 
national minority on the grounds of the Frame Convention. This will be followed by the local 
Roma policy in the municipality of Nieuwegein, which was submitted to the Equal Treatment 
Commission for assessment. 
 
8.3.1 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities  
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was drawn up by the 
Council of Europe and is the first multilateral convention completely devoted to the 
protection of minorities. In the past it was customary to regulate such protection in bilateral 
agreements. The obligations of the Framework Convention are legally binding for members 
states but are not directly applicable. This means that in principle the Convention cannot be 
invoked before a national court. With regard to the extent to which the Convention creates 
obligations, it is sometimes said that if tax laws were phrased this way no one would ever pay 
taxes.60 This is partly due to the different interests of the states involved in developing the 
Convention, which ranged from composite states like the Soviet Union to colonial powers. In 
spite of this, the Advisory Committee that supervises compliance with the Convention for the 
Committee of Ministers has interpreted both the Convention and the monitoring mechanism 
in an authoritative and impressive way. De Graaf has already written on this in a compelling 
report, so we are limiting ourselves in this section to the aspects that are mainly of 
importance to the Sinti and Roma.61 
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Although the Frame Convention can be called a success in view of the large number of 
parties that signed or ratified it, the absence of a definition of ‘national minority’ is often 
seized on in order to minimalise the obligations that ensue from the Convention. This also 
happens in the Netherlands. Whereas the Convention was first seen as an extension of 
integration policy, it was increasingly labelled an impediment. The government decided that 
the most important rights, such as the right to be educated in one’s own language, were only 
applicable to the Frisians, and that the only right that applied to other minorities was the right 
to be protected from discrimination. This did not bring about a change in the fear of 
difference. Through Minister Verdonk of Housing, Communities and Integration, the second 
Balkenende cabinet chose to embrace the promotion of unity, and the Convention was 
declared applicable only to the Frisians on the basis of five criteria:62 
1. they have the Dutch nationality; 
2. they are distinguished from the majority by language, culture and history (they have 
their own identity); 
3. they want to preserve this identity; 
4. they have traditionally been established on Dutch soil; 
5. they have traditionally lived in a specific region of the Netherlands. 
 
The Advisory Committee deals with this in its Opinion.63 A few points concerning the 
deprivation and marginalisation of the Roma and the Sinti were discussed in the previous 
sections, such as the problems concerning statelessness and housing. The Committee was 
critical not only of the constraints imposed by the criteria but also of the way the national 
government interprets the more procedural obligations included in the Convention. The 
national government regards the municipalities as the primary authorities responsible for 
policy (referring to decentralisation and the very small numbers of subjects), whereas the 
coordination of Roma policy is really the job of the national government. 
Due to a lack of parameter-setting policy, we have seen that since the emergence of the so-
called Roma communities, long drawn-out problems have developed which for thirty years 
the local authorities have apparently been unable to deal with adequately and with due regard 
for the rights and duties of those involved as laid down by international law.64 An example of 
this is the Wisselgeld project in the municipality of Nieuwegein, which will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section. 
 
The Advisory Committee is not the only body that has called on the Netherlands to recognise 
the Roma and Sinti as national minorities and to treat them in conformity with the Frame 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Earlier in 2009 a report on the 
Netherlands was published in response to the visit of the Human Rights Commissioner to the 
various EU countries.65 Both bodies are concerned about the prevailing prejudices against the 
Roma and Sinti, among others, and the discrimination that they experience. The ECRI has 
also called for the recognition of Roma and Sinti as national minorities.66 Finally, even before 
the criteria were formulated, the Meijers Commission rightly pointed out that excluding the 
Roma and Sinti from the protection of the Convention is arbitrary and possibly 
discriminatory.67 
 
The requirement that a minority must live within a specific region of the Netherlands quite 
specifically excludes Roma and Sinti, even if they have been living in the Netherlands for 
generations. Not only is this possibly in violation of the ICERD, as the Meijers Commission 
has stated,68 but it also violates the spirit − the purpose − of the Convention. Art. 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which the Netherlands is also party, states that 
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every treaty creates obligations for the member states which should be undertaken in good 
faith. International law thereby does more than impose a mere procedural requirement.69 In 
its case law, the International Court of Justice states that in assessing good faith, the results 
and actual efforts involved in implementing the treaty should be taken into account.70 
The relationship between regional treaties, such as those of the Council of Europe and UN 
law, can be quite complex. But if this standard is applied as a general principle of law to the 
Netherlands and the Frame Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the 
Netherlands comes off badly. By way of comparison, Germany recognises not only the 
Frisians and a few other national groups but also the Roma and Sinti (with about 70,000 
members) as national minorities.71 The Netherlands has a much smaller group of Roma and 
Sinti than Germany does. Fear of the obligations (and costs) due to this marginalised group 
that the Convention might impose is unjustified. The fact that the aforementioned obligations 
cannot be directly invoked before a national court is no reason why the Netherlands, as a 
model human rights country, should fail to fulfil its obligations.  
 
8.3.2 The Wisselgeld Project72 
 
 
The municipality of Nieuwegein has a long history of tension between café and restaurant 
owners and the Roma. Most of the Roma in this region belong to the ‘1978 group’, whose 
residence in the Netherlands was legalised shortly after their arrival. The only policy that 
existed at the time to promote integration was that they exchange their caravans (under 
coercion or not) for regular housing.73 In 2008 the tension led to serious fights.74 The 
recriminations went back and forth, and it was not clear what the cause and effect were. It 
was said that the fights began after a Roma boy was beaten up and his family went to the 
alleged perpetrators to fetch him. Finally, with increased police intervention, matters calmed 
down. Then the television programme Premtime decided to devote one of its shows to the 
disturbances in Nieuwegein.75 The show illustrates the Roma’s distrust of the municipality, 
its officials and its other residents. In response to complaints from hotel and catering 
establishments and to the increased media attention, a consultation was held in September 
2008 involving the mayor, the party chairmen from the city council and the police.76 The 
results were not made public, but not long afterwards the Wisselgeld (Small Change) project 
was started in January 2009.77 
 
Run-up and background  
In December 2008, the Second Chamber of parliament asked the Minister of Housing, 
Communities and Integration to work with the Roma communities in developing a unified 
approach. This occurred in response to reports of truancy, illegality, low participation in the 
labour force and anti-social behaviour in the so-called Roma reception municipalities such as 
Nieuwegein, Utrecht, Den Bosch and Tilburg. Local efforts that were made in the context of 
the Wisselgeld project in Nieuwegein and a lobby for financing by the various municipalities 
attracted national attention. In the letter of Minister Van der Laan written in response to the 
request from the Second Chamber, which was quoted in section 8.1, the unified approach 
turned out to be one-sided and almost all the Roma contact persons were stigmatised as 
criminals. 
 
‘Indeed, from conversations with the “Roma municipalities” it seems that, apart from a few 
positive exceptions, the key figures from the Roma community often have criminal records, which 
makes it difficult for city councils to establish and maintain good contact with them.’78 
 
The minister took the position that municipalities themselves have plenty of opportunity to 
tackle the problems themselves. He was opposed to setting up a separate group policy for 
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Roma at the national level. This runs counter to the advice of human rights commissioner 
Thomas Hammarberg,79 who calls for an overarching strategy at the national level that is set 
up in cooperation with the Roma community (and not only the Roma municipalities). There 
is a practical argument for this, in addition to the much-needed base of support it provides. 
The present policy, for which the municipalities are responsible, has proved ineffective for 
years. It would testify to a healthy grasp of reality not to expect new results if the old policy 
were continually applied.  
 
Discontinuing financial support to minority organisations of Roma and Sinti is striking in the 
light of the comment about the Roma and Sinti’s low degree of organisation. Indeed, such an 
observation should result in the creation of conditions for starting a dialogue with minority 
organisations at all political levels, certainly if genuine solutions are being sought for existing 
problems. 
 
Roma organisations were shocked by that passage and saw the letter as ‘discriminatory and 
stigmatising’,80 especially because it involved estimates. Both organisations deplore the fact 
that this is government policy and that apparently it is not necessary to involve the people 
who are the object of the plans.81 Great care should be taken when it comes to estimates, as 
we know from the so-called Update Study of the number of unregistered Antilleans. In that 
study, Antillean drug couriers and tourists were erroneously included in the statistics, 
resulting in a distorted picture on which policy was subsequently based.82 
 
Notes on the project  
In July 2008 the municipality of Nieuwegein established what it called the Wisselgeld (Small 
Change) approach for ‘intensive coaching for multi-problem Roma families’.83 The local 
Roma requested that they be involved in the project, but their appeal was brushed aside and 
the project was started. Finally the Roma took the matter to the Equal Treatment Commission 
(Commissie Gelijke Behandeling; CGB). The Commission’s two judgements had to do with 
threatening to discontinue government benefits if the Roma refused to cooperate with the 
Wisselgeld approach, and the discontinuing of two social security payments.84  
In this case, an organisation promoting the interests of the Roma, along with a lawyer, 
submitted a complaint to the CGB about the deterioration of the situation of the Roma caused 
by distinctions being made on the basis of race, by the pressure and coercion being used in 
the Wisselgeld approach and by the placement of intermediaries in a Roma family. The 
Commission is authorised to issue judgements on such governmental actions on the basis of 
art. 7a of the Equal Treatment Act (AWGB), which prohibits the making of distinctions with 
regard to social protection. Partly because the aggrieved families had not given permission to 
pass on their information to the CGB, the CGB ‘could not assess any damage at this time’ 
and there was no indication of a distinction having been made on the grounds of race. 
 
The Commission is bound by the framework of the AWGB and limited itself to the question 
presented to it. Here we will look further into a few aspects of the case. The municipality 
took the position that an intermediary is not forcibly placed in a family but at the family’s 
request. The term ‘request’ may be technically applicable, but the voluntary content of it is 
certainly debatable, on the basis of the municipality’s own memorandum. Under the heading 
‘If the voluntary option does not work’ we read the following: 
 
‘One ... way to put an intermediary in contact with the family is by means of a crisis within the 
family: threatened eviction or termination of government benefits, or the threat of placing a child 
in custody. At that moment, the [chain partners] can set up a strategic plan, a contract with 
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conditional aspects; the family is offered a chance as long as it accepts the coaching/ direction of 
the intermediary. Thus failure to comply with the conditions in the contract has direct 
consequences for the family. In this way we can speak of pressure or coercion, and of conditional 
assistance and community service.’85 
 
The municipality also made it known that no specific measures were being introduced with 
regard to the Roma, but that only existing rules were being enforced. This raises the question 
why a separate memorandum on Roma alone was necessary if the plan was really making use 
of existing resources alone (the memorandum itself contains no statistics, only 
uncorroborated estimates). In addition, the job description of the intermediaries is specifically 
focused on Roma families and is based on the municipality’s image of them: 
 
‘The coaches must be able to take their share of rough treatment. ... They have to be alert to the 
cultural aspects of the families’ behaviour and be able to use creative and unorthodox approaches 
in dealing with them. The bargaining culture of “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”, 
which is essential to the way many Roma people conduct their lives, can be used by the 
intermediary...’ 
 
In addition, the intermediary ‘should be unafraid and daring’ and should be accustomed to 
dealing with crisis situations. This may be true for all intermediaries in social services, but 
searching for the skill ‘to resist being placated by sweet talk, etc.’ is stigmatising, to say the 
least.86 
 
In the judgement of the Equal Treatment Commission, the need to consider the context (and 
to recognise diversity) was mentioned but not applied in this case.87 The CGB, acting within 
the framework of the AWGB, came to the conclusion that no racial distinction was made. 
This does not mean, however, that an ‘equal approach for everyone’, which the city of 
Nieuwegein supports, will never result in discrimination.88 It is important to recognise that 
within a broader legal framework focusing on relevant differences and consequences of 
policy for certain groups is not an exception to the general principles of equality but an 
elaboration of those principles. 
 
Generally speaking there is a great deal to be done with regard to the rising popularity of 
pressure and coercion in the social services,89 certainly when it is aimed at one particular 
ethnic group (with repressive measures). With regard to the interweaving of investigation, 
repressive measures and social services, it is striking that the four big cities (Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) have been receiving extra financial resources since 2006 
as part of the major cities policy in order to prevent certain ethnic minority youths from 
embarking on criminal careers.90 Native Dutch youths who frequently have run-ins with the 
police do not qualify for such a programme, even though it has been proven that they 
reoffend more seriously and for longer periods that ethnic minority youths.91 
An example of a group-specific policy initiated by the national government is the 
‘Government policy for problem Antillean-Dutch youngsters’.92 After the Antillean 
Reference Index (VIA) − the registry of problem youngsters of Antillean ethnicity − was 
dropped after being persistently criticised for its discriminatory character, the minister of 
Housing, Communities and Integration was reluctant to destroy the data that had already been 
collected. According to him, the Antilleans constitute only one of several groups of at-risk 
young people, and ethnicity is only one of the factors necessary for an effective approach to 
the problem. The VIA was replaced by the Reference Index for At-Risk Youngsters (VIR), 
which contains not a word about ethnic registration, either in the imperative or in the 
prohibitive sense. The VIR grants a great deal of latitude to the many authorities that deal 
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with young people when it comes to exchanging and supplementing data. This means that 
information on ethnicity can easily be gathered in practical situations,93 and social assistance 
and the taking of repressive measures can flow into each other unhindered. Another example 
in which ethnicity plays a specific role is the Strategy for Moroccan-Dutch Problem 
Youngsters.94 
Apart from the questions that can be raised about them, these approaches to ethnic problems 
refute the government’s claim that it only conducts general policy, not policy that is aimed at 
specific minorities. In addition, the more than 19 million euros that have been set aside for 
such an ethnically-based approach95 contrast sharply with the € 60,000 per year that the 
national government has deemed sufficient to solve the problems with (and certainly not of) 
the Roma until 2012.96 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
There is still little systematic knowledge of the Roma in the Netherlands that is available for 
use in Monitor studies. The registries maintained by anti-discrimination services, the police 
and the Public Prosecution Service still contains few complaints of discrimination against 
Roma and Sinti. To increase the willingness to report to these authorities, greater trust will 
have to be created. Minority organisations such as the Triana Foundation in Utrecht are 
working on this, largely as intermediaries. Unfortunately, the financing needed to carry on 
these activities is inadequate. 
In the area of education, very little has changed with regard to the relatively low Cito test 
scores and the high rate of truancy. Separate facilities to make up for this disparity should 
satisfy stringent requirements. As for housing, there is still a shortage of trailer parks despite 
an obligation under European law to deal with this problem. 
 
The arrival of residents from recent EU states has brought new Roma to the Netherlands from 
Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. In France, a similar situation resulted in tossing all the Roma 
on one heap, regardless of their connection with the country (or the length of their residence 
there), and led to mass deportations. This is an additional risk for stateless people, and a large 
percentage of the Roma are stateless, including those in the Netherlands. Stateless people do 
not enjoy the civil rights that ought to provide them with minimal social security and 
protection. Statelessness also seems to promote criminality and an informal economy. 
Stateless people simply do not exist in the eyes of the law, and partly for this reason they live 
along the margins of society. Fighting the discrimination of Roma should be put on the 
agenda, but so should social inclusion, and this can be done by dealing adequately with 
statelessness. It is also important that when problems are spotted among either newcomers or 
Roma and Sinti who have lived in the Netherlands for generations, they should be dealt with 
using measures that are not discriminatory and do not violate their right to freedom of 
movement as EU citizens. 
 
The Frame Convention for the Protection of National Minorities obliges the government to 
protect vulnerable groups such as the Roma, but in the Netherlands it has only been declared 
applicable with regard to the Frisians. The exclusion of the Roma and Sinti from the 
protection of the Convention is arbitrary, which makes it seem discriminatory. In addition, 
the national government lacks a necessary parameter-setting policy and a facilitating attitude. 
Because of this, the local authorities have no consistent long-term policy and are unable to 
come up with an effective approach to the problems.  
As the European Court of Human Rights underscored in the Oršuš case, even attempts to 
uphold equal treatment − as the city of Nieuwegein advocates in its Wisselgeld project − can 
conceal discriminatory aspects when it comes to the structural deprivation and 
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marginalisation of ethnic minority groups. To avoid this, local and national governments 
should base their work on a thorough knowledge of the target group. In this regard, making 
room for intercultural skills can help restore trust. Indeed, mutual distrust cannot be removed 
by force. This requires sincere overtures and dialogue. 
 
For both the national government and the local authorities, deprivation and criminality among 
the Roma play an important role in policy formation, but so do prejudices. This is evident in 
the letter of the minister of Housing, Communities and Integration and in the local Wisselgeld 
project. The question remains whether the content and the implementation of the project meet 
the legal obligations regarding the right to non-discrimination, partly because of the ‘pressure 
and coercion’ approach aimed at one ethnic group. 
Given the deprivation and marginalisation of the Roma and Sinti and the widespread 
prejudice against them, which can lead to discrimination, just focusing on problems with the 
Roma is not enough. Although it goes without saying that serious problems do occur, dealing 
with the problems that the Roma themselves experience is at least as important if any results 
are to be achieved. In a society that is becoming more and more digitised and bureaucratic, it 
is not easy for everyone to keep up. Added to this general trend is the mutual distrust that 
often dominates the relationship between the Roma and the rest of society. It is the 
government’s responsibility to take the lead and to restore trust. In doing so, it is essential 
that Roma professionals and minority organisations be involved in searching for solutions. 
Working together as equals improves the chance of success. 
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9 The consequences of stigma 
 
Colette van Laar, Belle Derks and Naomi Ellemers 
 
In this chapter we will discuss the results of a research programme aimed at examining the 
impact of social identity on the well-being, the motivation and the performance of members 
of socially devalued groups, such as ethnic minorities.1 The results show that it is essential for 
the motivation and performance of members of these groups − such as individuals from a 
particular culture or with particular religious convictions − that their identity be respected and 
supported by the surrounding community (such as important persons in their school or place 
of employment). Respect and recognition of ethnic minorities’ social identity improves their 
well-being, increases their identification with society and raises their ambitions and 
performance in the areas of education and employment. 
 
9.1 The consequences of stigma  
Individuals define themselves not only on the basis of their personal characteristics and 
outcomes but also in terms of the social categories to which they belong, such as their gender, 
ethnicity, profession and their role as parents. This part of the identity − which is known as 
one’s social identity − is central to people’s lives and determines how they see themselves, 
how they distinguish themselves from others and how they respond to others. Social identity 
is therefore based on group categorisations: the individual defines himself or herself 
according to similarities he or she has with others in that category. One’s social identity as a 
Dutch person, for example, represents the characteristics that a Dutch person shares with 
other Dutch people and that distinguish him or her from others who are not Dutch. The extent 
to which a certain identity directs the perceptions and behaviour of an individual depends on 
the value that the individual attaches to that specific identity, as well as on the situation in 
which the person finds himself.2 Every specific identity has its own relevant dimensions for 
comparison and behavioural norms. Not only are these important for the measure of 
satisfaction that one derives from one’s own behaviour and performance, but they also 
determine the ambitions and expectations that one has for the future.3 Identities that are 
connected to socially relevant categories such as gender, ethnicity and age are especially 
influential because they are central to social discussions regarding the distribution of 
resources and regarding conflicts between groups in that society. Social identity is of special 
importance to groups with a lower social status and groups for whom there are negative 
stereotypes and low expectations, as is often the case with migrants or second-generation 
ethnic minorities. 
A great deal of work in social psychology has been aimed at studying the processes related to 
social identity. This work has shown that to a significant degree social identity directs social 
behaviour. Social identity plays a major role in the commitment individuals feel towards a 
group and the extent to which they are prepared to devote themselves to their group, in the 
desire to distinguish themselves as a group from other groups, and in group behaviour, such 
as giving preferential treatment to members of one’s own group as opposed to members of 
other groups.4 In conducting research on social identity, social psychology focuses on 
underlying processes: exactly how do social identities manifest themselves, and what 
function do they serve? In this way, social-psychological research attempts to learn more 
about how the articulation of identity influences individual behaviour and what role social 
identity plays in social problems such as participation in the labour market, income 
discrepancies and differences in the attitudes of native Dutch and ethnic minority Dutch 
towards higher education.5 
In our work, we have focused on the role of social identity in the motivation and performance 
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of members of devalued groups. More specifically, our work focuses on the effects of 
underrepresentation as opposed to integration in school and work situations on the well-
being, motivation and performance of members of ethnic minority groups. Although the 
participation of minorities in education and paid employment has increased, integration is far 
from complete. Underrepresentation has assumed new forms in recent years, owing to the 
fact that members of minority groups attend certain schools or certain types of schools, or are 
chiefly represented in specific professions or at specific levels in the labour process. In 
addition, there are indications that ethnic minorities do not always function optimally, which 
is evident in a higher attrition rate, burn-out and health problems.6 Relatively little is known 
about the conditions under which members of ethnic minorities are optimally motivated and 
achieve maximum performance in school and work situations. In fact, attempts to increase 
integration are often led more by ideological considerations than by social-scientific 
knowledge. 
By means of various experiments and correlational studies in our laboratory and in real-life 
situations we have been able to obtain a clearer picture of the role that social identity plays in 
the motivation and performance of members of groups with a lower social status. In this 
chapter we will give an overview of our findings. The research provides insight into the way 
the psychological concept of social identity can be used to help these groups attain a higher 
social position, such as in schools and in the labour market. First we will give an overview of 
theoretical knowledge with regard to social identity and stigma (section 9.2). Then we will 
discuss the results of our research (section 9.3). In doing so we will look at the effects of 
segregation and integration on motivation and performance (section 9.3.1), the effect of 
social identity protection on motivation and performance (section 9.3.2) and the important 
role that the low status group plays in the motivation and performance of its members and in 
the behaviour of group members towards their group (section 9.3.3). 
  
9.2 Theoretical framework: social identity and stigma  
Our research programme is based on theories from the social sciences that predict how 
individuals will react to the low status of the groups to which they belong, such as social 
identity theory,7 social categorisation theory8 and the stigma perspective.9 These theories are 
based on the assumption that membership in a stigmatised or low status group can have 
negative effects on one’s self-image. In addition, members of low status groups actively try to 
withstand the threat to their self-image caused by the low group status or stigma with which 
they have been confronted. Many social-scientific theories are based on the individual need 
for a positive self-image. The self-image of an individual develops by means of self-
assessment, social comparisons with others and through the reflected assessments of others.10 
It is much more difficult for members of groups with a low status to maintain a positive self-
evaluation because of the objectively lower outcomes of their group and because of the 
negative expectations and stereotypes that others have of their group. Research shows, 
however, that members of low status group are creative and flexible in preserving a positive 
self-image despite these challenges.11 
If it is not possible to raise one’s own status or the status of the group in a meaningful way, 
then members of low status groups can use various strategies to protect themselves from the 
threat of social comparison with higher-status groups. In social identity theory, the term 
social creativity is used in reference to these strategies because these strategies do not change 
the low status of the group but instead creatively improve the image that group members have 
of their group.12 For example, low status group members prefer to compare themselves with 
others from the same social group so the low status of the group is less conspicuous.13 Low 
status group members can also ascribe the cause of their low status to external causes (such as 
discrimination), thereby avoiding negative implications for themselves.14 Finally, they can 
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make their feelings of self-worth less dependent on domains in which their group performs 
poorly (such as school or work) and focus on domains in which their group traditionally 
excels, such as music or sports.15 
Each of these strategies for protecting the self-image has specific short-term and long-term 
costs and benefits. While devaluing the domains in which one performs more poorly is an 
effective strategy for protecting one’s self-worth, this strategy probably reduces motivation 
and performance in central domains such as school and work, which have been given a lower 
value in order to protect self-worth.16 By the same token, attributions to external causes may 
protect the self-evaluation of the low status group, but they can also lead to lowered 
expectations and lowered perceptions of control. This reduces motivation in the domain over 
the long term. The costs and benefits of a strategy partly determine which strategy is chosen. 
Whether members of low status groups are able to use a strategy in order effectively to 
protect their self-image depends on the social context. The social context offers a frame of 
reference with various social influences, norms and rules that make it easier or more difficult 
to use a particular strategy. The availability of members of one’s own and other groups within 
this social context plays an important part here. Thus it is less easy to limit social 
comparisons to member of one’s own group in an integrated environment where members 
cannot avoid being exposed to other groups. In the same way, in an integrated situation it is 
more difficult to devalue a domain in which the group does not perform well. Indeed, in 
integrated situations individuals are confronted with members of other groups who actually 
attach a high value to this domain. It can therefore be argued that integrated situations are 
more threatening because they necessarily impose comparisons with members of higher 
status groups and place a high value on domains in which the group does not perform well. 
This makes it more likely − not less − that in an integrated situation members of low status 
groups will devalue a domain. 
We thus expect that two opposing processes will influence whether a self-protective strategy 
will be used: threats and social pressure. The degree of integration between low status groups 
and high status groups first has an effect on threat to social identity and self-image, and 
thereby on the self-protective strategies that will be used. Threats to self-image take place by 
means of social comparisons. When a member of a low status group finds himself in an 
integrated environment (such as a child of ethnic minority origins in an overwhelmingly 
White school), the difference in status between the groups will be emphasised because 
comparisons with members of the high status group are easier to make. So assessing one’s 
self-worth depends not only on one’s own performance but also on the average performance 
level in the environment.17 A student of Moroccan origin will give a lower assessment of the 
performance of Moroccan students in the class if there are also native Dutch students in the 
class who are performing better. Because the difference in status between the two groups is 
easier to see in integrated situations, the threat to a person’s social identity will be greater. To 
preserve his self-worth, the student can distance himself from the school domain and turn his 
attention to another domain in which he performs better. This helps to protect his self-image 
but can have a negative effect on school motivation. So the threat hypothesis states that 
integration can negatively affect motivation and performance. 
But we also expect that the confrontation with members of higher status groups will have a 
positive effect. People whose main contacts are with members of their own low status group 
run the risk of being in a situation in which less emphasis is placed on the importance of good 
performance. After all, the average participation in the labour force is lower among members 
of their own group, fewer individuals are involved in advanced training, and important role 
models (such as parents, older brothers and sisters and acquaintances) have less experience 
with higher education and jobs. It can also be predicted that in an ethnically segregated 
environment there will be a tendency to turn away from domains in which the group performs 
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poorly and instead to concentrate on alternative domains that are important to the group, such 
as religion, culture and sports.18 Members of high status groups focus mainly on the 
dimensions that give their group high status (such as school performance for native children). 
For this reason, when members of low status groups are in contact with these high status 
groups there is greater social pressure on them to perform well on the same dimensions. For a 
child from an ethnic minority group, the pressure to perform at school will therefore be 
higher in a class with a large proportion of native students than in a ‘black’ school. The social 
pressure hypothesis thus states that integration can have positive consequences for the 
motivation and performance of members of devalued groups. 
We have studied the processes described here in experimental groups under controlled 
conditions as well as in existing groups in school and work situations. By taking this 
approach we are able to make unambiguous statements about cause-and-effect relationships 
that also can be generalised and applied to other situations in which these issues occur. We 
have concentrated on three lines of research. The first line of research examined the effects of 
integration on identification with important social domains that are relevant to status, such as 
school and work. The second line focused on gaining a better grasp of the way members of 
low status groups protect their social identity and the consequences of this for motivation and 
performance. The third line looked at the influence of the broader social group on the 
motivation and performance of individual group members. 
 
9.3 The research results 
In the following sections we will discuss the results of the research. Specifically, we will 
examine the effects of integration, the effects of social identity protection and the role of the 
low status group. 
 
9.3.1 The effects of integration on motivation and performance  
Our first line of research examined the effects of integration on the extent to which members 
of low status groups identify with important social domains that are relevant to status, such as 
school and work. More specifically, we studied the role that threat and social pressure play in 
motivation and performance. In a series of studies we showed that members of low status 
groups who focus mainly on contacts with their own group do indeed show positive effects 
on well-being (reduced level of threat) but also negative effects on motivation and 
performance (reduced pressure to perform well). Integration, on the other hand, can 
positively affect motivation and performance by means of the increased social pressure to 
engage in domains relevant to status, such as school and work. However, this effort only pays 
off if the raised threat present in situations in which the high status group is strongly 
represented can be neutralised. The way these negative effects of integration can be 
neutralised is examined in the second line of research, which is discussed further on in this 
chapter. 
In the first set of studies we focused on gaining at a better understanding of the effects of 
integration on well-being, motivation and performance. An example of such an investigation 
is a study of ethnic minority and native Dutch primary school pupils.19 The investigation built 
on the findings of Maurice Crul.20 Crul asked a group of successful ethnic minority pupils 
how they had attained their relatively high position at school. The pupils indicated that they 
owed their good results to the fact that they had been integrated during the primary school 
years. Our study focused on the empirical tests of the connection Crul had predicted between 
integration and ‘success’ at school. As part of the study, sixteen classes of group eight pupils 
(group eight is the last year of Dutch primary school) were visited in Alkmaar, four in Leiden 
and seven in Rotterdam. The integration at the schools varied as a whole between 0% and 
94% native Dutch pupils. Pupils filled in a questionnaire in which their identification with the 
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school domain and various alternative domains were measured (family, sports, social 
acceptance, appearance, behaviour and religion), and their self-worth, motivation and 
performance in the various domains was assessed. The degree of integration of the pupils was 
established on the basis of the percentage of native Dutch pupils in the class and on the basis 
of the (smaller) reference group of pupils with whom the pupil associated. The teachers also 
filled in a background questionnaire about the pupils in which they assessed the pupils’ 
motivation and performance. 
The results showed that the percentage of native Dutch pupils in the class correlated 
positively with the performance of the pupils. In addition, ethnic minorities pupils in more 
integrated classes were given recommendations to attend higher-level secondary schools (in 
the Netherlands, the choice of what level of secondary school to attend is based on 
standardised tests and teacher recommendations). However, the results of our investigation 
also showed that a high percentage of native Dutch pupils in the class comes with a price tag 
for ethnic minority pupils because the environment it creates feel less safe. Although ethnic 
minorities in an integrated class did perform better on average, they had lower self-worth and 
said they were less motivated than ethnic minorities in a class with few native Dutch pupils. 
The results of this study thus partly support Crul’s hypothesis that integration benefits school 
performance but comes at the expense of feelings of well-being and motivation. 
Further studies in this line of research showed that integrated classes can be threatening 
because the social comparisons with the high status group in these situations is experienced 
as negative for members of the low status group. We conducted a detailed study as to why 
integrated performance situations lead members of low status groups to feel threatened and 
harm their motivation in dimensions that are important for status.21 An example of this is a 
longitudinal study of first year students at Leiden University. This study showed that 
members of low status group in integrated situations perceive less respect for their identity 
and experience more negative stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination. Both native Dutch 
and ethnic minority students were involved in the study. At three points during the first year 
of their degree programme (the propaedeutic year) they were asked to fill in a questionnaire: 
at the beginning, halfway through and at the end of that year. Among other things, the 
questionnaire measured the student’s identification with the study programme and with 
various alternative domains. Their self-worth, motivation and performance in different 
domains were also assessed, and observed stigmatisation, discrimination and attitudes with 
regard to various groups were all measured. The results showed that compared with native 
Dutch students, ethnic minority students had the feeling that their ethnic group was valued 
less at the university. This negative value in turn negatively affected the observed quality of 
the relations between the various ethnic groups and the university, the contacts that ethnic 
minority students had with other groups and their well-being and performances in this 
context. The observed discrimination, and the fear that the stereotypes would be substantiated 
also led to lower identification with the study programme.22 This longitudinal study therefore 
showed that an integrated university context can be threatening for students from ethnic 
minority origins, which can negatively affect their level of performance. 
 
9.3.2 The effects of social identity protection on motivation  
Our second line of research was aimed at better understanding how members of low status 
groups can protect their social identity, and what the consequences of social identity 
protection are for their motivation and performance. Earlier research showed that people who 
are confronted by the low status of their group are less motivated to perform on dimensions 
that are associated with high status groups.23 This reduced motivation is partly the result of 
the aforementioned strategies that members of low status groups can use to protect their self-
image, such as limiting social contacts and comparisons with members of their own group 
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(self-segregation) and reducing the importance of dimensions in which one’s own group 
performs poorly (domain devaluation). These cognitive strategies reduce threats to social 
identity and thereby increase well-being among members of low status groups. However, the 
strategies may have adverse consequences for the actual status of the group members if the 
members turn away from performance dimensions that are important for status in that society, 
or if by segregating themselves they fail to realise that they have a status gap to bridge. In a 
series of investigations we studied how the use of these negative self-protective strategies can 
be avoided and how low status groups can be motivated to focus on dimensions that lead to 
higher social status.24 
We examined whether members of low status groups can be motivated to perform betteron 
dimensions that are important for status if they have the opportunity to protect their social 
identity. Naturally this social identity protection must occur in a way that does not at the 
same time harm motivation on dimensions that are important for status (such as domain 
devaluation and self-segregation). According to the social identity theory, members of low 
status groups can also protect their social identity by paying attention to positive aspects of 
their own group, such as the high performance of their group on alternative performance 
dimensions.25 Ethnic minorities can focus attention on cultural or religious dimensions, for 
example. We investigated whether paying attention to positive aspects of the group enables 
members of low status groups to withstand threats to their social identity, and whether it is 
possible to do this without turning away from dimensions that are important for status so that 
motivation on these dimensions is maintained. 
We conducted various studies in which we looked at members of low status groups who 
experience threats to their social identity (because they are in an integrated environment, for 
example). The results consistently show that members of low status groups are indeed more 
motivated to perform well on dimensions that are important for status when they protect their 
social identity by focusing attention on positive characteristics of their own group.26 
Moreover, it appeared that this social identity protection can also come from the person’s 
environment. Low status groups were more highly motivated and performed better on 
dimensions important for status if – in a situation in which emphasis is placed on dimensions 
important for status - respect was expressed in the surrounding environment for the high 
performance of the group on an alternative dimension. In two studies we investigated the 
influence of perceived stigmatisation in Dutch society of the person’s own ethnic group on 
the person’s attitude towards the labour market. An internet study among young working and 
studying Muslim women indicated that perceived stigmatisation by the native Dutch did 
affect young Muslim women’s attitude with regard to their study and work. Muslim women 
who felt pressured by the native Dutch to conceal their religious identity reported less interest 
in the study and work domain than Muslim women who did not feel stigmatised because of 
their religious identity. Those who reported being positively valued by the native Dutch 
indicated that they identified more with Dutch society. An experimental study among young 
working and studying Muslim women that was conducted through various Islamic 
organisations supported these results and also confirmed the causal direction of the found 
relationships. In this study, a systematic comparison was made among women who were 
placed in a situation in which their social identity was or was not supported by their 
immediate environment. Here, too, female Muslims reported being more highly motivated in 
the domains of work and study if their social identity was supported by the immediate 
environment. If the immediate environment gave more support for a person’s ethnic identity, 
it also resulted in greater identification with Dutch society. 
The results of these studies show that if Muslim women are to participate in Dutch society 
they must have the freedom and ability to communicate their identity as Muslims in 
educational institutions or in the labour market. Confirming their valued social identity 
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therefore has positive societal implications. Attention to ethnic identity alone is not enough, 
however. Members of low status groups in work and school situations benefit especially from 
so-called double value. Value for one’s ethnic identity is important for dispelling a sense of 
threat (threat hypothesis), while value for the educational or work domains is important for 
motivating the person to perform well (social pressure hypothesis). Only double value assures 
that members of low status groups will demonstrate higher motivation in school and work 
domains as well as in areas that are important to their own ethnic or religious identity. Only 
then are they more likely to identify with Dutch society. 
This second line of research therefore shows that a positively valued social identity is a 
requirement for high motivation among members of low status groups. When members of 
low status groups feel that their social identity is being protected, this stimulates them to 
perform well on dimensions that can lead to higher social status. The results of the first line 
of research point to the risk of integrated situations. Integration evokes a sense of inevitable 
failure if it undermines people’s social identity. Adding to this, our second line of research 
shows how members of low status groups can still be motivated to perform well in this 
threatening environment on dimensions that are important for status. Specifically, it is 
important that members of low status groups have the feeling that their social identity is 
positively valued and respected by members of the high status group. This makes the 
integration less threatening and motivates members of low status groups to improve their 
performance on dimensions that will lead to a higher social status − even if these are 
primarily associated with high status groups. Our work also shows how important it is that 
members of low status groups feel valued and respected as a group, especially in integrated 
situations in which the threat is high. Only in situations that allow them to maintain a positive 
image of their group will they achieve optimal performance on dimensions through which 
they can improve their position. 
 
9.3.3 Social identity protection and the group  
So far we have mainly looked at the influence of persons who are immediately present in 
school or work situations. In the first two lines of research we focused on how the presence of 
native Dutch students in the classroom, or positive recognition from native colleagues at 
work, influence the motivation and performance of ethnic minority students and employees. 
In a third line of research we look at the broader social context. This was an investigation of 
how more generally the expectations of others influence the motivation and performance of 
members of low status groups. The results of these lines of research show that strategies used 
by individual group members to protect their social identity also have social consequences for 
the position of the group as a whole. 
Members of low status groups can try to improve their position by attempting to achieve 
better results individually (individual upward mobility) or by striving for better results for the 
whole group (collective mobility or social change). It is often thought that the position of low 
status groups will improve when all members of that group try to perform as well as possible 
on their own on dimensions that lead to higher social status. Research shows, however, that 
individual mobility does little to improve the position of low status groups as a whole, and in 
some respects can even lessen the opportunities for other members of the group.27 Improving 
the position of a low status group as a whole will mainly be achieved when group members 
specifically try to challenge and improve the low status of their group.28 
In our work we looked at what kinds of upward mobility are supported by members of low 
status groups, and at how different forms of social identity protection affect the status of the 
social group. The results show that members of low status groups find it important that 
members of their group pursue upward mobility in a way that is consistent with the identity 
of the group.29 Minorities are more supportive of group members who aspire to upward 
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mobility in activities that are compatible with the interests of the group (ingroup domains) 
than in activities that are seen as contrary to the interests of the group (outgroup domains). 
For example, a member of an ethnic minority group who accepted a good job at the Ministry 
of Justice in the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (with activities that serve the 
interests of the native Dutch group) is seen as someone who contributes less to the interests of 
the group than an individual who accepted exactly the same job but with the Department of 
Civic Integration (with activities that serve the interests of minorities). The first individual 
consequently received less support from other group members for this kind of upward 
mobility. Group members who aspire to upward mobility in ingroup domains are seen as 
more loyal to their own group, and as more closely identified with and sympathetic towards 
the group. The research showed that for it is these factors that lead to these group members to 
be given more support. 
We also found that the manner in which members of low status groups reduce social identity 
threat affects the way the individual behaves toward other members of the low status group. 
As described in the second line of research, we attempted to combat the negative effect of 
social identity threat by making group members conscious of positively valued characteristics 
of their group. An alternative way to reduce threats to social identity is to point out to group 
members the positive aspects of their personal identity.30 In principle, both social identity 
protection and personal identity protection can increase the motivation of low status group 
members to perform well on dimensions that are important for status. However, there are 
differences in the ways in which members of low status group aspire to higher positions, and 
the consequences of this aspiring are also different.31 Members of low status groups who 
focus on their personal identity are primarily interested in improving their own position in the 
status hierarchy, even at the cost of other people’s opportunities.32 However, members of low 
status groups who are able to protect their social identity will not only try to perform better 
on dimensions that are important for status but will also try to improve the positions of other 
members of the group so the group as a whole will achieve better results.33 For example, 
when a female employee works in a company in which the prevailing climate is positive with 
regard to the performance of women (social identity protection), she will not only improve 
her own position but will also help other women to advance in their careers. In contrast, when 
women work in an environment in which they feel that women are less valued than men, they 
are more likely to focus on their own individual qualities rather than the qualities related to 
their gender. As a result they will feel less involved in the fight against gender discrimination 
in general.34 These results indicate the advantages of social identity protection over more 
individual forms of self-protection: when group members can maintain a positive image of 
their group, despite the devaluation of their social identity, they will also be more inclined to 
pursue a better position for the whole group instead of only trying to improve their own 
position by distancing themselves from the prevailing negative image of their group. 
These findings thus demonstrate the importance of a positive social identity for members of a 
low status group. In principle, low status groups can motivate themselves in dimensions that 
are important for status by noting that they may be able to achieve better individual results 
than other members of their group. The results of our research show that this does not help 
the group as a whole and can even be counterproductive. The low status group as a whole has 
a better chance of improving its social position if members of low status groups are able to 
derive a positive self-image from their group membership instead of focusing on their own 
personal identity. Only when members of groups with a low social status have the 
opportunity to maintain a positive image of their group will they strive for better results for 
themselves and other group members. Only then will they also be given the support of 
members of their own group, which is an important basis for increasing motivation and 
performance and thereby improving their chance of success.35 
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9.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we discussed the results of a programme of research that investigated the role 
of social identity in well-being, motivation and performance. The results show that for the 
motivation and performance of members of low status groups, such as ethnic minorities, it is 
important that their identity − as people with a certain culture or certain religious convictions 
− be respected and supported by others in their environment, especially by important persons 
in the school or work situation. Whenever this happens, there is a marked improvement in 
their well-being, motivation and performance and a stronger identification with Dutch 
society. These are conditions for success in school and work situations, which is of great 
importance to the full social integration of these groups. The results of the research 
programme show that identities need not be negative factors but can be harnessed for the 
purpose of achieving positive societal outcomes and improving the position of minorities in 
society. 
The results of the research programme discussed here have important implications for the 
integration of ethnic minority groups by means of education and employment. The current 
government policy appears to be based on the idea that the best way to integrate ethnic 
minorities into Dutch culture is to pay not too much attention to differences in ethnic origins, 
and to encourage people to focus on their own personal identity and on Dutch culture. The 
research programme discussed here, however, shows that these ideas fail to acknowledge the 
psychological need individuals have for a positive social identity. Because low status groups 
base their self-image partly on their group, and because they need the support of that group, 
they will only be motivated to achieve success in society when they can maintain a positive 
image of their group. If they have the feeling that their identity is not being valued, they will 
focus on reducing the threat to their social identity through such means as turning away from 
society and from the dimensions that determine status in that society. However, if they 
perceive that their identity is being respected, they will be more likely to aspire to successful 
participation in that society, regardless of the negative feedback that they may sometimes 
receive. In addition, in an environment that values their identity low status group members 
not only perform better on dimensions that are important for status, but they also help other 
members of their group achieve the same success. 
These conclusions should not be interpreted as an appeal to solve the problems related to the 
integration of minorities with ‘coddling’ or ‘tea drinking’. The results of our investigation 
show unequivocally that double value is essential. Value for one’s own ethnic identity is 
necessary to remove the sense of threat (threat hypothesis). But value for dimensions that are 
important for status is essential in motivating members of minority groups to perform well in 
important social domains, such as school and work (social pressure hypothesis). Measures 
that focus exclusively on valuing ethnic or cultural differences (‘coddling’ or ‘tea drinking’) 
only remove the threat to identity. This may increase well-being, but it does not increase 
motivation to become integrated or to perform well on dimensions that lead to societal 
success. An integration policy that keeps harping on the importance of good school results 
and participation in the labour market will be experienced as a threat unless attention is paid 
to the specific background or the circumstances that members of ethnic minorities have to 
manage. The self-protective strategies that enable them to live with this threat (by restricting 
themselves to comparisons within their own group or by focusing on other performance 
domains) make it less likely that they will pursue the kinds of performances that truly 
promote integration. The only policy that will be effective in promoting integration is one 
that succeeds in combining both aspects: communicating value for the identity of the low 
status group, and making it clear that commitment is expected in domains in which societal 
success can be achieved. 
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10 Anti-discrimination restrictions and criminal prosecution in 2009 
 
Marija Davidović  
 
In this chapter we will examine the nature and scale of racial discrimination and the role of 
the police and the Public Prosecutor. We will also undertake a year-by-year analysis of the 
available figures,1 which were provided to the Anne Frank House by the National Police 
Services Agency (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten; KLPD) and the National Expertise 
Centre for Discrimination (Landelijke Expertise Centrum Discriminatie; LECD) of the Public 
Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie; OM). As in previous years, these authorities make 
a distinction between the articles of the law that refer specifically to discrimination and 
criminal offences that are aggravated by discriminatory behaviour, such as threats or arson. 
The latter occur frequently but generally are not registered as discriminatory acts. Because of 
this there is no comprehensive overview of all discriminatory incidents, in addition to the 
unwillingness to report them. 
The data in this chapter follow up on and partly overlap the chapter dealing with the same 
matter for 2008 in the Racial Discrimination Monitor, commissioned by the Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, insofar as developments for 2009 are 
mentioned there.2 
 
10.1 Discrimination and the government 
This chapter will attempt to answer some frequently asked questions concerning 
discrimination and the role of criminal law. When can we say that discrimination has taken 
place? Autonomy − the right to make your own choices without being excluded on irrelevant 
grounds − and human equality are fundamental to the operation of our society. Establishing 
discrimination can be quite simple, but there are also a multitude of complex situations in 
which discrimination is less obvious. 
 
It becomes more difficult to establish discrimination when the right not to be discriminated 
against clashes with another right, or when, intentionally or not, a group of people with the 
same ethnicity are adversely affected by government policy. Prohibiting a Dutch citizen from 
following a particular course of study because she or he also has Iranian nationality is an 
example of such a policy. In her research, Terlouw shows that the policy does not increase 
public safety as it was intended to do, but it does imply that Iranians − even those with a 
Dutch passport − constitute a danger as a group. Van der Vlies is also critical of the policy 
and notes that ‘the constant repetition of the accusations can give the impression that they are 
correct.’3  
Profiles can be helpful in providing public assistance, but they can also make it easier to track 
people down. It does need to be kept within the statutory framework, certainly when it comes 
to ethnic profiles. Contrary to what is generally thought, the effectiveness of police action 
does benefit from respecting anti-discrimination laws. This has been demonstrated in several 
studies carried out by the Open Society Institute (OSI) on the application of ethnic profiles in 
investigatory activities.4 In the context of counterterrorism, Bovenkerk explains clearly that 
the chance of successfully finding and apprehending terrorists decreases when ethnic profiles 
are used.5 This is partly because of the use of incorrect terrorist indicators. He also refers to 
the consequences of eliminating experiential knowledge (which the police need for tracking 
down terrorists). Another European study about the Netherlands shows that ethnic minorities 
often think they are being stopped because of their origins. Discrimination, whether perceived 
or not, is detrimental to trust in the police − who need that trust to carry out their work 
properly.6 
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In addition to these so-called ethnic profiles, there are other measures that can 
disproportionately affect certain ethnic groups, such as the power of the police to conduct 
preventive body searches. Under this measure everyone within a designated area can be 
searched, regardless of whether you are suspected of having committed a punishable 
offence.7 Here, too, there are strong doubts as to whether such actions contribute to public 
safety, while it is believed that people who look foreign are being searched with 
disproportionate frequency.8 While discrimination is often not a matter of purposeful action, 
stereotypical images are involved on an unconscious level.9 Exposing these mechanisms 
helps make detective work more effective. The discriminating effect of preventive searches in 
real-life situations − that is, the application of this authority − has never been investigated.10 
It is imperative that such a study be carried out for the sake of a safe and diverse society for 
all residents, and to determine in a broader sense whether the measures are effective in 
fighting criminality and what the side effects are. 
 
The data in this chapter are mainly concerned with discrimination between members of the 
public. Before considering discrimination in terms of the registered numbers, an overview is 
given of relevant laws and regulations and of the authorities that register discriminatory 
incidents. 
 
10.2 Laws and regulations  
Dutch discrimination legislation is influenced by the international legal systems of which the 
Netherlands is a part. For this reason, we provide below a brief explanation of the most 
relevant legal instruments. 
 
10.2.1 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) has applied to the Netherlands since 1972 and resulted in a few amendments to the 
Dutch Penal Code.11 The basic premise is that people are not to be hampered by 
discrimination in the way they function socially. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination supervises compliance with the CERD. In its most recent Concluding 
Observations, the Committee stated that the Dutch government is not doing well in fighting 
racial discrimination on a number of points. One point of criticism had to do with the ethnic 
registration of young people as cited above.12 
 
10.2.2 Criminal law: anti-discrimination restrictions  
The CERD forms the basis for anti-discrimination restrictions in most Western countries. In 
the Netherlands, new anti-discrimination articles were added to the Penal Code in the run-up 
to the ratification of this convention in 1971,13 followed by a few more amendments. A recent 
addition to the anti-discrimination restrictions is art. 137h (removal from one’s profession for 
discrimination). The article went into effect on 25 March 2010.14 A study of the application 
of this punishment for reasons other than discrimination (such as for fraud or sexual offences) 
indicates that the judiciary is reticent in applying it. In addition, there appears to be little 
enforcement of the professional disqualification,15 so what the article will contribute to the 
struggle against discrimination remains to be seen. 
 
In principle this study is concerned with discrimination on the grounds of race, which is 
explained in conformity with the broad definition provided in the first article of the CERD. It 
covers discrimination based on skin colour, place of origin, national or ethnic descent. One 
interesting feature is the relationship between the grounds of race and religion. In some 
situations in which there is evidence of discrimination, these grounds are interchangeable 
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because of their interrelatedness, an example being anti-Semitism. The anti-discrimination 
restriction on the grounds of religion can count on an increase of interest after the upcoming 
abolition of the blasphemy restriction (147 of the Penal Code).16 The other grounds fall 
outside the scope of this Monitor insofar as there is no ethnic component. Briefly 
summarised, the Dutch anti-discrimination restrictions are as follows: 
− article 90quater of the Penal Code is the definition of discrimination; 
− article 137c prohibits discriminatory defamation (except on the grounds of gender); 
− article 137d criminalises inciting hatred, discrimination or violence; 
− article 137e prohibits the distribution of discriminatory statement; 
− article 137f prohibits rendering support to discriminatory activities; 
− article 137g prohibits discrimination in the exercise of an office, a profession or a 
business, but only on the grounds of race; 
− article 137h allows for removal from a profession as an additional punishment for 
discrimination; 
− article 429quater is the misdemeanour variant of art. 137g (that is, without the required 
intent), but for more grounds than race alone. 
 
The full text of these anti-discrimination restrictions can be found in Appendix I. 
 
10.2.3 Criminal law: Discrimination Instruction  
Another piece of national legislation that needs to be be mentioned is the Discrimination 
Instruction.17 These are official instructions from the Board of Procurators-General, the 
purpose of which is to guarantee the quality of investigation and prosecution in cases of 
discrimination being dealt with by the police and the Public Prosecutor. In criminal law, 
discrimination occurs in two forms. One is the violation of the aforementioned anti-
discrimination articles. There are also ‘criminal offences aggravated by discriminatory 
behaviour’: violation of other articles of the Penal Code in which ‘underlying discriminatory 
factors’ are present. If, for example, a fire is started to protest the building of a mosque, or 
someone is assaulted on account of his origins, these offences are only registered as arson 
(art. 157 of the Penal Code) or assault (art. 300 of the Penal Code). This makes it difficult or 
impossible to trace the discriminatory aspect in the registration systems of the police and 
Public Prosecutor.18 The Instruction requires, among other things, that harsher penalties be 
imposed for these offences under general criminal law, but also that they be registered, 
naturally in addition to the registration of the anti-discrimination restrictions. 
The Instruction also requires that each police force have a portfolio holder for these cases at 
the strategic level (for making policy) and a discrimination liaison officer at the operational 
level (for implementing policy). The requirement that reports must be recorded is also 
included. The same holds true for the requirement that the report results in a criminal 
response − such as a summons, a transaction settlement or dismissal − unless the report does 
not refer to a punishable offence. The decision to regard the report as an informal notification 
should always be made in consultation with the Public Prosecution Service (OM). Mediation 
may only take place in exceptional cases. 
With regard to the OM, the Instruction specifies that the undesirability of discrimination be 
clearly demonstrated via the criminal law, in part by means of the media attention that cases 
of discrimination sometimes receive. The Instruction also stipulates that if there are 
indications of a discriminatory offence, a summons in principle should always be issued. 
Only in lighter cases can a transaction settlement first be offered. With regard to discretionary 
dismissals, restraint should always be exercised. 
Another section of the Instruction concerns consultative structures. It requires that the subject 
be put on the agenda of the tripartite consultation composed of the chief public prosecutor, 
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the mayor and the chief of police at least twice a year. It also devotes attention to the regional 
discrimination consultation (RDO), which takes place at least twice a year as well and is 
made up of the police, the public prosecutor’s office, the public administration (usually the 
municipality) and the anti-discrimination service (ADV). The RDO makes use of what is 
called a uniform case review: an Excel file in which all known cases of discrimination are 
entered along with their characteristics, the progress of the case and the way the case was 
settled. An investigation was carried out on the functioning of the RDOs, the results of which 
are expected in 2010.19 
The final responsibility for compliance with the Instruction is in the hands of the Public 
Prosecution Service, insofar as the action of the local public administration is not involved. In 
this study, the Instruction serves as a frame of reference for assessing the data. 
 
10.3 Registration 
The discrimination statistics have two defects, which are generally acknowledged. First is the 
incompleteness of the figures. In a survey of 24,000 individuals conducted by the 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), which is the human rights advisory organ for the 
European Union, it was demonstrated that perceived discrimination occurs with great 
frequency,20 especially among Muslims, and that more than three-quarters of all incidents are 
never reported.21 This seems to indicate that the vulnerable groups who experience a great 
deal of discrimination are less willing to report. 
The second defect is the fragmentation of the figures. In the Netherlands, discrimination is 
dealt with by both the Public Prosecutor and by the agencies listed below (there are others), 
some of which are exclusively active in the area of discrimination and to a greater or lesser 
degree are in contact with the police, the Public Prosecutor or both. Each has its own 
registration method. 
At least three international reports on the Netherlands that were issued in 2009 expressed 
concern about this situation.22 The third report contained two other salient points.23 The first 
point concerns the factors that contribute to the creation of a climate in which discrimination 
can take place. Discriminatory defamation in public (such as intolerant speech) is mentioned, 
as well as stereotyping and prejudice, but so is that fact that the government can exacerbate 
this situation by the use of ethnic profiles. An explicit reference is also made to intolerant 
speech that can make people feel that discrimination is socially acceptable. Intolerant speech 
is not the same as discrimination, but according to the report it can aggravate social tension 
and make the groups concerned feel unsafe or unprotected. The figures related to the 
discrimination experienced by these groups do not tell us everything, but they can be useful 
in an effective plan to tackle discrimination. 
 
10.3.1 Anti-discrimination services 
Anti-discrimination services, or ADVs, refers to the network of anti-discrimination agencies 
and municipal access points where discrimination can be reported. The ADVs, most of which 
are affiliated with the organisation Art. 1, deal with complaints and provide information and 
advice for the region. On the basis of their data the organisation Art. 1 compiles national 
figures.24 
A few comments about registration methods should be made at this point. Art 1 and the 
ADVs register discrimination on more grounds than those mentioned in the Penal Code. The 
agencies also receive complaints about situations that people have experienced as 
discriminatory. That is, these are subjective interpretations of a situation where there is no 
indication that discrimination has taken place according to the legal norms. Some complaints 
are redirected to the Equal Treatment Commission (CGB) or the police. 
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There is no complete and integrated file of all the figures from the many agencies that register 
discrimination.25 Not all the ADVs register the complaints they receive with the common 
system that has been in use since 2008. Work is being done to correct this as well as to reduce 
ambiguity by employing the same definitions, concepts and classifications. To this end an 
arrangement has been reached through the Ministry of the Interior that establishes a uniform 
registration form.26 This form has not been adequately brought into line with the registration 
method used by the police and the Public Prosecutor, so even if the ADVs make optimal use 
of it its added value will remain limited. There are also a few flaws, such as the absence of 
anti-Semitism as a category, lack of clarity with regard to breaking down the category of race 
into ethnicities, and whether information from the suspects is being registered. 
So in terms of professionalism and the creation of a national network this effort leaves much 
to be desired. It is important that it be improved, not only in order to comply with the 
requirements laid down in the national ADV network act but also because a well-functioning 
ADV is vital to the RDOs mentioned in section 10.2.  
 
10.3.2 Police: National Expertise Centre for Diversity  
The National Expertise Centre for Diversity (Landelijk Expertise Centrum Diversiteit; 
LECDiv) is the knowledge centre for the police and is part of the Police Academy.27 The 
centre deals with problems of diversity, and discrimination is only one of its constituent 
portfolios. As of 2010 the discrimination portfolio became an integral part of the LECD.28 
The centre provides the corps with advice and support. 
 
An important point of focus for the LECDiv, besides the challenges with regard to 
registration under the anti-discrimination articles, are the criminal offences aggravated by 
discriminatory behaviour. Despite a long-standing requirement − as contained in the 
Discrimination Instruction, for example − these incidents were rarely registered by the 
police, if at all, until the end of 2008. As a result, it was not possible to construct a 
comprehensive crime picture containing both kinds of registered incidents of discrimination. 
In 2008 registration improved when almost all the corps began making use of the ‘uniform 
case review’, and the first Criminal Discrimination Report (Poldis) was published in 2009.29 
 
This was followed in September 2010 by the second report, Poldis 2009.30 The improvements 
that were planned in response to the 2008 report had been delayed, and as a result the new 
report follows the same methodology as in 2008.31 A few improvements were made such as 
separate registration for anti-Semitism,32 since this form of discrimination can be both 
religious and ethnic. The next report will attempt to formulate clear research questions and a 
uniform national registration. This effort will be assisted by the Common Approach to 
Discrimination workgroup (Gezamenlijke Aanpak Discriminatie; GAD), in which the 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, the OM and the police, Art. 1, 
the Association of Netherlands Municipalities and the Equal Treatment Commission all 
participate.33 
 
Of the 2,212 incidents registered in 2009 (26 less than in 2008), discrimination on the 
grounds of race was the most frequently registered, although there is a decrease in the total 
number. In 2009, 761 incidents were registered, and in 2008 that was 898. Up until now, data 
collection has appeared vulnerable to regional shifts in interest and personnel. The police 
themselves have warned of an incomplete picture of discrimination based on these figures 
(which mainly reflect the priorities of the various corps and the methods of registration) and 
from the lack of willingness of people to report.34 
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In 2009 there was also substantial criticism of the new national computer system that the 
police use to register reports. In the policy response to Poldis it was remarked that the system 
‘has had a negative effect on registration’.35  
The so-called Basic Facility Enforcement programme (Basisvoorziening Handhaving; BVH) 
was supposed to bring about improvements in the area of discrimination, for example, by 
facilitating the registration of criminal offences aggravated by discriminatory behaviour. In 
the system as it now stands, the question about discriminatory behaviour is a required field. 
Before this such information had been optional, which does not help in the registration of an 
offence that is relatively infrequently reported. In an earlier report on the BVH, the IJsselland 
police region noted that because of all the red tape, police officers were more likely to ignore 
the administrative requirements in cases that had been dealt with.36 This influences the 
reliability of the figures for use in research and in making political decisions. According to 
the corps, the differences between planning and results as well as deviations from the trend in 
numbers of offences, clear-up rates and OM suspects are partly due to lack of familiarity with 
the new system. In the explanation to the annual report and the progress report, it is noted that 
problems with registration are taking place on a national scale.37 
 
Generally speaking, the appointment of a strategic portfolio holder, discrimination liaison 
officer and discrimination ‘task accent holders’ is going ahead for all the corps, but on the 
ground things are running less smoothly. Some corps lack the necessary know-how or ability 
to carry out the tasks that these functions require in the allotted time. This may change with 
the introduction of 200 trained task accent holders (at the district level) that was ordered by 
the Board of Chief Commissioners.38 In the policy response to Poldis 2009 there appeared to 
be increased tension regarding registration quality. The planned improvements for Poldis are 
being ‘accelerated’, and the use of the uniform case review is being stimulated. The Board of 
Chief Constables will report on the progress of the new BVH registration system at the end of 
2010. 
 
Despite the problems with the operating system, the corps have not been sitting idle. In 2009 
the Amsterdam-Amstelland corps issued the report Ongelijkwaardigheid en veiligheid 
(Inequality and safety). This theme was put on the agenda by the Board of Chief 
Commissioners, since it is not only a social risk but also a safety risk if one person’s dignity 
or freedom weighs more in the scale than that of someone else.39 The report mentions 
stumbling blocks such as unfamiliarity with the rules within the corps with regard to such 
matters as the requirement to register a report and the tendency to mediate in cases of 
discrimination, as well as the disobligingness on the part of the police due to prejudice and 
stereotypical thinking. 
 
10.3.3 The Public Prosecution Service: National Expertise Centre for Discrimination 
Since 1998 the Public Prosecution Service has had its own expertise centre: the National 
Expertise Centre for Discrimination (Landelijk Expertise Centrum Discriminatie; LECD).40 
As the name suggests, this knowledge point for the Public Prosecution Service is especially 
entrusted with the subject of discrimination. In each of the eleven regional public 
prosecutor’s offices there is a public prosecutor for discrimination who, because of the 
specialised character of the material, is responsible for settling cases of discrimination. An 
advocate general for discrimination works in each of the five public prosecutor’s offices at 
the courts of appeal. In the Board of Procurators General a procurator general is charged with 
the discrimination portfolio. The method used for registering discriminatory offences is 
described in section 10.5. 
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business (art. 137g of the Penal Code) was strikingly low in 2009. While in 2007 and 2008, 
this accounted for 25% and 33% respectively of the total number of persons arrested for 
discrimination, in 2009 it was only 19%. Although in 2008 an exceptionally large number of 
suspect were arrested on the grounds of this article, the drop in 2009 is also significant when 
compared with the years before 2008. This may indicate a decline in this form of 
discrimination, but it may also have to do with a problem of observation. 
 
 
 
Table 10.1 Number of suspects arrested for violation of anti-discrimination 
restrictions per article of the law in the period 2004-200942 
 
 
Article of the law 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  
 
137c      254   274   224   165   172  152 
137d     147   205   131   143     94    90 
137e       54     91     68     47     35    32 
137f         6     38     16     15       9      1 
137g       73     75   110     98   137    57   
 
Source: KLPD 
 
10.5 Statistics: Public Prosecution Service (OM)43
 
The figures on the OM’s approach to discrimination are made available by the LECD. The 
ways in which the offices of the public prosecutor register discriminatory offences largely 
determine the LECD’s operating procedure and options. In 2008, after a long delay, the OM 
began introducing the new GPS registration system.44 This system distinguishes between 
standard cases and customised cases. By December 2009, a little less than half the standard 
cases had been input in the new system, which meant that the plan to switch over completely 
to GPS by the end of 2009 was not realised. The customised cases, including discrimination, 
have not yet been entered into the GPS. A pilot project for inputting these cases was started in 
late 2009. It is now expected that it will be possible to issue the first discrimination figures 
with the GPS in 2013.45 Cases of discrimination are still being registered using the old 
system. COMPAS was the judicial data processing system that the OM previously used to 
register all information on inflow and settlement. 
 
The data in COMPAS are only accessible by region. For this reason, data from COMPAS are 
filtered out from the discriminatory offences for the LECD via the ICT department by 
searching for anti-discriminatory restrictions (arts. 137c-g and 429quater of the Penal Code). 
According to a study carried out in Amsterdam back in 2004, the absence of general criminal 
offences is not to be blamed on the system.46 Announcing the arrival of a new system has not 
changed this situation, however, even though the introduction of the GPS has been delayed 
several times. Once the new system is up and running, it is also supposed to provide insight 
into general criminal offences aggravated by discriminatory behaviour. Another improvement 
announced by the OM is that the GPS will have a greater data capacity than the old system. 
Part of the operating procedure is also being reversed. Before a case is input and assigned a 
public prosecutor’s office number, it is checked on the basis of intake criteria to make sure 
everything is in order. Otherwise it is sent back to the police. 
The new operating procedure and the new system have also taken their toll.47 The training of 
OM employees has meant diverting time normally spent on regular tasks. Thus fewer cases 
123
have been passed on to the courts.48 In addition to the delays there are also various risks that 
come with ‘going full digital’, such as digital privacy protection. 
 
Before moving on to the figures that were provided for 2009, an important closing comment 
should be made. The figures of the LECD, unlike those of the police, do not reflect the 
number of persons suspected of discrimination. The OM figures that are dealt with in this 
section concern discriminatory offences. One case may involve several offences, and these 
are registered separately.49
  
 
10.5.1 Inflow  
In 2009, an unusually small number of discriminatory offences were registered with the OM, 
as we see in table 10.2. Only in 2001 and 1999 did the number of offences drop just below 
200 (198 and 193 respectively).50 The 160 discriminatory offences for 2009 were well below 
that mark. There is only one possible explanation for this, and that is that according to the 
figures from the LECD the Rotterdam public prosecutor’s office registered considerably 
fewer reports of discrimination than in the two previous years. In 2008 there was a record 
number of 61 because of the cases against the National Alliance, a right-wing extremist 
organisation.51 In 2009 there were only 17 discriminatory offences.52 This means the 
Rotterdam region has returned to the low numbers of 2005 and 2006 (17 and 13 respectively). 
 
In addition to registering reports from the public and tracking down suspects, the police are 
supposed to send their official police reports on to the OM. Earlier Monitors mentioned the 
need for transparency concerning the inflow of discrimination to the police and the inflow (or 
referral) to the OM.53 The difference between the police figures and the OM figures was also 
considerable in 2009 (298 arrested suspects and 160 incoming discriminatory offences), 
although a decrease can also be seen in the KLPD figures. 
 
The figures in table 10.2 show a considerably smaller inflow for art. 137c and art. 137g of the 
Penal Code in 2009. Each article’s proportion of the whole has remained almost constant 
over the years, however. Approximately three-quarters of the discriminatory offences concern 
discriminatory defamation, while inciting hatred, discrimination and violence constitutes less 
than a fifth of all the discriminatory offences. The rest is fairly equally divided among the 
other anti-discrimination restrictions. 
 
 
 
Table 10.2 Inflow of discriminatory offences to the OM per article of the law 
  2005-2009 
 
 
Article of the law 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  
 
137c    166 187 166 168 119 
137d     46   18   27   24   26 
137e     10   25     7   19     8 
137f       2     1     0     1     0 
137g       9   10   16   15     7 
429quater      8     5     0     5     0 
Total   241 246 216 232 160 
 
Source: LECD 
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10.5.2 Settlement  
With such a low inflow, a drop in settlement figures is also to be expected. Just over 100 
fewer settled discriminatory offences in 2009 (194) than in 2008 is a considerable difference. 
Compared with the inflow, however, the results are not so drastic. The settlement rate of 
121% is comparable to that of 2008 (125%), when 291 offences were settled by the OM. 
Except for a few sudden drops, such as in 2007 (93%), settlements have been 20% higher 
than inflow for several years. There are a few explanations for this. Offences from earlier 
years might be settled a year later than their year of inflow. Finally, an offence can be settled 
with a dismissal against which a complaint is successfully submitted (art. 12 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure). In that case, the OM has to prosecute anyway and the case counts twice 
as settled. 
 
The relatively high number of summonses (71%) is positive. This is higher than the 59% of 
discriminatory offences for which summonses were served in 2008. Comparing the 
dismissals for discrimination (18%) with the dismissal rate for all punishable offences is also 
positive. This was 16% in 2008 as it was in 2009.54 The OM is hereby showing that over the 
years it has been acting in conformance with the Discrimination Instruction. 
 
 
 
Table 10.3 Types of settlement of discriminatory offences by the OM, 2005-2009 
 
    2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  
Summons   152 198 140 173 137 
Transaction settlement 35 62 29 48 20 
Conditional dismissal  4 4 4 3 3 
Dismissal   49 38 28 67 34 
Total    240 302 201 291 194 
 
Source: LECD 
 
Table 10.4 concerns settlement by the courts and is also an indication of the performance of 
the OM. After all, a summons is served in order to reach a conviction for a punishable 
offence, such as discrimination. One major difference between table 10.4 and table 10.3 
 
 
Table 10.4 Cases settled by the courts, 2005-2009 
 
     2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  
Conviction    131 153 89 114 135 
Acquittal    10 17 13 27 16 
Summons invalid   0 3 1 0 2 
Prosecution barred   0 0 0 0 1 
Discharge from further prosecution 0 0 0 0 0 
Conviction with the imposition 
 of penalty   1 4 1 0 0 
Referred to another forum  0 0 1 0 0 
Unknown    6 9 2 12 7 
Total     148 186 107 153 161 
 
Source: LECD 
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 (Types of settlement of discriminatory offences) is that table 10.3 shows the number of 
offences for which summonses were served by the OM. The table of cases settled by the 
courts concerns cases of discrimination (rather than offences). Like the OM, the courts do not 
always deal with all cases brought to them in the same year, which explains the difference in 
settlement with that of the OM. 
 
In recent years, the proportion of convictions for all offences has decreased slightly from 
94% in 2004 to 91% in 2008.55 It is not possible to deduce from the documents how many 
convictions there were for the cases brought by the OM in 2009 regarding discrimination. For 
cases of discrimination, this ‘success rate’ is usually a bit below average (still just above 
80%), with a dip in 2008 to 75%. In 2009 it rose again to its old level (84%). 
 
10.5.3 Factors behind discriminatory offences  
Section 10.5 describes the LECD’s general methodology. The figures in this section were 
obtained in another way. In addition to data from COMPAS, the LECD also gathers 
information via the Discrimination Registration Code (DRC), which is a uniform 
questionnaire sent to the regional public prosecutor’s offices that provides information on 
who is discriminating, who is being discriminated against and where. 
 
Why do we want to know what is being reported on discrimination to the police (and 
sometimes the OM)? It is in the public interest that an adequate system for the protection of 
minorities be implemented in order to guarantee a peaceful society. Besides guaranteeing 
specific standards for minorities, such a system also includes non-discrimination.56 Gaining a 
clear picture of the types of and grounds for discrimination helps the government perform this 
task, so that the rights of one person do not outweigh those of any other − at least not on the 
basis of irrelevant personal characteristics or grounds. 
 
Why do we want to know more about the suspects than just their names and addresses when a 
case is tried? Discrimination is not always easy to establish. A fight between a young man of 
Dutch ethnicity alone and a young man of both Dutch and Indonesian nationality takes on 
different connotations if it is known that the Indonesian youth is a member of a militant 
Islamic movement, the Dutch boy has White Power tattoos or that the fight had to do with an 
overdue group assignment at school. Knowing more about the suspect is therefore important 
so that discriminatory incidents that reach the police and the Public Prosecutor can be 
registered as precisely as possible and the response can be appropriate. In the case of suspects 
who discriminate repeatedly, the legal possibility to increase the severity of the sentence, 
which is already provided in the anti-discrimination restrictions, can thereby be employed 
more effectively. 
Discrimination is often expressed in forms that are different from those prohibited in the anti-
discrimination articles. Examples include the kind of violence described above, threats, arson 
and other criminal offences aggravated by discriminatory behaviour. Data about a suspect can 
help establish such discriminatory behaviour. Although it is not visible in the registration, 
information on people charged with criminal offences aggravated by discriminatory 
behaviour is important to the individual case. According to the Discrimination Instruction, 
the demanded punishment must then be increased in order to reflect the presence of 
discrimination as a special objectionable feature. 
 
Looking back at the Discrimination Registration Code (DRC) and the figures it produced for 
2009, the following sections have to do with who was discriminated against (the victims) and 
who did the discriminating (the suspects). 
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10.5.4 Grounds for discrimination  
The anti-discrimination restrictions in the Penal Code provide the grounds on which people 
may not be excluded or offensively addressed. Information on all six grounds is obtained 
using the DRC.57 The registry of the OM supplements this, however (as do the police in 
Poldis 2009). In addition to the legal grounds for discrimination, anti-Semitic incidents are 
also registered. When anti-Semitism is indicated, it is not always clear whether the 
discrimination is based on race or religion. A separate category in the registry obviates this 
indistinctness. 
Of all the grounds, discrimination on the grounds of race (51%) and anti-Semitism (35%) 
appear most frequently in the statistics. The figure of 7% for discrimination on the grounds of 
religion or personal beliefs follows in third place, which is a drop of 10% over 2008. Gender 
(0% for years, with the exception of 1% for 2008), disability (consistently 0%), and sexual 
orientation (a stable 4% since 2007) comprise hardly any incidents, as table 10.5 shows. 
 
 
 
Table 10.5 Grounds for discrimination, 2005-2009 
 
 
 2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
 
Race       46%   55%   67%   69%   51% 
Anti-Semitism     23%   33%   19%   17%   35% 
Religion/personal beliefs      6%     6%     7%   10%     7% 
Homosexual orientation     3%     2%     4%     4%     4% 
Gender       0%     0%     0%     1%     0% 
Disability       0%     0%     0%     0%     0% 
Other grounds    21%     0%     0%     0%     1% 
Unknown       1%     3%     1%     0%     2% 
Total    100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Source: LECD 
 
The first salient detail is the 18% drop from 2008 to 2009 for the grounds of race and the 
increase in the percentage of anti-Semitic discriminatory offences. One explanation for the 
latter may be the close connection between the grounds of anti-Semitism and international 
political developments, such as the Gaza war in the beginning of 2009.58 Another possibility 
is that people have discovered the route to the media and the police station. For many years, 
discrimination on the grounds of race has been the most frequently registered and rapidly 
growing problem in the fight against discrimination. This trend came to an end, at least 
partly, in 2009 (as did the figures of the police in Poldis 2009). 
 
In table 10.6, the grounds of race are broken down even further. At first glance, 
discrimination on the grounds of skin colour seems to have been registered with the same 
relative frequency as it was in 2008, and the registration of discrimination on the grounds of 
‘national or ethnic origins’ seems to have decreased. As in previous years, it is still unclear 
how this categorisation is done. In what category does discrimination against an Antillean 
woman belong, for example? Is she being discriminated against because of her gender, her 
skin colour or her national or ethnic origins? Or all three perhaps? If the various public 
prosecutor’s offices were to impose consistency in registration, the total picture of this form 
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of discrimination would be more reliable. Whether the public prosecutor’s offices are 
engaged in a consistent practice is not apparent from the figures, but the LECD intends to 
promote consistency through its activities. 
 
 
 
Table 10.6 Race as grounds for discrimination, 2005-2009 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
Skin colour     29%   27%   21%   22%   22% 
— Negroid    29%  17%  14%  11%  16% 
— Coloured (not negroid)     9%     6%  11%    5% 
— White        2%     0%    1%    1% 
National or ethnic origins   17%  28%   47%  47%  29% 
— Surinamese/Antilleans    3%    3%     5%    5%    2% 
— Turks/Moroccans   15%  11%   20%  26%  12% 
— Roma/Sinti       0%     0%    0%   1% 
— Ethnic minorities/ 
foreigners       9%   15%  13%  11% 
— Other national or ethnic   
origins        6%     6%    2%    2%     
Total      46%  55%   67%  69%  51% 
 
 
Source: LECD 
 
Nevertheless, it would clear things up considerably if the various minorities and population 
groups were listed in the sub-table to replace the current breakdown by skin colour and 
origins. This method would also eliminate the need to use the none too neutral term ‘negroid’ 
or to place Turks and Moroccans in the same group. It is also striking that in the figures of the 
OM there is a 14% drop for these two groups. In Poldis 2009, where discrimination against 
Moroccans and Turks is registered in separate categories, there is only a drop for the Turks. 
The number of registered incidents concerning the Moroccans increased by 17%.59 
 
10.5.5 Suspects  
Most of those suspected of discrimination are young men. Since 2005 there have been more 
suspects from other age groups, and the category ‘19 years and younger’ is no longer so 
strikingly overrepresented. We know that there is a general tendency to punish young people 
more quickly, but they also commit serious crimes less frequently.60 The overwhelming 
majority can be punished with an alternative settlement such as community rehabilitation. 
In 2009, 40% of the suspects were between 20 and 39 years of age, one-third were under the 
age of 19 and one-quarter were between 40 and 64. The percentage of male suspects 
fluctuates between 86% and 90%. 
 
Because of the small numbers it is difficult to recognise trends. Table 10.7 does indicate that 
discrimination based on political and religious convictions was registered somewhat more 
frequently in 2009 than in previous years, but five of the six are offences charged to Wilders. 
What is also striking is the drop in the number of white suspects and suspects with right-wing 
extremist sympathies. These numbers comprise non-racial violence or punishable offences 
other than the anti-discrimination restrictions. They are partly offset by the data as discussed 
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in chapter 2, ‘Racial and right-wing extremist violence in 2009.’ 
 
There are a growing number of suspects whose ethnic background is unknown. When 
combined with the categories ‘Other non-white private’, ‘Other’ and ‘Unknown’, this raises 
questions concerning the added value of these last two categories. As with the registration of 
grounds for discrimination, a transparent and consist registration method must be used to 
produce reliable data. 
 
 
 
Table 10.7 Suspects of discriminatory incidents, 2005-2009 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
Extreme right         30     51     26     24    13 
Religion/personal beliefs         0       0       1       1      6 
Political convictions          2       2       1       1      6 
By investigating officer         4       2       3       1      0 
Private individual, 
Surinamese/Antillean         2       1       2       4      1 
Private individual, 
Turkish/Moroccan         3       5     14      15    20 
Other non-white, private 
 individual          2       7       2        2      2 
White, private individual     185   144   152    178    88 
Private individuals (ethnic 
 background unknown)        8     17     14        5    18 
Other            3       8       1        0      2 
Unknown           2       9       0        1      6 
Total         241   246   216    232  160 
 
 
Source: LECD 
 
One closing remark that should be made about the suspects is that in 2009 not one 
investigating officer was suspected of discrimination. The police have their own complaints 
commissions where complaints of discrimination may be registered. May be, because most 
complaints are recorded under the heading ‘treatment’, which makes it almost impossible to 
tell whether the complaint has anything to do with discrimination.61 Insofar as the complaints 
are already published − and publication is compulsory − the decision taken about a complaint 
is not published. There is no central, national registration of the complaints being lodged, nor 
do the annual reports of the various police regions provide a definite answer. In short, it is 
quite difficult to obtain information on this point. Without further investigation it is 
impossible to determine whether complaints of discrimination on the part of investigating 
officers should instead be lodged with the police and OM rather than the complaints 
commissions. 
For several years a descending trend has already been spotted among the anti-discrimination 
agencies (ADVs), where no final judgement is made as to whether the complaint was 
justified or not. In 2008 and 2009 there were 198 and 282 complaints respectively. The lion’s 
share of the complaints concern the regional police corps.62 This suggests that people prefer 
approaching an ADV with complaints of discrimination by an investigating officer rather 
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than the police themselves. One possible explanation is that anyone with a complaint about 
the behaviour of an official from the criminal justice chain would be reluctant to report it to 
the same chain. Nevertheless, the improbably low number of investigating officials who are 
suspected of discrimination presents a problem with regard to the balance and transparency of 
these figures. This is all the more serious in light of the fact that special records are kept of 
the frequency with which police officers are the victims of discrimination − even though this 
is not grounds protected in the anti-discrimination articles.63 
 
10.6 Conclusion 
Results from the present research, and from the chapter in the Racial Discrimination Monitor 
of the same name, show that racial discrimination, including anti-Semitism, accounts for the 
lion’s share of the figures. The government’s response to the latter reflects its concern about 
the fragmentation of the figures and endorses the researchers’ warning about promulgating 
generalities.64 So it is surprising to see that this is exactly what the government does in its 
response to international criticism when it uses the same figures to deny that Dutch society is 
becoming more harsh. The police registration of discrimination is vulnerable to regional 
shifts in focus and personnel, but in Poldis the criminal offences aggravated by 
discriminatory behaviour are also reported. As for the OM, it is still not possible to generate 
statistics that contain both the anti-discrimination articles and criminal offences aggravated 
by discriminatory behaviour. The rollout of the GPS registration system was held in 2006, 
and it is expected to produce its first figures in 2013. 
Mindful of the problems facing registration that occur when new computer systems are 
introduced (GPS for the OM and BVH for the police), it is possible to point out a few general 
changes and trends. The number of suspects arrested for discrimination was 298 in 2009 and 
still 411 in 2008, while Poldis shows a smaller decrease by 26 incidents (2,212 in 2009 and 
2,238 in 2008). The OM reported an inflow of only 160 discriminatory offences in 2009 and 
194 settled (in 2008 that was 232 and 291 respectively). Comparison of these figures is 
difficult owing to the use of different registration methods, but they do show that the 
proportion based on racial grounds has dropped for the first time in a long time. 
When the grounds of race is broken down, it is striking that the OM figures show a decrease 
of 14% for Turks and Moroccans, who are registered in the same category. In Poldis 2009, 
where the discrimination against Moroccans and Turks is registered in separate categories, 
there is only a decrease for the Turks. The number of registered incidents involving 
Moroccans increased by 17%. 
Additional observations include the improbably low number of investigating officials 
suspected of discrimination and the fact that special records are kept of how frequently a 
police officer is a victim of discrimination − without this being grounds that are protected in 
the anti-discrimination articles. This method of registration is problematic with regard to the 
balance and transparency of the figures and the policy on which they are based. In the policy 
reaction to Poldis 2009, measures are mentioned for improving the quality of registration, but 
this imbalance is not among them. 
 
Criminal law and the corresponding policy regulations, along with the anti-discrimination 
restrictions, provide a formal answer to the question of when one can speak of discrimination. 
The next question is what to do with the gathered data. Registration is not a goal in itself; it is 
a means by which the instruments used to tackle this form of criminality are more effectively 
employed. Recognising the need for registration entails not only the effort involved in the 
registration itself but also the critical evaluation of the effort in terms of its effectiveness. 
This also requires looking at new and existing government regulations. 
The small number of reports of discrimination remains an area of concern, as it does in Poldis 
130
2009 and the government's reaction to it. One reason for the reduced willingness to report is 
the lack of trust in the usefulness of reporting and in the agencies that serve as reporting 
centres. Several international reports that are referred to in this chapter point out that 
members of minority groups are more frequently stopped − disproportionately more 
frequently − and asked for their identity cards, questioned and searched than native Dutch 
people. In addition, according to the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe, ethnic profiling is often applied to groups that are already frequently exposed to 
discrimination.65 This is disastrous for trust in the police and the government, which should 
be attempting to strike the right balance between the government’s two tasks: safety and 
protection of the rule of law. In addition to evaluating the effectiveness of the measures being 
taken, such as the use of the Young People at Risk Reference Index or preventive searches, 
attention should also be paid to the aforementioned effects.  
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11 Concluding Remarks 
 
Peter R. Rodrigues and Jaap van Donselaar  
The Racism & Extremism Monitor is a research-based collaborative project of the Anne 
Frank House and Leiden University. The aim of the Monitor is to investigate the various 
forms of racism and extremism − and responses to these phenomena − and to publish the 
results in periodical reports. This means looking at forms of expression and forms of 
exclusion. Different kinds of victims and perpetrators are also identified, involving either 
native Dutch or ethnic minorities. The response to racism and extremism can vary, in terms 
of kind − legal, administrative and political, for example − and in terms of actors − such as 
governmental authorities, media, politicians and civil society.  
The recurrent monitoring of racism and extremism, as well as the responses to these 
phenomena, serves a range of objectives. It seeks to contribute to the general understanding 
of the problem itself and to finding solutions to racism and extremism as social problems. 
The longitudinal research that is conducted, and the periodical reports ensuing from it, result 
in an accumulation of knowledge. A picture emerges of developments over the somewhat 
longer term. In addition to recurring themes, the Monitor project also deals with new subjects 
of research. 
 
In this eighth report of the Racism & Extremism Monitor, the following subjects are 
examined: 
− racial and right-wing extremist violence; 
− right-wing extremist groups; 
− the extreme right and the discriminatory quality of the PVV; 
− Islamic extremism in the Netherlands; 
− Islamic extremism in police practice; 
− anti-Semitism; 
− antiziganism; 
− the consequences of stigma; 
− anti-discrimination restrictions.  
 
This final chapter consists of two parts. The results and conclusions are presented in each of 
the separate chapters. In the first part of this chapter these will be repeated, not in extenso but 
briefly summarised. In the second part a few conclusions will be drawn based on these 
chapters that go a bit further than the individual reports. This analysis will concentrate on the 
fundamental tension between freedom of expression and the anti-discrimination restrictions. 
 
Racial and right-wing extremist violence in 2009  
The year 2009 had the lowest number of violent incidents (148) since the Monitor began its 
research in 1997. The explanation for this may have to do with the decrease in the number of 
right-wing extremist street activists as well as with the vanishing problem of the Lonsdale 
youth. In the period covered by this Monitor report, the decrease in violence against Muslims 
and Muslim targets is particularly striking. Two important comments should be made with 
regard to the violence figures: 1) in all probability the inventory on which our findings are 
based suffered from underreporting, i.e. the failure to report incidents to the police; and 2) 
recent survey studies show a trend of stabilisation rather than a decrease in violence. This 
makes it difficult to answer any questions regarding the scale of racial violence in the 
Netherlands in 2009. 
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Right-wing extremist groups  
Over the past Monitor period there was a decline in the importance of the classical extreme 
right. Support for street groups with a National Socialist orientation has shrunk and the 
number of right-wing extremist demonstrations has decreased. This was partly caused by 
internal conflicts within these groups and the failure to attract new followers. With the 
disappearance of the Lonsdale youth culture a potential source of new supporters dried up. In 
addition to this decline in followers there are also signs that a number of groups are 
undergoing a certain measure of ‘professionalisation’: group members are more careful and 
considered in the way they confront their opponents. There is also a stronger international 
orientation among some right-wing extremist groups. 
 
The extreme right and the discriminatory quality of the PVV  
The PVV can be seen as the new extreme right. The comments made by Wilders have not 
become less harsh over the past few years, and this designation is all the more applicable 
given the content of the PVV party platform. Wilders’s ideas also have an international 
appeal. The groups with which the PVV maintains contact were chosen on the basis of a 
similar view of Israel and the absence of anti-Semitism. The measure of radicalism is not a 
criterion. 
As the criminal proceedings against Wilders continue, earlier pronouncements by the 
European Court of Human Rights will be of importance. These state that while politicians 
may be allowed more freedom of expression, a national conviction may be sustained if there 
is evidence of inciting hatred and intolerance. 
 
Islamic extremism in the Netherlands  
Islamic extremism is a worldwide, socio-political movement whose most radical elements 
express themselves through terrorist actions. This extremism is based on Salafist jihadism, an 
ideology that is singularly characterised by mechanisms of exclusion. Important factors that 
have played a role in the development of Islamic extremism are the growing presence of the 
West in Islamic countries and the increased migration from Islamic to Western countries. 
There is also support for Islamic extremism in the Netherlands. The Islamic networks consist 
largely of young people. Some second-generation young people see Islamism as an 
alternative to the traditional values of their parents and the values of the secular society in 
which they must find their way. The search for identity has proven to be an important factor 
in the process of radicalisation. Another factor is social protest, prompted to no small degree 
by the experience of social discrimination and exclusion. 
The internet has made it much easier to gain access to extremist groups and their ideology 
over the past decade. This medium has enabled young people to construct their own versions 
of their faith and to make trans-border contacts. To illustrate the ideological components of 
extremist doctrine, an analysis was given of texts from now dismantled Dutch networks in 
which young people participated. 
 
Islamic extremism in police practice  
What exactly are we talking about when we say ‘Islamic extremism’, and what kinds of 
incidents have taken place? The incidents with which the police were confronted in 2009 can 
be broken down into threats, bomb scares, white powder letters, assaults, missing identity 
documents and possible indications of extremist violence. The research produced no clear 
indications of an actual attack and few definite cases of violence. What is clear is that in 2009 
there was a high level of perceived threats, which received intensive police attention. The 
vast majority of these threats could be identified as false alarms, so their connection with 
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Islamic extremism amounted to no more than a fear of such extremism. This does not mean 
that that the danger of Islamic extremism does not exist, the authors argue. Terrorism is a 
form of psychological warfare in which the whole point is to create fear. This effect is clearly 
reflected in the incidents of 2009. Despite all indications to the contrary, however, vigilance 
is in order.  
 
On gas chambers, Jewish Nazis and noses 
Anti-Semitism has a long history which reached its absolute low with the Holocaust. How 
has anti-Semitism developed in the Netherlands since then? An important factor influencing 
this development has been the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus the slogan encouraging the 
retroactive return of Jews to the gas chambers is often linked to the Palestinian Hamas: an 
expletive that is also used by football hooligans against Ajax football players. Causes can be 
found in the ‘blaming the victim’ paradox and the growing opposition to the dominance of 
the Holocaust in the Western world. There is also evidence of a fatal triangle consisting of 
anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel. The New Dutch play an important role in 
this. In today’s era of globalisation, the internet is an exceptionally effective instrument for 
spreading anti-Semitism, with cross-references to the most diverse groups and individuals. 
The conclusion is that anti-Semitism is multifunctional, since there’s something in it for 
everyone. 
 
Antiziganism  
In the Netherlands there is still little systematic knowledge available concerning the 
discrimination of Roma and Sinti. The arrival of people from states that have recently joined 
the European Union has resulted in new Roma coming to the Netherlands from Poland, 
Bulgaria and Romania and other countries. There is also a relatively large number of stateless 
people among the Roma, who usually congregate along the margins of society. To avoid the 
structural deprivation and marginalisation of these target groups, the government must be 
more thoroughly informed about them. Given the widespread prejudice against them, 
focusing only on problems with the Roma is not enough. Tackling the problems that the 
Roma themselves experience is at least as important a goal. In the search for solutions, Roma 
professionals and minority organisations should also be involved. 
 
The consequences of stigma  
Current government policy is based on the assumption that ethnic minorities stand the best 
chance of integrating into Dutch society if not too much attention is paid to differences in 
ethnic origins and people focus on their own personal identity and on the Dutch culture. 
However, the results of the research programme on the role of social identity in well-being, 
motivation and performance show that people have a psychological need for a positive social 
identity. Low status groups will only be motivated to achieve success in society when they 
feel that their social identity is positively valued. The conclusions of this study must not be 
seen as an appeal to solve the problems of the integration of minorities by means of 
‘coddling’ or ‘tea drinking’, however. 
 
Anti-discrimination restrictions and criminal prosecution in 2009 
Racial discrimination, including anti-Semitism, still accounts for the lion’s share of all forms 
of discrimination (51%). This is the upshot of an analysis of the available figures for the year 
2009. Despite the introduction of a new Public Prosecution Service registration system, it is 
still not possible to obtain figures on general criminal offences aggravated by discriminatory 
behaviour. In the meantime, the police have made these figures available in their Poldis 
reports. The small number of reports of discrimination being made to the police may suggest 
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a lack of trust in the usefulness of reporting or in the agencies that serve as reporting centres. 
The author urges the periodic evaluation of both the registration of discrimination and policy 
measures that can have discriminatory effects. 
 
The fundamental tension between freedom of expression and anti-
discrimination restrictions  
 
The ninth Monitor report offers a range of results that lend themselves to further 
consideration. Examples are the interchangeability of the role of victim and perpetrator and 
the changes in the right-wing extremist landscape. In our opinion, the most salient is the 
fundamental tension between the right to freedom of expression and anti-discrimination 
restrictions.  
 
The social and political debate on migrants is dominated by the feeling that many native 
Dutch people find this group a great nuisance and the idea that the unvarnished displeasure 
this causes should be publicly expressed. Usually an appeal to freedom of speech is made to 
legitimise any harsh criticism. The right to freedom of expression is fundamental, of course, 
and deserving of respect, but that does not mean the right is unrestricted. This is true of all 
rights and therefore also of human rights. In short, rights reach their limit when there is 
evidence of the abuse of rights or infringement on the rights of others. The adage ‘you can 
say what you want’ is therefore only partly true. The decisive factor is how you say it. If you 
speak the truth, you may still be committing a wrongful act if you say it in an unnecessarily 
offensive way. 
There are several statutory provisions that limit our right to freedom of expression. These 
include intellectual property rights but mainly they have to do with expression offences such 
as lese-majesty, defamation of character, threats, slander and libel. The restriction on 
discriminatory defamation in its present form is based on the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) of 1966. Since the adjustment of 
Dutch criminal law in 1971, discriminatory group defamation and inciting hatred, violence 
and discrimination have all been made punishable. In making this change, the lawmakers 
wanted to express the fact that defamation is already prohibited, and that society experiences 
discriminatory defamation as even more serious than that. The maximum punishment for 
defamation is three months, and for discriminatory defamation it is twelve months. 
 
It is conceivable that these norms are out-of-date and ought to be repealed. After all, the law 
is here to serve us and not the other way round. Yet when it comes to fundamental rights, it is 
important that we look beyond the limits of national law. In the case of discriminatory 
defamation and inciting hatred, the norms are based in the ICERD, a convention that was 
drawn up in part on account of the revived anti-Semitism in Europe after the Second World 
War. Is this norm on the wane? In 2008 the European Union (EU) drew up a Framework 
Decision for combating racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. Each contracting 
state is to make inciting hatred punishable, and the state may choose to impose this restriction 
only if the public order is being disturbed or if the expressions are threatening, offensive or 
defamatory. There is a strong feeling within the EU that discrimination should be combated, 
and to this end various directives against discrimination on the grounds of race (among 
others) have been adopted in addition to the Framework Decision. With these directives, in 
combination with the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, the safeguards against 
discrimination are firmly anchored. At the present time, European law also influences 
national law with regard to discrimination. 
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This anchoring of safeguards in the human rights conventions and in European law does not 
mean that the restrictive norms are anchored forever. The anti-discrimination restriction has 
been explicitly defined within the EU several times in recent years. Adopting EU law 
requires a fair amount of time and can only be realised with a majority of the member states. 
If the view is propagated that the prohibition of discriminatory defamation, or inciting hatred, 
is no longer a contemporary issue, then the legislative machinery of the EU should be set in 
motion. The courts can make a reasonable attempt to interpret laws according to the spirit of 
the times. 
Suspending a law, however, is the responsibility of the legislature, in this case the EU 
legislature: the Netherlands together with the other member states. The alteration of human 
rights conventions, such as the ICERD, is by no means a simple matter either, unless is it 
decided to revoke the convention entirely. By opting for the latter, the Netherlands would be 
withdrawing from international standards of decency that have been inspired by history and 
have been laid down in these conventions. The protection of values such as combating anti-
Semitism, of which Islamic extremists are guilty, would be abandoned. Restrictions on the 
freedom of expression have also been put in place to protect society against Islamic terrorism. 
Freedom of speech and anti-discrimination restrictions can only serve society by working 
hand-in-hand. If they fail to do so, the protection of values that are essential to society as a 
whole will be abandoned. Depending on the times, these two basic rights can fall out of 
balance. When that happens, the solution is not to discard the scales but to make the effort to 
find a new balance point. 
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Appendix I: Overview of anti-discrimination restrictions 
 
Article 90quarter  
Discrimination or discriminating shall be defined as any form of distinction, any exclusion, 
restriction or preference, the purpose or effect of which is to nullify or infringe upon the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise on an equal footing of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social or cultural fields or any other field of social life.  
 
Article 137c 
1. Any person who verbally or by means of written or pictorial material gives intentional 
public expression to views insulting to a group of persons on account of their race, religion or 
convictions, their heterosexual or homosexual preferences or their physical, psychological or 
mental disability, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year or to a fine 
of the third category.  
2. If the offence is committed by a person who does so professionally or habitually, or by two 
or more persons in alliance, he or they shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding two years or to a fine of the fourth category.  
 
Article 137d  
1. Any person who verbally or by means of written or pictorial material publicly incites 
hatred against or the discrimination of other persons, or commits acts of violence against the 
person or property of others on account of their race, religion, convictions, sex, heterosexual 
or homosexual preference or their physical, psychological or mental disability, shall be liable 
to a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year or to a fine of the third category.  
2. If the offence is committed by a person who does so professionally or habitually, or by two 
or more persons in alliance, he or they shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding two years or to a fine of the fourth category.  
 
Article 137e  
1. Any person who for reasons other than the provision of factual information:  
(1) makes public an utterance which he knows or can reasonably be expected to know is 
insulting to a group of persons on account of their race, religion or convictions or 
heterosexual or homosexual preference or their physical, psychological or mental disability, 
or which incites hatred against or the discrimination of other persons or violence against the 
person or property of others on account of their race, religion or convictions, sex, 
heterosexual or homosexual preference or their physical, psychological or mental disability;  
(2) conveys any object which he knows or can reasonably be expected to know contains such 
an utterance to someone, other than at that person’s request, or has the object in stock with 
the intention of distributing it or making it public; shall be liable to a term of imprisonment 
not exceeding six months or to a third-category fine.  
2. If the offence is committed by a person who does so professionally or habitually, or by two 
or more persons in alliance, he or they shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding one year or to a fine of the fourth category. 
 
Article 137f  
Any person who participates in, or provides financial or other material support for, activities 
aimed at discrimination against persons on account of their race, religion, convictions, sex or 
heterosexual or homosexual preference, or their physical, psychological or mental disability, 
shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding three months or to a second-category 
fine. 
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 Article 137g  
1. Any person who in the exercise of his office, profession or business,  
intentionally discriminates against persons on account of their race shall be liable  
to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months or a third-category fine.  
2. If the offence is committed by a person who does so professionally or habitually, or by two 
or more persons in alliance, he or they shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding one year or to a fine of the fourth category. 
 
Article 137h 
If the offender commits one of the punishable offences described in articles 131 through 134, 
137c through 137g and 147a as part of his professional activities, he is liable to being barred 
from the exercise of that profession. 
 
Article 429quater  
1. Any person who in the exercise of his office, profession or business discriminates against 
persons on account of their race, religion, convictions, sex or heterosexual or homosexual 
preference shall be liable to a term of detention not exceeding two months or a third-category 
fine.  
2. The same punishment shall be imposed on a person whose actions or negligence in his 
official capacity, profession or business, without reasonable grounds, are intended to or can 
have the effect of negating or infringing the acknowledgement, the enjoyment or the equal 
opportunity to exercise human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social or cultural spheres, or in other spheres of society, of persons with a physical, 
psychological or mental disability. 
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Appendix II List of abbreviations 
 
 
ADV Anti-discrimination services  
AEL Arab European League  
AFA Anti-Fascist Action  
AIVD General Intelligence and Security Service  
AWGB Equal Treatment Act 
BNP British National Party  
BVH Basic Facility Maintenance programme  
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear  
CBS Statistics Netherlands  
CERD Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination  
GCB Equal Treatment Commission  
CIDI Centre for Information and Documentation on Israel  
COMPAS Communication and Administration System of the Public Prosecution 
Service  
CTC Centre for Terrorism & Counterterrorism  
DRC Discrimination Registration Code  
DTN Terrorist threat in the Netherlands  
ECRI European Commission against Racism and Intolerance  
EDL English Defence League  
EU European Union  
FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs  
FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights  
GAD Common Approach to Discrimination  
GPS Integrated Criminal Law Processing System  
HKS Recognition Services System  
HR Supreme Court  
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
IPOL International Police Information 
ISPR Information Switchpoint Radicalisation  
IVOE Institute for Training and Education  
KLPD National Police Services Agency  
LECD National Expertise Centre for Discrimination of the Public Prosecution Service 
LECDiv National Expertise Centre for Diversity of the police 
LDD List Dedecker 
LJN National Case Law Number 
LPF List Pim Fortuyn 
MDI Discrimination on the Internet Reporting Centre 
MDTB With the Animals Against the Beasts 
NCTB National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
NJ Netherlands Case Law 
NJB Netherlands Legal Journal 
NJN National Youth Netherlands 
NSA National Socialist Action 
NSB Dutch National Socialist Movement (during the Second World War) 
NVU Netherlands People’s Union 
OCW Ministry of Education, Cultural Affairs and Science 
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OM Public Prosecution Service 
OSCW Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
OSI Open Society Institute 
PA Palestinian Authority 
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
PNR Passenger Name Record 
POLDIS Police review of discriminatory crime 
PVU Free Utrecht Party 
PVV Party for Freedom 
RAF Rote Armee Fraktion 
RB District court 
RDO Regional discrimination consultation 
RVF Racial Volunteer Force 
STB Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 
STCRT Government Gazette 
UN United Nations 
VIA Antillean Reference Index 
VIR Reference Index for At-Risk Youngsters 
VNG Association of Dutch Municipalities 
VROM Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 
WWI Ministry of Housing, Communities and Integration 
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